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Naturalism and the Problem of Normativity 
Michael-John Turp 
 
Abstract  
 
 
This dissertation explores the way in which normative facts create a problem for 
naturalist approaches to philosophy. How can lumpy scientific matter give rise to 
technicolour normativity?  How can normative facts show up in the world 
described from a scientific perspective?  In this context, I start by analysing 
Hume’s discussion of ’is’ and ‘ought’, Moore’s open question argument, and 
Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations. I then 
look at the nature of philosophical naturalism in detail, arguing that is 
fundamentally an epistemological commitment to the norms governing scientific 
publications. I consider the particular examples of Penelope Maddy’s approach 
to naturalising logic and the instrumentalist accounts of epistemic normativity 
favoured by advocates of naturalised epistemology.  I argue, however, that these 
approaches to naturalising normativity are unsuccessful.  In the second half of 
the dissertation, I develop a novel account of the nature of normative facts and 
explain how this relates to and resolves some of the difficulties raised in the first 
half. The account I defend has Kantian foundations and an Aristotelian 
superstructure.  I associate the right with the necessary preconditions for 
engaging in valuable activity and the good with the satisfaction of the 
constitutive ends of activities and practices.  I explain how my theory can 
account for epistemic normativity and defend a virtue-based theory of epistemic 
evaluation.  Finally, I argue against desire-based accounts of reasons and in 
favour of a role for the emotions in normative cognition.  The view I defend is 
intended to be compatible with our best scientific theories.  However, it is not 
naturalistic insofar as it is justified by distinctively philosophical methods and 
relies on extra-scientific considerations. 
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Introduction 
 
In this dissertation, I explore the sense in which normative facts pose a problem 
for naturalism.  How can lumpy scientific matter give rise to technicolour 
normativity?  How can normative facts show up in the world described from a 
scientific perspective?  These are vague worries and the first half of the 
dissertation attempts to make it clearer what they amount to.  In the second half, I 
argue for a particular account of the nature of normative facts and explain how 
this relates to and resolves some of the difficulties raised in the first half.  In 
successive chapters, I sketch an account of the metaphysics, epistemology and 
motivational force of normative properties, with a particular focus on epistemic 
normativity.  This is an ambitious project and, doubtless, the position I advocate 
is not right on every point.  Nevertheless, working through a plausible, 
constructive account of normative properties should throw light on the nature of 
normativity and help to make the problems and prospects of naturalism clearer. 
 
There is of course a long history of philosophers worrying about how to locate 
the normative in the scientifically given natural world.  In chapter one, I look at 
three influential discussions, namely Hume’s discussion of ’is’ and ‘ought’, 
Moore’s open question argument, and Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s 
rule-following considerations.  As well as advancing a partly novel view of 
Hume’s argument, I uncover structural similarities between the three sets of 
considerations and use them to refine my initial concerns.  The question becomes 
one of how naturalists might identify truth-makers for normative propositions.  
As these truth-makers have the special property of possessing normative force or 
authority, I propose the label of value-makers.  I restrict my discussion to realist, 
cognitivist approaches to normativity in anticipation of my later positive account. 
 
In chapters two and three, I look at the nature of naturalism in some detail.  
Whilst naturalism is very plausibly the dominant metaphilosophical position in 
contemporary analytic philosophy, it is used in various, sometimes mutually 
inconsistent, senses.  Most notably, we can distinguish ontological and 
epistemological varieties of naturalism.  In chapter two, I argue that the latter 
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variety is more fundamental.  Naturalism is best characterised as a commitment 
to the view that the natural sciences enjoy a uniquely privileged epistemic status.  
If the natural sciences are to have this preeminent role, however, we might well 
wonder what makes them unique.  This is closely related to the problem of 
demarcating science from non-science.  Of course, a commitment to 
epistemological naturalism places constraints on an answer to the demarcation 
problem.  In chapter three, I consider a number of possibilities.  Finally, I 
propose that we take refereed scientific articles as proxy indicators of scientific 
practice.  A study of norms governing scientific publication indicates that an 
impersonal, objectifying stance is typical of scientific practice. 
 
Having explained the problem of normativity in terms of value-makers, and 
characterised the naturalistic approach that leads to it, I shall be in a position to 
examine putative solutions.  In chapter four, I consider Penelope Maddy’s 
project of providing scientific foundations for logic.  In particular, I look at 
whether the kinds of facts that make up scientific explanations can be identical to 
value-makers.  I argue, however, that even if Maddy provides an explanation of 
our practices of logical inference, her account does not thereby contain the 
resources to justify those practices.  I consider whether logical psychologism 
fares better, and argue that although it is better than its reputation, it also fails. 
 
If scientific facts are not intrinsically normative, they may still have normative 
significance in virtue of their relational properties.  Thus, in chapter five, I 
consider the popular strategy of reducing normative reasons to pragmatic or 
instrumental reasons.  Here I focus on the well-developed literature on 
naturalised epistemology and engage with the work of Quine, Stich, Kornblith 
and Papineau.  I argue, however, that instrumentalism with respect to epistemic 
normativity faces critical difficulties and I highlight a number of implausible 
results stemming from a conflation of epistemic and pragmatic reasons. 
 
In the second half of the dissertation, I construct a positive account of the value-
makers for normative propositions.  Chapter six sets the agenda by looking at the 
relationships between certain key normative concepts.  In order to gain a handle 
on these concepts, I sketch a system of ethics for the relatively simple practice of 
  ix 
chess.  This involves distinguishing between the deontological and the 
evaluative.  I associate the former with the necessary preconditions for engaging 
in valuable activity and the latter with the satisfaction of the ends internal to 
practices.  The account I defend primarily draws on insights from the neo-
Aristotelian traditions of virtue ethics and epistemology, but also has certain 
Kantian themes. 
 
The last three chapters of the dissertation are concerned with developing this 
account of normativity and applying it beyond the relatively clearly defined and 
limited practice of chess.  In chapter seven, I return to the topic of epistemic 
normativity.  As well as providing an interesting case study, this allows me to 
pick up and resolve themes from my earlier discussion of instrumentalism.  On 
the evaluative side, I argue that truth, and truth alone, is the aim of belief and 
consequently the source of epistemic value.  I explain how this makes sense of 
our practices of epistemic evaluation, focussing on virtuous dispositions of 
thought.  As a potential challenge to my account, I consider a thought experiment 
suggested by Jason Stanley, which intuitively suggests that ascriptions of 
knowledge depend upon practical interests.  This gives me the opportunity to 
disentangle competing sources of normativity. 
 
In chapters eight and nine, I return to the idea that normative reasons not only 
justify our actions and beliefs, but also motivate them; when we are rational at 
least.  In chapter eight, I focus on the claim that desires must figure in any 
naturalistically acceptable account of normative force.  I consider the Humean 
claim that desires are necessary for motivation, but I argue that there is no 
compelling reason to accept this view.  I also argue that a desire-based theory of 
reasons leaves us with an unattractive anti-rationalism with respect to ends that is 
incompatible with our practices of evaluation and our moral development.  
 
Finally, chapter nine moves from epistemic normativity to the epistemology of 
normative properties.  Mackie famously argued against moral realism by 
suggesting that moral properties would have to be ontologically and 
epistemologically queer.  Having already provided an account of what normative 
properties are, I frame chapter nine in relation to the epistemological challenge.  
  x 
Firstly, I show how Mackie’s epistemological argument depends on assumptions 
concerning the nature of moral motivation.  I then argue that these concerns can 
be allayed once we understand the role of the emotions in moral epistemology.  
Drawing on psychological and neurological findings, as well as insights from the 
phenomenological tradition, I defend the position that cognitive content and felt 
motivation can come together when emotional experience has normative content 
as its intentional object. 
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Chapter One  
Hume, Moore and Kripke 
 
In this chapter, I look at three influential discussions of the troubled relationship 
between naturalism and normativity.  I begin with Hume’s discussion of ’is’ and 
‘ought’, before moving on to G. E. Moore’s open question argument (OQA) and 
its close relationship to Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s rule-following 
considerations.  In part, this is intended to serve as an historical introduction to 
the subject matter of the thesis.  The deeper agenda, however, is to uncover the 
nature of the difficulty philosophical naturalists face in attempting to account for 
the normative.  Consequently, I shall be more concerned with the problems 
raised than with their solutions at this stage.  I shall argue that Hume, Moore and 
Kripke/Wittgenstein each provide us with an alternative approach to essentially 
the same underlying problem.  Roughly, for now, we can formulate this as 
follows: ‘how, constrained by naturalistic commitments, can one identify those 
aspects of the world which serve as the truth-makers/truth conditions of 
normative propositions/assertions?’ 
1.1 Hume on ‘is’ and ‘ought’ 
 
Hume’s famous discussion of ‘is’ and ‘ought’ in Book III of the Treatise runs as 
follows: 
 
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always 
remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of 
reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations 
concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that 
instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no 
proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not.  This 
change is imperceptible; but it is, however, of the last consequence.  For as 
this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation of affirmation, ‘tis 
necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that 
a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this 
new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different 
from it.  But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume 
to recommend it to readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention 
wou’d subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the 
distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of 
objects, nor perceived by reason. (T III, 1, I, 469–70) 
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If there is a received view of this passage, it sees Hume as defending the logical 
principle that one cannot deductively derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’.  Following 
R. M. Hare (1952: 29), this principle is sometimes known as “Hume’s Law”.  
For example, Jesse Prinz (2007: 1) describes Hume as showing that ‘there is no 
way to deduce a statement that has prescriptive force (a statement that expresses 
an unconditional obligation) from statements that are purely descriptive’.  Again, 
William Casebeer describes Hume’s Law as stating that ‘it is impossible to 
deductively derive an “ought” statement from a set of premises that contain only 
“is” statements’ (2003: 128).  Any attempt to do so is to commit a logical fallacy, 
sometimes lumped together with Moore’s different putative error of reasoning 
under the label of the ‘naturalistic fallacy’.1 
 
Hume, then, is thought to have shown that there is an inferential gulf separating 
propositions concerning the way matters actually stand in the world and 
propositions concerning how they ought to stand.  Moreover, this is thought to be 
a matter of unimpeachable logic.  In this vein Charles Pigden writes: 
 
Hume … is appealing to the conservative character of deduction.  He is 
making a strictly logical point.  A valid inference preserves, but does not 
extend, the truth.  The conclusions are contained within the premises.  So, if 
'ought' does not appear among the premises of an alleged inference, but does 
figure in the conclusion (if, that is, it expresses a new relation or 
affirmation), then the inference must be invalid.  (1989: 130) 
 
Now, it is true that in the syllogistic logic with which Hume was familiar one 
cannot deduce an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’.  Syllogistic logic is conservative in the 
rough sense that the conclusion is already contained in the premises.  One only 
gets out of a syllogism what one has already put in.  So one cannot derive an 
‘ought’ from an ‘is’, any more than one can derive the term ‘almond’ from the 
term ‘avocado’.  If an ‘ought’ is derived from a set of premises containing only 
‘is’ statements, either a normative term has been smuggled in, for instance a 
thick moral concept, or the argument is an enthymeme with a suppressed 
normative premise.2                                                         
1 For instance, Åsa Wikforss (2001: 219) refers to ‘the famous “naturalistic fallacy” of trying to 
derive an “ought” from an “is”’. 
2 For instance, one might derive an obligation from a promise (see Searle 1964 for details of how 
this can be achieved).  The derivation depends however on the fact that promises already involve 
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Matters are more complicated if we turn to modern logic, which is not 
conservative in the same sense.  Here we should say that one cannot non-
vacuously derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’.  The following is a vacuous example 
employing the principle that everything follows from a contradiction: 
 
P1: It is raining and it is not raining. 
Therefore: You ought to carry an umbrella. 
 
Here is another vacuous example by way of the rule of Disjunction-Introduction: 
 
P1: London is the capital of England 
Therefore: Either London is the capital of England or one ought to kill the 
infidel.3 
 
There is, however, a clear intuitive sense that there is something wrong or 
uninteresting about these examples.  One reason for this is that the inferences 
would remain valid even if the normative conclusions were replaced with non-
normative conclusions.  The pattern of inference does not require a normative 
conclusion and so reveals nothing about normative propositions in particular.  It 
is clear, in any case, that the prospects of naturalising normativity are unlikely to 
turn on such considerations.  Moreover, it is clear that Hume did not have such 
examples in mind.  If Hume had been making a purely formal point, then it must 
have been within a syllogistic framework.  But, then, the claim that one cannot 
deduce an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ is a trivial thought, on a par with the claim that 
one cannot deduce the term ‘almond’ from the term ‘avocado’.  It would then be 
implausible that ‘this small attention wou’d subvert all the vulgar systems of 
morality’ or be of ‘the last consequence’.  Moreover, Hume himself describes the 
closely related idea that ‘reason alone can never give rise to any original idea’ as 
a ‘very obvious principle’ (T I, 3, XIV, 157).  This much suggests that we should 
                                                        
an entanglement of the descriptive and the evaluative.  A promise is a speech-act, which, if it is to 
be distinguished from a mere collection of sounds and gestures, is meaningful in virtue of the 
normative standards governing the background institution of promising. 
3 Both examples are adapted from Prior (1960).  See also Pigden (1989). 
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look elsewhere if we are to understand the significance of the passage in 
question. 
 
One reason commentators may have been misled into thinking that Hume is 
making a point concerning deductive validity is that Hume refers to the question 
of ‘how this new relation can be a deduction from others’ (T III, 1, I, 469, 
emphasis added).  We should notice, however, that ‘deduction’ in Hume’s sense 
is by no means the same as ‘deduction’ in our sense.  As Alasdair MacIntyre 
observes, the word ‘deduction’ appears rarely in Hume’s writings (1959: 460).  
Where Hume is clearly referring to what we would call ‘deduction’, his preferred 
term is ‘demonstration’.4  This is in keeping with standard eighteenth century 
usage, where ‘deduction’ and its cognates were used to mean ‘inference’ and its 
cognates, not ‘entailment’.  As MacIntyre writes, Hume ‘is not making a point 
about entailment – for he does not mention it’ (1959: 465). 
 
A deeper source of error, however, is the tendency to read the passage on ‘is’ and 
‘ought’ in isolation from Hume’s broader epistemology and philosophy of mind.  
For example, Pigden (1989: 129) describes the discussion as ‘Hume’s 
afterthought’, coming as it does at the end of a section devoted to the defence of 
what we would now call non-cognitivism.  Thus, he sees the passage as cut off 
from the body of Hume’s work.  Attempting to understand the discussion out of 
context is, however, a serious mistake.  In order to see this we need to look at 
Hume’s theory of reference, which will enable us, in turn, to understand what he 
in fact meant by ‘deduction’. 
 
According to Hume’s theory of reference, then, mental content resembles that 
which it represents and reasoning involves re-arranging mental content so that it 
can be seen to instantiate various relations.  Following Locke, in substance if not 
in nomenclature, Hume held that mental content is present in the form of either                                                         
4 This does not mean that Hume’s use of ‘demonstration’ is synonymous with our use of 
‘deduction’.  In particular, Hume uses ‘demonstration’ in such a way that the conclusion of a 
demonstrative argument is necessarily true.  For instance, Hume writes in the Abstract that 
‘wherever a demonstration takes place, the contrary is impossible and implies a contradiction’ (A 
650).  This might suggest that Hume limited his use of ‘demonstration’ to deductive arguments 
with necessarily true premises, such as mathematical proofs.  For detailed discussion see Owen 
(1999: 87–91). 
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impressions or ideas.  Impressions, Hume tells us, are ‘all our sensations, 
passions and emotions as they make their first appearance in the soul’ (T I, 1, I, 
1).  Ideas, on the other hand, are the materials upon which reason, or the 
‘imagination’, operates.  Today we might speak of sense data and concepts or 
thoughts respectively.  Central to the relationship between the two categories of 
perception is the so-called ‘Copy Principle’, according to which all of our ideas 
are copies of corresponding impressions (T I, 3, VII, 96).5  The relationship is 
causal.  An idea is caused by the corresponding impression, from which it 
derives its content.  Impressions, in turn, derive their content from whatever 
caused them.6 
 
Ideas are importantly different from the propositional content favoured by more 
recent theories of mind.  Although ideas can be propositional in the sense that 
they can be judgements or beliefs, they do not have the sort of propositional 
structure which would allow them to enter into inferential relations in the same 
manner as propositions.7  Instead of depending on the logical constants which 
make up the connective tissue of propositional logic, Humean reasoning involves 
the mind passing from one idea to another via ‘philosophical relations’ (T I, 1, V, 
14).8  There are seven philosophical relations, supposedly exhaustive.  These are 
resemblance, identity, space and time, quantity or number, quality or degree, 
contrariety, and cause and effect.  Philosophical relations are an ‘arbitrary union                                                         
5 More precisely, all of our simple ideas, ideas that are indivisible in thought, are copies of 
whichever simple impressions originally caused them.  Complex ideas with no correspondent 
impression, such as a unicorn or a golden mountain, can be constructed from simple ideas. 
6 For Hume, the cause of an impression is necessarily obscure: ‘As to those impressions, which 
arise from the senses, their ultimate cause is, in my opinion, perfectly inexplicable by human 
reason, and ‘twill always be impossible to decide with certainty, whether they arise immediately 
from the object, or are produc’d by the creative power of the mind, or are deriv’d from the author 
of our being’ (T 1, 3, V, 84).  Metaphysical investigation of ultimate causes violates Hume’s 
methodological strictures. 
7 Beliefs are distinguished from ideas in terms of their greater ‘force and vivacity’ (T I, 3, VII, 
96).  In this sense, beliefs are intermediate between impressions and ideas. 
8 The mind can also move from one idea to another via principles of association or ‘natural 
relations’.  According to Hume’s psychological theory of associationism, by which he set great 
store, there are precisely three ways in which the mind ‘is convey’d from one idea to another’ (T 
I, 1, IV, 11), namely resemblance, contiguity in space or time, and cause and effect.  Apparently 
inviting a comparison with Newton’s theory of gravitation, Hume describes association as ‘a kind 
of ATTRACTION, which in the mental world will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in 
the natural, and to shew itself in as many and as various forms’ (T I, 1, IV, 12–3).  Patterns of 
thought produced by association are structurally analogous to patterns of reasoning, but distinct 
insofar as they are psychologically determined (see T I, 3, VI, 92).  For instance, Hume invokes 
natural relations in order to account for the phenomenology of causal expectation, which cannot, 
he argues, be grounded in reason. 
  6 
of two ideas’ (T I, 1, V, 13) in the sense that any two ideas with which the mind 
is already stocked can be compared in the imagination via the intermediary of a 
philosophical relation.  However, there is no natural compulsion to reason from 
one to the other.  We reason from one idea to another when we judge that they 
stand to one another in a particular philosophical relation.  For Hume, unlike 
Descartes, this is always a fallible process. 
 
Although we are free to reconstruct his arguments in terms of premises, 
conclusions and formal validity, we can already see that this is not how Hume 
would have envisaged the inference from an ‘is’ to an ‘ought’.  Importantly, 
valid demonstrative reasoning depends on content, rather than form.9  As we 
have already mentioned, the content of an idea is causally derived from the 
corresponding impression.  Following from the Copy Principle, an idea 
resembles the impression that caused it.  Hence, if we consider visual 
impressions as the paradigm case, ideas are imagistic.10  Following Millgram, we 
might call Hume’s a ‘pictorial theory of content’ (2005: 220).  Demonstrative 
reasoning, then, requires memory to call up ideas and imagination to rearrange 
these images in our mind, place them in juxtaposition, and notice the 
philosophical relations which they bear to one another, either directly or through 
a chain of intermediate ideas.11  Thus, Harrison describes mathematical 
reasoning on the Humean model: 
 
Two and two are four – an a priori necessary truth, discoverable by reason 
– can be known to be true by comparing our idea of, say, two spots and 
another idea of two spots, and seeing that they must be equal in number to 
our idea of four spots.  (1976: viii) 
                                                         
9 See further Owen (1999: 3). 
10 There are, of course, ideas corresponding to impressions from non-visual modalities.  Owen 
suggests with some misgiving that we might think of Hume’s example of the idea of the taste of a 
pineapple as a ‘gustatory image of an impression of taste’ (1999: 73).  Although this usage tends 
to jar, committing us to non-visual images, it does at least help us keep in mind the fact of 
resemblance between impressions and ideas.  It seems easier to understand how an imagistic idea 
can resemble a visual impression than, say, how an idea of a taste resembles the corresponding 
impression.  Perhaps this is due to our greater facility at isolating, manipulating and 
simultaneously comparing visual images than smells, sounds, feels or tastes. 
11 ‘All kinds of reasoning consist in nothing but a comparison, and a discovery of those relations, 
either constant or inconstant, which two objects bear to each other’ (T I, 3, II, 73).  Although the 
‘objects’ Hume mentions can be either ideas or impressions, if both objects are impressions it is a 
case of perception rather than reasoning. 
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In this case, the relevant philosophical relation is quantity or number.12 
 
So, on this model of reasoning, inferring an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ would involve 
bringing to mind both the idea of a particular action and the idea of its 
appropriateness, and noticing how the two ideas are related.  The manner in 
which the two ideas are related will depend on their respective content, which 
will in turn depend on their origins.13  As the content of an idea derives from the 
content of the corresponding impression, Hume’s theory of reference also 
provides a method for identifying bogus or meaningless ideas: 
 
When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term is 
employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need to 
enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived?  And if it be 
impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion. (E 22; see 
also E 74, A 648–9) 
 
Whenever there is no corresponding impression, an idea is devoid of content.  
Or, more strictly, it is devoid of the content we previously took it to have.  For 
example, we naively take ourselves to have an idea of necessary connection.  
However, careful empirical investigation reveals that there is no impression from 
which this idea could derive its content.  Rather, we have numerous impressions 
of the regular conjunction of two events.  Hence, it turns out that our idea of 
necessary connection is actually an idea of constant conjunction.  Strictly, 
therefore, we have no idea of necessary connection, merely the appearance of 
one.14  This is perhaps a surprising result, entailing that empirical investigation 
can correct errors concerning the contents of our own minds.  More pertinently                                                         
12 Millgram (2005: 220) observes that ‘in Hume’s day the foremost deductive science was 
geometry, in which the reasoning was explicitly pictorial’.  An emphasis on geometric as 
opposed to algebraic proofs increases the intuitive appeal of an imagistic account of 
mathematical reasoning. 
13 Hume writes as follows: ’Tis impossible to reason justly, without understanding perfectly the 
idea concerning which we reason; and ‘tis impossible perfectly to understand any idea, without 
tracing it up to its origin, and examining that primary impression, from which it arises.  (T I, 3, II, 
74–5) 
14 Drawing a distinction between the appearance and reality of an idea is obviously not without 
difficulty.  It may be for this reason that Baillie (2000: 28) claims that Hume ‘[does not] deny 
that we have an idea of this necessary connection’.  Here, however, is what Hume actually writes: 
‘Every idea is copied from some preceding impression or sentiment; and where we cannot find 
any impression, we may be certain that there is no idea’ (E 78).  Again, ‘when we speak of a 
necessary connection betwixt objects, and suppose that this connection depends upon an efficacy 
or energy, with which any of these objects are endow’d; in all these expressions, so apply’d, we 
have really no distinct meaning, and make use only of common words, without any clear and 
determinate ideas’ (T I, 3, XIV, 162). 
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for present purposes, it shows that an idea ungrounded in an appropriate 
impression is without its apparent content.  As Humean reasoning relies on 
content rather than form, such an idea cannot moreover enter into inferential 
relations (or not those which we originally thought).  Hence, questions 
concerning the possibility of reasoning involving normative ideas essentially 
depend upon how and if the ideas are associated with impressions.  What, then, is 
the source of our normative ideas? 
 
It is here that Hume’s empiricism is significant.  It was Hume’s view that a 
tradition of speculative metaphysics, reasoning from uncertain first principles, 
had ‘drawn disgrace upon philosophy itself’ (T intro, xiii).  Impressed above all 
by Newton and the explanatory successes of the natural sciences, Hume sought 
to place philosophy on an equally sound scientific footing by introducing 
similarly strict methodological discipline.  This project is clearly indicated by the 
subtitle of the Treatise, ‘being an attempt to introduce the experimental method 
of reasoning into moral subjects’.  Hume writes: 
 
And tho’ we must endeavour to render all our principles as universal as 
possible, by tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and explaining all 
effects from the fewest and simplest causes, ‘tis still certain we cannot go 
beyond experience; and any hypothesis, that pretends to discover the 
ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at first to be rejected as 
presumptuous and chimerical.  (T, intro, xvii) 
 
The impressions that cause our normative ideas must therefore be located via 
experience.  The difficulty is that there is no clear candidate for an empirically 
discoverable property which resembles our idea of the appropriateness of an 
action distinct from the action itself: 
 
Take any action allow’d to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance.  Examine 
it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, 
which you call vice.  In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain 
passions, motives, volitions and thoughts.  There is no other matter of fact in 
the case.  The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object.  
(T III, 1, I; 468)15                                                         
15 There are clear parallels here with Hume’s discussion of ‘necessary connexion’ in the context 
of causation: ‘Here again I turn the object on all sides, in order to discover the nature of this 
necessary connexion, and find the impression, or impressions, from which its idea may be 
deriv’d.  When I cast my eye on the known qualities of objects, I immediately discover that the 
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Ideas derive their content from imagistic impressions, but there is no imagistic 
difference between the representation of an action and the representation of the 
appropriateness or inappropriateness of an action.  Millgram expresses this point 
clearly: 
 
The easiest way to see this is to imagine trying to use a picture of a state of 
affairs to represent the necessity or obligatoriness of that state of affairs by 
modifying the representational elements of the picture – perhaps by 
scrawling “Necessary” or “Obligatory” across the top.  The attempt is 
bound to fail: what one will get is not a picture of necessity, but a picture 
of, say, a landscape marred by peculiar skywriting.  (2005: 235) 
 
If, however, there is no difference between the two images, then there is no 
difference in content which would mark a distinction between normative and 
non-normative ideas.  The conclusion is that if our normative ideas have 
specifically normative content this must derive from some source other than our 
experience of the external world.16 
 
At this stage, one might be inclined to maintain that we do perceive normative 
properties in the world in addition to natural properties.  In order to pursue this 
line of argument one might object to Hume’s pared down phenomenology.  Isn’t 
it the case, one might ask, that we see an action as virtuous or vicious, that we 
are directly aware of the goodness or wickedness of an action and that this 
awareness is intrinsic to our phenomenological experience?  It is far from easy, 
however, to flesh out this intuitively attractive claim in a way that does not 
violate Hume’s methodological principles.  In particular, Hume is constrained by 
his account of the nature of perception, according to which ‘my senses convey to                                                         
relation of cause and effect depends not in the least on them.  When I consider their relations, I 
can find none but those of contiguity and succession’ (T I, 3, II, 77). 
16 Not only shall we fail to find normative properties by studying actions or states of affairs in 
themselves, but also, Hume argues, we shall fail if we consider the relations holding between 
them.  He employs the following argument: ‘Let us chuse any inanimate object, such as an oak or 
elm; and let us suppose, that by the dropping of its seed, it produces a sapling below it, which 
springing up by degrees, at last overtops and destroys the parent tree: I ask, if in this instance 
there be wanting any relation, which is discoverable in parricide or ingratitude?’ (T III, 1, I, 467).  
Our normative ideas cannot be grounded in a relation because two states of affairs can instantiate 
the same relations, but differ in terms of their normative properties.  One might argue that the 
relation holding between an oak and an acorn is quite different from that between human 
relatives insofar as the nature of the relation depends on the nature of the relata.  The challenge 
inherent in this line of response is either to specify the nature of the difference in non-normative 
terms, so as to avoid charges of circularity, or to show that the circularity is not vicious.  For a 
defence of the latter approach see Millgram (2005: 227–8). 
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me only the impression of colour’d points, dispos’d in a certain manner’ (T I, 2, 
III, 34).  Light does not seem to carry normative information and it is hard to see 
how other modalities, accounted for in mechanistic terms, would be better 
equipped to do so.  There is no obvious candidate for, say, the smell of goodness 
or the taste of evil.  An appeal to a suprasensible faculty of intuition obviously 
would not do for Hume.17 
 
Thus, Hume concludes that the external world, as revealed by empirical 
experience, affords us no impressions which could ground our normative ideas.  
Hence, the inference from ‘is’ to ‘ought’ cannot proceed if normative ideas are 
supposed to derive their content from corresponding external normative 
impressions.18  There are no such impressions and, so, normative ideas would be 
meaningless and unsuitable for entering into inferential relations.  Although the 
point, thus expressed, concerns meaning, we have seen that the root of the 
problem is epistemological, rather than logico-semantic in the modern sense.  
How, from a particular epistemic standpoint, subject to certain methodological 
restrictions, are we to locate the referent of normative properties or relations?  As 
Hume has a causal theory of reference and the investigation of causal relations 
apparently lies within the proper domain of the natural sciences, we might gloss 
the question as ‘how can science identify normative properties?’ 
                                                         
17 My central claim is of course that Hume’s problem of locating the referents of normative ideas 
stems from his naturalism.  However, it is interesting to note an alternative line of argument, 
according to which Hume’s problem might result from an insufficiently naturalistic approach.  
We can extract the argument from certain thoughts of John Dewey, starting from the idea that in 
scientific method ‘the vine of pendant theory is attached at both ends to the pillars of observed 
subject-matter’ (1929: 2a).  Hume’s model of the relationship between mind and world is of 
Newtonian inspiration.  Newtonian physics, grounded first in experience, developed in 
accordance with reason, returns to the second pillar of observed subject matter in experiment and 
confirmation.  Hume adopts Newton’s mechanistic model of the world and, in this light, develops 
his account of concept acquisition.  However, the vine is left swinging.  Rather than testing his 
model against experience, Hume interprets his experience in light of his theoretical commitments, 
with the arguably implausible result that his experience is claimed to be devoid of normative 
qualities.  Dewey might have been referring to Hume when he wrote, ‘The discoveries and 
methods of the physical science, the concepts of mass, space, motion, have been adopted 
wholesale in isolation by philosophers in such a way as to make dubious and even incredible the 
reality of the affections, purposes and enjoyments of concrete experience.’  (1929: 35)  Dewey, 
himself an empirical naturalist, does not deny the reality of the value in the world as revealed in 
experience. 
18 Notice how the two tines of Hume’s infamous fork are related in this line of argument.  It is 
because putative normative facts are not matters of fact that they cannot be inferred from non-
normative facts as relations of ideas. 
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Hume, of course, did not finally doubt the meaningfulness of moral discourse.  
Famously, he maintained that the source of our ideas of morality is available 
upon introspection: 
 
You never can find it [vice], till you turn your reflexion into your own 
breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards 
this action.  Here is a matter of fact; but ‘tis the object of feeling, not of 
reason.  It lies in yourself, not in the object.  So that when you pronounce 
any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the 
constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the 
contemplation of it.  (T III, 1, I; 468–9) 
 
A normative idea derives its content from the passions, from a ‘feeling or 
sentiment’.  In order to distinguish our normative ideas from our non-normative 
ideas, a further element is adjoined to the image, not a further image, but a 
feeling of approbation or disapprobation.  Hume calls the passions ‘secondary’ or 
‘reflective’ impressions, in order to illustrate that they arise in response to 
‘original’ impressions, either of the external world or of internal sensations (T II, 
1, I, 275).  Our passions resemble our ideas of virtue and vice insofar as they 
have a felt aspect of approbation or disapprobation and corresponding 
motivational force.19   
 
Although the object of approbation or disapprobation is the ultimate cause of the 
normative idea, it is not the source of its content.  The situation is analogous to 
the case in which our perception of one event constantly conjoined to another 
gives rise to the idea of necessary connection, the content of which, however, can 
neither be derived from the events considered in themselves nor form the relation 
between the two events.  Rather, we must ‘enlarge [our] view to comprehend 
several instances; where [we] find like objects always existing in like relations of 
contiguity and succession’ (T I, 3, XIV, 155).  This repetition gives rise to a new 
impression of ‘determination’, from which the content of his idea of necessary 
connection derives.  An important consequence is that our idea of necessary 
connection turns out not to be about its putative objects.  Similarly, our ideas of 
                                                        
19 The association between the passions and the affective elements of our moral psychology 
remains at the heart of contemporary arguments in favour of non-cognitivism.  Hume’s claim that 
‘reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will’ (T II, 3, III, 413) remains 
influential.  We shall return to this later in the chapter. 
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virtue and vice turn out not to be about their putative objects, although we have a 
natural tendency to project our normative ideas onto the external world. 
 
The content of our normative ideas, deriving from internal passions, is not, then, 
wholly pictorial and does not resemble its apparent object.  As the content of 
normative ideas is unlike the content of ideas derived from sensory impressions, 
we cannot reason from one to the other via philosophical relations.20  Although 
the normative idea arises in response to its apparent object (either directly in 
response to the impression, or in response to the subsequent idea), they are 
logically and psychologically independent.21  There is no necessary connection 
between any given impression and a feeling of approbation or disapprobation.  
This is the line of thought underpinning the following striking passage: 
 
‘Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to 
the scratching of my little finger.  ‘Tis not contrary to reason for me to 
chuse my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person 
wholly unknown to me.  ‘Tis as little contrary to reason to prefer even my 
own acknowledg’d lesser good to my greater, and to have a more ardent 
affection for the former than the latter.  (T II, 3, III, 415–6) 
 
I have now dealt at some length with the details of Hume’s theory of reference 
and his account of demonstrative reasoning.  This seemed necessary for several 
reasons.  First, there is the intrinsic value of a correct understanding of Hume’s 
discussion of ‘is’ and ‘ought’.  Second is the influence of Hume’s argument.  
Millgram claims that ‘today [Hume’s Law] is a philosophical near-truism, and 
the burden of proof is taken to rest squarely on the shoulders of its opponents’ 
(2005: 218).  If he exaggerates, it is not by much.  Hume’s discussion has, 
moreover, filtered out from academic philosophy and established itself as 
received wisdom across swathes of the natural and social sciences.  For example, 
we read the following in a recent Nature editorial:                                                         
20 Of the seven philosophical relations Hume considers only four, ‘resemblance, contrariety, 
degrees in quality, and proportions in quality and number’ (T III, 1, 1, 464, emphasis removed) as 
putative candidates.  Although Hume does not explicitly explain this constraint, it is 
straightforward to see what motivates it.  Hume holds identity to be more properly a matter of 
perception than of reasoning (T I, 3, II, 74), and cause and effect, and space and time are more 
properly associated with probabilistic reasoning concerning matters of fact; they hold between 
external objects rather than between an internal action (that of approbation or disapprobation – an 
‘ought’) and an external object (an ‘is’). 
21 As Hume subscribes to logical psychologism (T, intro, xv), this finally reduces to the same 
point. 
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It becomes particularly hard – and at the same time especially important – 
to resist the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ of inferring what ought to be from what 
is.  Science may be able to tell us why some values are more easily held 
than others.  But it cannot tell us whether taking the easy path in terms of 
which values we espouse is the right thing to do’ (2009: 763). 
 
No defence of the status of the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ as a fallacy is offered.  Nor, 
indeed, would any be expected by an educated readership.  If, however, such 
claims owe an implicit debt to Hume’s authority, it is of practical importance that 
we understand Hume’s argument correctly.  Third and most important for present 
purposes, a faulty understanding of Hume’s discussion blinds us to its proper 
significance.  Were Hume making a point concerning formal validity in the 
modern sense, we might be inclined to join Richard Joyce in saying ‘Who 
cares?’  (2006: 153).  This would be unfortunate as Hume’s argument, when it is 
properly understood, remains vital to concerns about the relationship between the 
natural and the normative.  It does so by providing a clear example of the manner 
in which an empirical stance can render the idea of realistically construed mind-
independent norms mysterious or, even, meaningless.  I shall return to this 
problem at the conclusion of the chapter.  First, I propose to turn to two further 
arguments, both of which can be plausibly interpreted as purporting to show the 
inadequacy of the natural facts to determine the truth of normative proposition.  
These are Moore’s OQA and the ‘sceptical paradox’ which Kripke finds in the 
writings of Wittgenstein.  I shall consider each in turn. 
 
1.2 Moore’s Open Question Argument 
 
Moore argued that any proposed definition of ‘good’ commits the ‘naturalistic 
fallacy’.22  Unfortunately, the label is peculiarly opaque insofar as the alleged 
error is neither a logical fallacy nor does it exclusively apply to naturalistic 
definitions of ‘good’. The naturalistic fallacy is intended to operate equally 
against ‘metaphysical’ definitions, asserting an identity between ‘good’ and                                                         
22 By ‘definition’, Moore means something like a real definition, identifying what goodness is 
with some other property, rather than a nominal definition.  Thus, he writes that ‘verbal questions 
are best left to the writers of dictionaries and other persons interested in literature; philosophy, as 
we shall see, has no concern with them’ (PE 2).  Note also that Moore does not object to 
definitions of ‘the good’, as opposed to ‘good’, if by defining ‘the good’ we mean establishing its 
extension.  This amounts to the claim that we are entitled to say ‘X is good’ only when using the 
‘is’ of predication, as opposed to the ‘is’ of identity.  
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some object existing in a ‘supersensible real world’ (PE 39).  Nevertheless, we 
shall see that Moore’s OQA does pose a challenge to naturalistic ethics.   
 
Before outlining the structure of the argument in its most familiar form, it is 
worth noting that, as with Hume’s discussion of ‘is’ and ‘ought’, the received 
view of Moore’s OQA cannot be supported by a close examination of the text.  
Although I spent considerable time unravelling the historical Hume’s line of 
argument, I shall not pursue the same course with respect to Moore.  Hume’s 
discussion turned out to be stronger and more interesting than its standard 
interpretation.  The reverse is true of Moore’s OQA.  As Moore himself later 
came to recognise, his presentation is muddled and fails in its aims (1932: 127).  
Not only is his central line of argument weak, but he also vacillates concerning 
the precise nature of the alleged fallacy.  Competing passages suggest any of the 
following interpretations: that to commit the naturalistic fallacy is (i) to define 
goodness, (ii) to assert of some property other than goodness that it is goodness, 
(iii) to deny that goodness is a simple property or (iv) to deny that goodness is 
non-natural.  Thomas Baldwin appropriately concludes that ‘Moore’s discussion 
is hopelessly confused on this matter’ (1990: 70).  Although these claims require 
substantiation, an excursion into detailed exegesis would tend to divert us from 
our main topic.  Moreover, the matter has been discussed perfectly well 
elsewhere.23  These brief comments, then, are merely by way of introducing the 
caveat that whilst I take Principia Ethica as my primary text, my aim is a rational 
reconstruction rather than an interpretation of the OQA.  I am more interested in 
the insight driving the OQA than in its faulty expression. 
 
As it is commonly understood, then, the OQA runs as follows (PE 15–6).  Take 
any proposed definition of ‘good’.  Moore borrows Russell’s example of ‘what 
we desire to desire’.  Next, consider some property A, which we judge to be 
good.  Now, frame the following questions: 
 
(1) A is good, but is it what we desire to desire? 
                                                         
23 See Baldwin (1990: 69–73). 
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(2) A is what we desire to desire, but is it good? 
 
Given the postulated synonymy between ‘good’ and ‘what we desire to desire’, 
the above questions should appear to be of the same sort as the following trivial 
questions: 
 
(3) A is something we desire to desire, but do we desire to desire it? 
 
(4) A is good, but is it good? 
 
It is evident, however, that (1) and (2) differ from (3) and (4).  Whilst we cannot 
answer (3) or (4) in the negative without conceptual confusion, (1) and (2) 
appear significant and undecided in advance.  Whilst (1) and (2) are open 
questions, (3) and (4) are closed.  Moore supposed this to show that ‘good’ 
cannot simply mean ‘what we desire to desire’: 
 
“That we should desire to desire A is good” is not merely equivalent to 
“That A should be good is good.”  It may indeed be true that what we desire 
to desire is always also good; perhaps, even the converse may be true: but it 
is very doubtful whether this is the case, and the mere fact that we 
understand very well what is meant by doubting it, shews clearly that we 
have two different notions before our minds.  (PE 16) 
 
Although one would have to proceed by enumeration, the argument appears to 
generalise against any definition.24  Moore concluded that the property of 
goodness must be simple, unanalysable, and non-natural. 
 
Whilst this compact argument has been widely discussed over the past century or 
so, it receives little contemporary support.  Briefly, Moore appears to have                                                         
24 Note, however, that there is reason to question the validity of this move.  Quite obviously, the 
handful of examples Moore actually considers constitute a slim basis for concluding that no 
natural property is coreferential with ‘good’.  This may suggest that the appeal to generalisation 
is motivated by some independent principle.  One possibility is the definist fallacy discussed 
below.  Sturgeon (2003: 536) raises a further objection.  He notes that there is one property which 
we can be perfectly certain is coreferential with ‘good’.  Trivially, ‘good’ is coreferential with 
itself.  So, Moore’s argument that ‘good’ is not coreferential with any natural property only goes 
through on the assumption that ‘good’ does not itself refer to a natural property.  In other words, 
the argument begs the question against the Cornell Realist view that goodness is a sui generis 
natural property.  This does not, however, show that the OQA is similarly question-begging with 
respect to reductive naturalistic proposals.  For we cannot be sure in advance that the proposed 
reduction will not be vulnerable to the OQA. 
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overlooked that asking is an opaque context.  In Fregean terms, even if ‘good’ 
and ‘what we desire to desire’ have different senses, they might, for all the 
argument shows, have the same reference.  For instance, one can ask whether the 
‘morning star’ is the ‘evening star’ without betraying a lack of conceptual or 
linguistic competence.  This is because ‘morning star’ and ‘evening star’ have 
different senses.  Empirical investigation, nevertheless, reveals them to have the 
same reference, i.e. Venus.  According to Kripke’s influential account this is, 
indeed, a necessary truth.  Moreover, identity statements apparently susceptible 
to the OQA, but in fact true, are not limited to the a posteriori.  One reason is 
conceptual difficulty.  The proposition ‘eiπ + 1 = 0’ is less likely to command 
universal assent than ‘0 = 0’.  Minor computational difficulty suffices; compare 
’992 = 9801’ with ‘9801 = 9801’.  And, if mathematical complexity can 
undermine introspective tests of identity, there is little reason to suppose that 
ethics is an easier case.  Thus, the OQA as it stands neither rules out a broadly 
naturalistic account of normativity, nor rules in a posteriori methodology as the 
only viable means of generating such an account. 
 
Before considering how the OQA can be strengthened, we should notice a further 
reason to be sceptical concerning its significance to the project of naturalising 
normativity, namely that it is unclear whether the OQA has any special relevance 
to the normative.  Thus, it is often observed that Moore’s OQA is not directed 
against definitions of moral terms such as ‘good’ in particular, but targets 
definitions of simple properties quite generally; colour properties such as 
‘yellow’, for instance.25  William Frankena argues that the naturalistic fallacy is 
but an instance of a more general ‘definist fallacy’: 
 
The definist fallacy is the process of confusing or identifying two 
properties, of defining one property by another, or of substituting one 
property for another.  Furthermore, the fallacy is always simply that two 
properties are treated as one, and it is irrelevant, if it be the case, that one 
of them is natural or non-ethical and the other non-natural or ethical.  One 
may commit the definist fallacy without infringing on the bifurcation of the 
ethical and the non-ethical, as when one identifies pleasantness and redness 
or rightness and goodness.  (1939: 471) 
                                                         
25 E.g. Joyce (2006: 148) and Bloomfield (2006: 172–3). 
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As Frankena observes, this fallacy merely expresses Bishop Butler’s maxim, 
quoted with approval by Moore opposite the title page of Principia Ethica, that 
‘everything is what it is, and not another thing’.26  If this is so, Moore’s 
naturalistic fallacy bears no special affinity to Hume’s problem, or to the central 
theme of the present thesis.  Furthermore, the definist fallacy threatens to turn 
into universal acid in the form of the paradox of analysis.  It then becomes 
difficult to resist the following view advanced by Darwall, Gibbard and Railton:  
 
To grant Moore all of the resources he deploys or assumes in his official 
presentation of the open question argument would suffice to bring the 
whole enterprise of conceptual analysis to a standstill and show nothing 
about Good in particular.  (1992: 3) 
 
Frankena’s interpretation might be correct, although it is difficult to reconcile 
with Moore’s insistence that there is something special about definitions of 
goodness, as opposed to other properties, which merits the label ‘naturalistic 
fallacy’.27  Certainly, passages can be found in Frankena’s defence.28  The case is 
difficult to adjudicate, for, as mentioned above, Moore equivocates concerning 
the precise nature of the fallacy.  In any case, our present concern is with the 
normative and it is here that the OQA appears most interesting, and, perhaps, 
most potent. 
 
Departing now from Moore’s text, let us consider the following question: ‘What 
accounts for the intuitive openness of putative identifications of normative 
properties with natural properties?’  It has struck a number of philosophers that                                                         
26 See also PE 206. 
27 I have in mind the following passage: ‘When a man confuses two natural objects with one 
another, defining the one by the other, if for instance, he confuses himself, who is one natural 
object, with “pleased” or with “pleasure” which are others, then there is no reason to call the 
fallacy naturalistic.  But if he confuses “good,” which is not in the same sense a natural object, 
with any natural object whatever, then there is a reason for calling that a naturalistic fallacy; its 
being made with respect to “good” marks it as something quite specific, and this specific mistake 
deserves a name because it is so common’ (PE 13).  The difficulty is that Moore never explains 
why it is that good marks out something quite specific.  My following discussion is, in part, an 
attempt to fill this lacuna. 
28 For example, Moore concludes the chapter entitled ‘Naturalistic Ethics’ as follows: ‘In this 
chapter I have begun the criticism of certain ethical views, which seem to owe their influence 
mainly to the naturalistic fallacy – the fallacy which consists in identifying the simple notion 
which we mean by ‘good’ with some other notion’ (PE 58).  Against this interpretation, however, 
we should note that Moore himself goes on to define beauty: ‘it appears probable that the 
beautiful should be defined as that of which the admiring contemplation is good in itself’ (PE 
201).  It is difficult to see how Moore can be rendered consistent on this point. 
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the best candidate explanation is the fact that normative ideas motivate us to 
act.29  For instance, Darwall, Gibbard and Railton write: 
 
Attributions of goodness appear to have a conceptual link with the 
guidance of action, a link exploited whenever we gloss the open question 
“Is P really good?” as “Is it clear that, other things equal, we really ought 
to, or must, devote ourselves to bringing about P?”  (1992: 4) 
 
As we saw above, it is the fact of the intimate connection between normative 
ideas and motivation that Hume relied upon in order to distinguish our ideas of 
objects from our normative ideas, which we naively take to be about those 
objects.  Judging that some action or state of affairs is morally right obligates us 
and, minimally, typically motivates the virtuous among us to act accordingly.  
Judging that some action or state of affairs instantiates certain natural properties, 
however, is compatible with indifference. This was Hume’s point in maintaining 
that ‘‘Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to 
the scratching of my little finger’ (T II, 3, III, 415). 
 
Although the OQA is directed in the first place against the moral property of 
goodness, the argument applies mutatis mutandis to other normative properties, 
moral and non-moral, insofar as normative properties are associated with 
motivation to act (and, more controversially, to believe).  Perhaps the most 
popular view is that the recognition of goodness causes, or is otherwise 
associated with, an affective mental state such as a desire, which necessarily 
motivates.  It is this line of thought, which, contrary to Moore’s intentions, led to 
non-cognitivism as the dominant line of response to the OQA in the twentieth 
century.  However, we have no current need to make this assumption or to take 
sides in the ongoing debates concerning internalism.  Let us instead label the 
motivational aspect ‘normative force’, leaving aside its nature and origins for the 
present.  We reach the conclusion, then, that it is the normative force associated                                                         
29 E.g. Hare (1952: 30), Baldwin (1990: 89–90), Darwall, Gibbard and Railton (1992: 4–5), 
Jackson (1998: 153) and Bloomfield (2006: 170).  Blackburn sums of the idea as follows: ‘The 
reason expressivism in ethics has to be correct is that if we supposed that belief, denial, and so on 
were simply discussions of a way the world is, we would still face the open question.  Even if 
that belief were settled, there would still be issues of what importance to give it, what to do, and 
all the rest.  For we have no conception of a “truth condition” or fact of which mere apprehension 
by itself determines practical issues.  For any fact, there is the question of what to do about it.  
But evaluative discussion just is discussion of what to do about things’  (1998: 70). 
  19 
with the idea of goodness which keeps open questions open.  Complete 
confidence in identifying goodness with some natural property is precluded by 
the fact that we can reasonably question whether knowledge of the natural 
property’s instantiation suitably motivates us. 
 
Before moving on to look at the rule-following considerations, it is worth 
emphasising a further similarity between Moore and Hume.  The likeness 
emerges most clearly when Moore recasts his argument in primarily 
metaphysical terms: 
 
Immensely the commonest type of truth, then, is one which asserts a 
relation between two existing things.  Ethical truths are immediately felt 
not to conform to this type, and the naturalistic fallacy arises from the 
attempt to make out that, in some roundabout way, they do conform to it.  
It is immediately obvious that when we see a thing to be good, its goodness 
is not a property which we can take up in our hands, or separate from it 
even by the most delicate scientific instruments, and transfer to something 
else.  (PE 124) 
 
Later, in summing up this discussion, Moore writes that ‘here, then, we have the 
root of the naturalistic fallacy’ (PE 125).  The project of naturalising normativity 
involves asserting an identity relation between some natural object and some 
normative property.  Natural objects are those objects which, in the first place, 
we can ‘take up in our hands’, or the properties of such objects as can be detected 
by scientific instruments.  Although tangibility is a rough and ready criterion, the 
thought seems to follow from Moore’s view of the natural as that which exists in 
time (PE 40).30  The property of goodness, by contrast, does not appear to be the 
sort of property which can be handled or probed with scientific instruments. 
Scientific methodology is, therefore, inadequate to the task of providing 
knowledge of normative properties such as goodness.  Thus, Moore argues, we                                                         
30 Moore is commonly represented as endorsing a methodological account of the natural (e.g. 
Miller 2003), writing that ‘by “nature” then, I do mean and have meant that which is the subject-
matter of the natural sciences and also of psychology’ (PE 40).  However, he also writes: ‘If we 
consider whether any object is of such a nature that it may be said to exist now, to have existed, 
or to be about to exist, then we may know that that object is a natural object, and that nothing, of 
which this is not true, is a natural object’ (PE 40).  This suggests that Moore’s understanding of 
the natural is more properly metaphysical than methodological.  The natural is that which exists 
in time, this metaphysical property determining the scope of the natural sciences (and 
psychology).  Hume’s naturalism, as we saw above, amounts to methodological strictures.  
Constrained in this way, he holds aloof from metaphysical speculation concerning the causes of 
our impressions.  I shall spend considerable time analysing these two types of naturalism in the 
next chapter. 
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must rely on the cognitive faculty of intuition.  The argument reconstructed in 
this way returns us to the Humean scientific investigator surveying the world, 
discerning facts but no values, and concluding that the two cannot be identical. 
 
1.3 The Rule-Following Considerations 
 
The ‘sceptical paradox’ that Kripke (1982) found in the writings of Wittgenstein 
arises from the following line of argument.31  Suppose that we come to calculate 
the sum ’68 + 57’ for the first time.  Let us suppose that we have previously 
added only smaller numbers.32  Given a correct understanding of ‘+’, we should 
of course answer that ‘68 + 57 = 125’.  Kripke, however, looks to shake our 
confidence by confronting us with a Wittgensteinian challenger: 
Perhaps, he suggests, as I used the term ‘plus’ in the past, the answer I 
intended for ’68 + 57’ should have been ‘5’!  …  After all, he says, if I am 
now so confident that, as I used the symbol ‘+’, my intention was that ’68 
+ 57’ should turn out to denote 125, this cannot be because I explicitly 
gave myself instructions that 125 is the result of performing the addition in 
this particular instance.  By hypothesis, I did no such thing.  But, of 
course, the idea is that, in this new instance, I should apply the very same 
function or rule that I applied so many times in the past.  But who is to say 
what function this was?  In the past I gave myself only a finite number of 
examples instantiating this function.  All, we have supposed, involved 
numbers smaller than 57.  So perhaps in the past I used ‘plus’ and ‘+’ to 
denote a function which I will call ‘quus’ and symbolize by ‘⊕’.  It is 
defined by 
 
   x ⊕ y = x + y, if x, y < 57 
                                        = 5 otherwise 
                                                          
31 There is considerable scope for debate as to whether, or to what extent, Kripke’s Wittgenstein 
(KW) corresponds to the historical Wittgenstein.  Colin McGinn, for example, maintains that 
‘what Kripke has done is to produce an impressive and challenging argument which bears little 
affinity with Wittgenstein’s own problems and claims: in an important sense Kripke and the real 
Wittgenstein are not even dealing with the same issues’ (1984: 60).  Other philosophers who 
doubt that Kripke has the correct interpretation of Wittgenstein include Blackburn ([1984) 2002) 
and McDowell ([1984] 2002).  One reason for concern is that an acceptance of the ‘sceptical 
paradox’ is difficult to reconcile with Wittgenstein’s professed ‘quietism’.  Martin Kusch, by 
contrast, argues that ‘Kripke’s interpretation of the sections on rule-following in PI and the 
Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics is, by and large, on target’ (2006: 237).  The matter 
is complicated further as Kripke disassociates himself from the arguments he presents, ‘with few 
exceptions’ (1982: 5).  For present purposes, I am officially content to attribute the arguments to 
the fictional character KW.  In practice, this means that I shall take Kripke (1982) as my primary 
text, referring to Wittgenstein only in order to clarify or magnify certain aspects of the argument. 
32 In fact, insisting that one has not previously performed the addition is unnecessary, although 
helpful to get the paradox off the ground.  For as Wittgenstein observes in Remarks on the 
Foundations of Mathematics, ‘If I know it in advance, what use is this knowledge to me later on?  
I mean: how do I know what to do with this earlier knowledge when the step is actually taken?”  
(1978: 1–3; see also Kripke 1982: 52n). 
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Who is to say that this is not the function I previously meant by ‘+’?  
(1982: 8-9) 
 
The sceptical challenge is to cite some fact or facts that suffice to show that we 
previously meant addition rather than quaddition.  Moreover, the facts we cite 
must enable us to read off what constitutes correct and incorrect usage of ‘+’.  It 
is not enough, that is, to show that we actually use ‘+’ in a particular way.  We 
must also show why we ought to use ‘+’ in the way we do.  Only then will the 
sceptic be satisfied that we are justified in responding ‘125’, not merely 
employing signs arbitrarily.  The sceptic argues that this challenge cannot be 
met, and so there is no fact of the matter in virtue of which sentences such as 
‘Jones meant addition by “+”’ are true.  Furthermore, the arguments leading to 
scepticism concerning the meaning of ‘+’ can be directed towards meanings 
quite generally, with the disturbing result of meaning nihilism.  As Kripke writes, 
‘the entire idea of meaning vanishes into thin air’ (1982: 22). 
 
The sceptic’s challenge is notoriously hard to meet.  It does no good to observe 
that our present behaviour is consistent with our past behaviour, as our past 
behaviour underdetermines the function denoted.  Our previous behaviour has 
been equally consistent with quaddition and addition.33  If we say that all along 
we have been following a general rule of addition, rather than relying on a finite 
stock of previous uses, the sceptic can respond that whatever words or symbols 
we use in order to express our commitment to the ‘+’ rule, rather than the ‘⊕’ 
rule, are equally open to deviant interpretations.  For example, if the ‘+’ rule 
included the word ‘count’, might not ‘count’ really have meant ‘quount’?34  The 
general problem is that a rule does not determine its own use.  It has no intrinsic 
normative force such that when faced with (the symbols representing) a rule we 
are obliged to apply it one way rather than another. 
 
For this reason we might be inclined to suppose that the normative force of a rule 
derives from reasons external to it.  Although, we might admit, there is nothing 
intrinsic to a rule forbidding deviant or non-standard uses, might there not be                                                         
33 There are evident parallels here with Hume’s problem of induction and Nelson Goodman’s 
(1955) ‘new riddle of induction’, the ‘grue’ paradox.  See further Kripke (1982: 58–9; 107–8). 
34 See Kripke (1982: 16). 
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some outside guidance, some ‘infinitely long rails’ which ‘correspond to the 
unlimited application of a rule’ (PI §218)?  Wittgenstein denies this: 
 
How can we know how he is to continue a pattern by himself – whatever 
instruction you give him? – Well, how do I know? – If that means “Have I 
reasons?” the answer is: my reasons will soon give out.  And then I shall 
act, without reasons.  (PI §211) 
 
An appeal to external guidance fails because justifications must end somewhere 
and we are then confronted with the same difficulties.  Moreover, the 
phenomenology of rule-following fails to support the idea that one looks outside 
the rule itself to determine its correct application: ‘we look to the rule for 
instruction and do something, without appealing to anything else for guidance’ 
(PI §228).  In any case, it would be hopeless to seek guidance from other rules or 
reasons, since these too are lifeless signs open to many and varied 
interpretations.35  Unless we strike bedrock, we are pulled into a hopeless 
sceptical regress. 
 
A different kind of response to the sceptic, and the one which has attracted most 
subsequent critical interest, involves an appeal to dispositions.36  Although there 
was no past time at which we actually added 68 and 57, had we been asked to do 
so we would have answered 125.  The fact that we were previously disposed to 
add not quadd is the fact which answers the sceptical challenge.  As Wittgenstein 
has one of his interlocutors say, ‘If I had have been asked what number should be 
written after 1000, I should have replied “1002”’ (PI §187).  The primary 
difficulty with this line of response is that it seems poorly equipped to handle the 
normativity of meaning.37  Kripke states the problem: 
                                                         
35 See further McGinn 1984: 18-24. 
36 Most commentators discuss dispositions at some point.  Kripke’s discussion comes at pp. 22–
37.  In defence of a dispositionalist account see Forbes (1984).  See also Boghossian ([1989] 
2002: 164–71), Martin and Heil (1998) and Kusch (2006: Ch. 3). 
37 A further issue raised by Kripke is the disparity between the infinite number of sums and the 
finite number of my dispositions, casting doubt on whether my dispositions could suffice to 
determine my meaning addition rather than quaddition (1982: 26–7).  However, as Blackburn 
([1984] 2002: 35) argues, it is far from clear whether dispositions are finite or infinite: ‘The 
brittleness of a glass is a respectable dispositional property.  But there is an infinite number of 
times and places and strikings and surfaces on which it could be displayed.’  Moreover, it seems 
that the issue of finitude applies not only to the individual, but also to the community at large (see 
Blackburn [1984] 2002: 37).  This threatens Kripke’s own ‘sceptical solution’.  See also Forbes 
([1984] 2002: 24–6). 
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A candidate for what constitutes my meaning one function, rather than 
another, by a given function sign, ought to be such that, whatever in fact I 
(am disposed to) do, there is a unique thing that I should do.  (1982: 24) 
   
For a sign to be meaningful, it must be governed by certain normative standards, 
say rules, which determine correct or incorrect usage.38  However, as McDowell 
sums up the problem, ‘a disposition is not something to which its exercises are 
faithful’ ([1984] 2002: 50).  One way to put the matter is to observe that in order 
to be governed by a rule it is not sufficient for one to be disposed to conform to 
it.  Rather, one must follow the rule, where following a rule is a matter of 
conforming to it for the right reasons or in the right way.  Of course, providing a 
satisfactory account of what constitutes the ‘right’ reasons or the ‘right way’ is 
no easy matter.  Roughly speaking, however, we might say that it is a matter of 
acting in accordance with a rule because of the rule, for the sake of the rule, or, 
as Kant would say, out of respect for the rule.  Thus, following a rule is an 
intentional act.  This is of course the point Kant relies upon in order to maintain 
that the only thing that is good without qualification is the good will; a good 
nature is merely beautiful.39 
 
A further difficulty for a dispositionalist account is that one can be systematically 
mistaken in the way in which one is disposed to follow a rule.40  Consider, for 
example, Aristotle’s arguments concerning happiness (eudaimonia).  For 
Aristotle, most people are systematically mistaken with respect to the meaning of 
happiness: 
 
The many, the most vulgar, would seem to conceive the good and 
happiness as pleasure, and hence they also like the life of gratification.  In 
this they appear completely slavish, since the life they decide on is a life 
for grazing animals. NE 1095b18-21 
 
                                                        
38 The standard view is that the normativity involved is sui generis semantic normativity.  For a 
dissenting voice see Wikforss (2001).  An alternative view is that language use is governed by 
pragmatic norms; ‘if you want to get on in society, pass exams, engage in commerce etc. then 
speak in the following way’.  Kripke’s own ‘sceptical solution’ seems to be of this sort.  I touch 
on this point again in Ch. 4. 
39 This may also be one of the intuitions underpinning Searle’s ‘Chinese Room’ thought 
experiment.  Searle’s Chinese Room operator conforms to his instructions, but does not follow 
them in the requisite sense and, so, fails to grasp of the meaning or significance of their output. 
40 See Kripke (1982: 28–30). 
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In fact, happiness turns out to be, primarily, if not exclusively, contemplative 
activity (theoria) (NE 1178b29-30).  This is so despite the majority’s 
dispositions to use ‘happiness’ differently.  Aristotle has arguments to show that 
the masses ought not to have the dispositions they do in fact have.  They 
misunderstand the meaning of happiness.  Whatever one thinks of Aristotle’s 
arguments, the contrary dispositions of the masses do not render them 
incomprehensible.  There is a logical gap between how people are disposed to 
use ‘happiness’ and how people ought to use ‘happiness’ which it makes sense 
for Aristotle to attempt to exploit.  It makes sense to suppose that someone could 
be brought to realise that they have been using ‘happiness’ incorrectly and, 
hence, change their dispositions accordingly.  This is possible only on the 
assumption that there is some external standard of correctness independent of the 
disposition they happen to have. 
   
In light of the difficulties facing the various candidates for facts of the matter 
such that one means plus rather than quus, the sceptic’s conclusion is meaning 
nihilism: there is no fact of the matter in virtue of which sentences such as “the 
student meant addition by ‘+’” are true.  It emerged from our look at the topic of 
dispositions that at least one of the missing facts is whatever grounds the 
normative dimension of meaning. Although we cannot conclusively rule out 
alternative explanations (perhaps we have missed a non-normative fact which 
would satisfy the sceptic), it seems likely that the problem of missing normative 
facts underpins the sceptical paradox.  This appears to be Kripke’s view: 
 
All [attempts to meet the sceptical paradox] fail to give a candidate for a 
fact as to what I meant that would show that only ‘125’, not ‘5’, is the 
answer I ‘ought’ to give.  (1982: 11, emphasis added). 
 
This, then, is the sceptical paradox.  When I respond in one way rather than 
another to such a problem as ‘68+57’, I can have no justification for one 
response rather than another.  (1982: 21, emphasis added)  
 
Endorsing the sceptical conclusion is a clearly unattractive option.  Kripke calls 
it ‘insane and intolerable’ (1982: 60).  Following the helpful Humean distinction 
between ‘straight’ solution’ and ‘sceptical’ solutions, we can divide responses 
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into two categories (Kripke 1982: 66).41  A straight solution attempts to show 
that the initial scepticism was, on closer inspection, unwarranted.  Thus, one 
might try to show that, contrary to initial appearances, there are some facts of the 
matter by dint of which one means plus rather than quus.  A sceptical solution, 
by contrast, begins with the concession that the sceptic’s case is unanswerable.  It 
goes on to maintain that our normal way of doing things is nevertheless 
legitimate because it does not stand in need of the justification which the sceptic 
demanded.  For instance, a demand for truth-makers might be watered down to a 
demand for warranted assertability, or the demand for truth conditions might be 
abandoned completely in favour of expressivism.42 
 
We have then a sketch of the rule-following considerations.  Attending to the 
vast critical literature on the intricacies of the argument, and proposed solutions 
to the sceptical paradox, would require a thesis length treatment at least.  As with 
Hume and Moore above, however, I am more concerned at this stage with the 
general structure of the problem than with proffered solutions.  In particular, I 
should like to emphasise certain common features of the three sets of 
considerations, diagnose a common ailment, and, in doing so, set out the main 
problematic of the thesis. 
 
1.4 Naturalism and Classical Realism 
 
By way of an opening, it will be helpful to consider Michael Dummett’s (1959) 
claim, endorsed by Kripke (1982: 73), that Wittgenstein’s rule-following 
considerations constitute an attack on ‘classical realism’.43  Dummett 
characterises classical realism as follows: 
 
It is certainly part of the meaning of the word “true” that if a statement is 
true, there must be something in virtue of which it is true.  “There is 
something in virtue of which it is true” means: there is something such that 
if we knew of it we should regard it as a criterion (or at least as a ground) 
for asserting the statement. The essence of realism is this: for any statement                                                         
41 Alternative labels are  ‘direct’ and ‘diagnostic’ anti-scepticism respectively.  See Kusch (2006: 
16). 
42 See Kripke (1982: 77–8).  See also Blackburn ([1984] 2002: 30–1) for more on this strategy of 
‘lowering the truth condition’, and its relationship to Hume’s account of causation. 
43 An equally attractive alternative label is ‘mirroring realism’.  Heal (1989), borrowing the term 
from Rorty, develops the implications of mirroring realism at some length in the context of both 
the rule-following considerations and Quine’s theses concerning the indeterminacy of translation. 
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which has a definite sense, there must be something in virtue of which either 
it or its negation is true.  (1959: 335–6) 
 
Mindful that it may be impossible to characterise classical realism in a manner 
satisfactory to all parties to the debate, let us try to flesh this out.  In particular, 
what, on the classical realist view, is involved in asserting some normative 
proposition p, say, ‘wilful murder is vicious’?  We might approach the question 
by noticing that for realists p is a possible object of knowledge.  On anything like 
the traditional tripartite conception of knowledge, it follows that p is truth-apt, 
possibly true and meaningful.  Insofar as p is a declarative sentence in the 
business of stating how things stand in the world, it is truth-apt.  That normative 
propositions are truth-apt is independently plausible, though controversial, in 
light of the well-known Frege-Geach considerations concerning the embedding 
of normative propositions in truth-functional contexts.  In order for p to be truth-
apt, it must be meaningful.  Moreover, if p is a possible object of knowledge, it 
follows that the belief that p demands justification and that this demand can be 
satisfied under certain conditions.  The meaning of p and its justification turn out 
to be intimately connected.  For, in general, some proposition p is meaningful in 
virtue if its truth conditions.44  The truth conditions of p are given by its truth-
makers.  On the classical realist view under discussion, these are mind-
independent facts to which p corresponds if true.  Moreover, these mind-
independent facts justify our belief that p and validate our claim to know that p.  
As Dummett notes, they serve as ‘a criterion (or at least as a ground) for 
asserting the statement’ (1959: 336).  
 
Classical realism, thus, involves a commitment to a cluster of natural and 
intuitively attractive views.  One of its central elements is the idea that for a 
sentence, or the proposition which it expresses, to be meaningful, there must be 
some fact which makes it so.  However, it is precisely this thought which the 
rule-following considerations challenge.  The sceptic’s conclusion was that there 
is no fact of the matter in virtue of which I mean plus not quus.  For this reason 
Kripke endorses Dummett’s view of the import of the rule-following 
considerations:                                                         
44 See Kripke (1982: 70): ‘The simplest, most basic idea of the Tractatus cannot be dismissed: 
a declarative sentence gets its meaning by virtue of its truth conditions.’ 
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If Wittgenstein is right, we cannot begin to solve it [the sceptical paradox] if 
we remain in the grip of the natural presupposition that meaningful 
declarative sentences must purport to correspond to facts.  (1982: 78–9) 
 
In this way, Kripke motivates his favoured non-factualist sceptical solution.   
 
Such a retreat from classical realism should not, however, be treated lightly.  One 
concern is that the abandonment of classical realism for some domain suggests a 
downgrading of the subject matter.  For instance, rejecting moral realism might 
seem to lead to the (morally) disastrous step of rejecting the reality of moral 
obligation.  Perhaps the disaster can be averted.  In part, this perceived threat 
motivates sophisticated non-cognitivist positions such as Simon Blackburn’s 
quasi-realism.  In any case, it is a plausible desideratum that an account of 
normative discourse should be justificatory in the sense that it is consistent with 
our continued entitlement to employ normative discourse more or less as our 
current reflective practice suggests. 
 
Do the rule-following considerations force us to reject classical realism in favour 
of non-factualism?  The challenge was to locate the truth-makers for propositions 
such as ‘Jones meant addition by “+”’.  Kripke’s Wittgenstein argues that the 
search fails.  Dispositionalism was perhaps the most promising approach, but we 
saw it blocked by the normative dimension of meaning.  The difficulty is that we 
need not only truth-makers, but also what we might call ‘value-makers’.  By 
value-makers I have in mind a special category of truth-makers.  They are truth-
makers insofar as they are facts or states of affairs which ground the truth of 
normative propositions.  However, they also make certain claims on us.  Rules 
are putative examples of value-makers.  If we are to follow rules, they must, in 
some sense, lead.  Value-makers have normative force; they are compelling 
standards. 
 
The present thesis is, in part, an enquiry into the metaphysics of value-makers.  It 
is also an attempt to assess the prospects of such an enquiry governed by 
naturalistic constraints.  Each of the three sets of considerations discussed in this 
chapter was constrained in this way.  Hume is an explicit naturalist and generates 
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for himself the problem of locating the value-makers which would give content 
to our normative ideas.  Moore develops the problem of identifying natural 
properties with the appropriate normative force in order to challenge naturalist 
opponents.  Although Kripke’s Wittgenstein is a more ambiguous creature, the 
sceptical paradox gets off the ground only once we couple it with naturalistic 
sounding assumptions about what sorts of facts we should look for to determine 
meaning.  Although Kripke initially presents the argument in an epistemological 
guise, he argues that the problem is ultimately metaphysical, allowing us the 
possibility of meeting the sceptic from a gods-eye perspective.45  Thus, he tells 
us ‘there are no limitations … on the facts that may be cited to answer the 
sceptic’ (1982: 14).  However, ‘no limitations’ appears to be an exaggeration.  
The limitations Kripke has in mind are behaviourist limitations, sometimes 
associated with Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mind.  However, naturalistic 
limitations remain.  Kripke’s discussion is in fact limited to properties such as 
dispositions, mental histories, qualitative states and the like.  As Jane Heal 
writes: 
   
Our looking for these kinds of items in answer to the original questions 
about thought is bound up with the dominance of scientific modes of 
understanding and our disposition to assume that we can find an account of 
thinking closely analogous to the kinds of account which science has given 
us of the constitution and workings of the natural world.  (1989: 146) 
 
There remains the unexplored possibility of an appeal to a non-natural property 
with the appropriate normative force.  Perhaps, for example, God guarantees that 
we mean plus not quus.  Perhaps meaning-constituting facts are to be discovered 
in a Platonic realm of Ideas.  Or, perhaps, primitive sui generis semantic 
properties justify us in our meaning practices.46  Each of these would serve 
simultaneous duty as truth-makers and value-makers.  
 
                                                        
45 This view of the argument is endorsed by Boghossian: ‘once we have corrected for the 
distortions induced by the dialogic setting, there ought not to be any residual temptation to think 
that epistemological considerations are playing a critical role in Kripke’s argument.’  ([1989] 
2002: 151) 
46 Kripke briefly raises the latter possibility, but rejects it as ‘desperate’ and ‘completely 
mysterious’ (1982: 51).  See also Boghossian ([1989] 2002: 178–80). 
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As I have emphasised, the open question remains open, and Kripke’s sceptic 
remains unsatisfied, due to the phenomenon of normative force.  Heal comments 
on this fact in relation to the rule-following considerations as follows: 
 
What Wittgenstein’s considerations show is that we cannot make sense of 
the idea that being confronted with some set of objects or chunk of the 
world should force possession of a certain concept upon a person.’  (1989: 
146–7, emphasis added) 
 
We can perhaps appeal to chunks of the world in order to provide efficient causal 
explanations of concept acquisition.  This is one sort of force.  However, we need 
a further sort of explanation for the queer phenomenon of normative force.  If we 
are committed to classical realism, we need to locate correspondingly queer 
properties, namely value-makers.  We have reason to think that a non-queer 
explanation, in terns of dispositions for instance, will not do.  Even if our 
dispositions to employ concepts in particular ways, or the categorical bases of 
these dispositions, causally determine future use, they do not thereby provide 
normative explanations.  As Paul Boghossian writes: 
 
Even if there were a dispositional predicate that logically covaried with a 
meaning predicate, the one fact could still not be identified with the other, 
for they are facts of distinct sorts.’  ([1989] 2002: 169).   
 
Recall the earlier quotation from Moore: 
 
It may indeed be true that what we desire to desire is always also good; 
perhaps, even the converse may be true: but it is very doubtful whether this 
is the case, and the mere fact that we understand very well what is meant by 
doubting it, shews clearly that we have two different notions before our 
minds.  (PE 16)47  
  
The OQA and the rule-following considerations converge at this point.  
Naturalists must either fully account for normative properties in terms of natural 
properties or eliminate them from their ontology and abandon realism with 
respect to them.  However, the queer phenomenon of normative force presents an 
obstacle to naturalistic accounts of normative properties.  One way to show 
ontological incompleteness is by appeal to independent variation.  For example, 
given that two points can coincide in three dimensions and still vary with respect                                                         
47 See also PE 14: ‘Even if it [good] were a natural object, that would not alter the nature of the 
fallacy nor diminish its importance one whit’. 
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to location, we know that we cannot provide a complete account of location in 
terms of three dimensions.48  If normative properties vary independently of 
natural properties, then the latter cannot offer a complete account of the former.  
The OQA and the rule-following considerations, if compelling, show that even 
were some natural property shown to co-vary with some normative property in 
terms of extension, this fact would not thereby demonstrate that they co-vary in 
terms of normative force.  For, we can always coherently question whether any 
empirically given property motivates us appropriately.  Similarly, we have seen 
Hume’s argument that the content of our normative ideas cannot be grounded in 
our experience of the external world, for there is nothing in our experience which 
resembles the element of approbation or disapprobation.  The shared thought is 
that our experience of the external world is necessarily compatible with 
motivational indifference. 
 
If we want to retain classical realism with respect to the normative, we need 
value-makers in order to make sense of normative propositions and sentences.  
We need to ask ‘do value-makers exist, and, if so, how do they fit into our 
ontological scheme?’  Whilst this is the question in full generality, my current 
ambition is to investigate how the problem becomes manifest within naturalistic 
constraints.  As I shall argue in the following chapter, naturalism is an 
epistemological or methodological position.  It is the adoption of a scientific 
stance towards traditionally philosophical problems.  How is this epistemological 
stance to be reconciled with the problem of value-makers? 
 
Given the difficulties involved in locating value-makers in the mind-independent 
external world, one possibility is to relocate them in agents’ subjective mental 
states.  For instance, we might turn to instrumentalism, associating value-makers 
with the satisfaction of agents’ desires.  We ought to act in such and such a way, 
or employ concepts in such and such a way, because doing so will enable us to 
meet our ends.  This approach has the advantage of appearing to explain why it is 
that norms have motivational force.  For, it is an apparent truism that we are 
motivated to bring about what we desire.  It is also perhaps the most natural view 
of the matter for a thoroughgoing naturalist, dovetailing with their available                                                         
48 This example is taken from Frank Jackson (1998: 9). 
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resources.  In chapter five I consider the merits of this approach as advocated by 
Quine, Maddy, Papineau and Kornblith with respect to epistemic normativity.  I 
shall argue, however, that instrumentalists err in dismissing the categorical force 
of certain norms.  I shall also argue in chapter eight that it is a mistake to ground 
reasons in desires. 
 
A further possibility is to argue that an unduly restrictive naturalistic 
methodology has caused us to overlook mind-independent value-makers.  Such, 
of course, was Moore’s view.  It was also a view towards which Wittgenstein, or 
one of his interlocutors, was tempted: 
 
“But I don’t mean that what I do now (in grasping a sense) determines the 
future use causally and as a matter of experience, but that in a queer way, 
the use itself is in some sense present.”  (PI §195)49 
  
Although a brute appeal to intuition of non-natural properties, or to grasping ‘in a 
flash’ (PI §191), does little to lessen the sense of mystery, I think that these 
answers lie in approximately the right direction.  While normative facts are not 
revealed by the methods of the natural sciences, they are nevertheless real and 
cognitively available.  The appropriate epistemology, I shall argue in chapter 
nine, depends upon the emotions.  But, whilst the emotions can provide the 
warrant for normative judgments, they do not provide the grounds.  Rather, I 
shall argue that the value-makers of normative propositions are aspects of human 
practices combined with facts about our nature as rational agents.  I shall argue 
for this positive account in chapters six and seven especially.  Given the 
emphasis on practices, there are certain affinities between my position and 
Wittgenstein’s emphasis on ideas such as forms of life.  However, the account I 
develop draws rather on the Aristotelian and neo-Aristotelian traditions, placing 
emphasis on the role of the virtues and the teleological structure of human 
activities. 
                                                        
49 There is an interesting coincidence of vocabulary here between Wittgenstein (as translated by 
Anscombe) and Mackie’s argument from queerness.  Bloomfield (2006: 185) also observes this 
point. 
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Chapter Two 
Naturalism as an Epistemological Stance 
 
In the previous chapter, I set out a problem for naturalistic accounts of 
normativity via a discussion of three influential sets of considerations and their 
interconnections.  In doing so I was content to rely on a relatively imprecise, 
intuitive sense of what naturalism is.  Given the differences and ambiguities 
involved in the three underlying conceptions, greater definition would have 
tended to obscure the central issue in any case.  In order to begin the process of 
understanding why naturalism struggles to accommodate the normative, 
however, it will be helpful to consider the nature of naturalism in far greater 
detail.  The task is independently important given the popularity of naturalism in 
contemporary analytic philosophy.1  Indeed, the naturalistic turn has taken such a 
hold that challenging a theory’s naturalistic credentials is widely regarded as a 
legitimate form of criticism.  This might have something to do with the way in 
which the term ‘naturalism’ has come to take on positive connotations.  
Naturalism is associated with healthy respect for the explanatory, predictive and 
technological successes of the natural sciences and due modesty regarding 
‘armchair’ philosophy.  The progress of the natural sciences, considered in 
juxtaposition to the apparent lack of progress in traditional philosophy, cautions 
that favouring philosophical arguments over scientific research is likely to be 
unwise.2  Insofar as this caution remains unheeded, non-naturalism appears to be 
a headstrong attitude.  It is thus unsurprising that philosophers are frequently 
hesitant to identify themselves as ‘non-naturalists’.  Accordingly, however,                                                         
1 In a recent straw poll of 931 working academic philosophers, 49.8% of respondents leaned 
towards or accepted naturalism, as opposed to 25.8% of respondents who leant towards or 
accepted non-naturalism.  The remaining 24.2% of respondents selected ‘other’, presumably on 
the grounds that the term ‘naturalism’ is unclear.  The results, along with meta-anlaysis, can be 
found online at http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl   
2 David Lewis puts the point rather more provocatively: ‘I am moved to laughter by the 
thought of how presumptuous it would be to reject mathematics for philosophical reasons.  
How would you like the job of telling the mathematicians that they must change their ways, 
and abjure countless errors, now that philosophy has discovered that there are no classes?  Can 
you tell them, with a straight face, to follow philosophical argument wherever it might lead?  If 
they challenge your credentials, will you boast of philosophy’s other great discoveries: that 
motion is impossible, that a Being than which no greater can be conceived cannot be 
conceived not to exist, that it is unthinkable that anything exists outside the mind, that time is 
unreal, that no theory has ever been made at all probable by evidence (but on the other hand 
that an empirically ideal theory cannot possibly be false), that it is a wide-open scientific 
question whether anyone has ever believed anything, and so on, and on, ad nauseam?’  (1991: 
59). 
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philosophers are inclined to view naturalism through the prism of their 
independently favoured commitments.  While it sometimes seems as if there are 
as many naturalisms as there are self-proclaimed naturalists, there is at least a 
reasonably clear division between ontological and epistemological naturalisms.  
In the first section of this chapter I shall argue that insofar as naturalism is a 
novel development in philosophy, it is fundamentally an epistemological thesis, 
without particular ontological commitments. In the second section I shall 
consider the charge that epistemological naturalism is self-defeating and defend 
the desirability of a pragmatic criterion for adjudicating between naturalistic and 
non-naturalistic approaches to philosophical problems. 
 
2.1 Epistemological and Ontological Naturalism 
 
When naturalism is advanced as a positive thesis, two views are frequently 
distinguished, namely epistemological naturalism (EN) and ontological 
naturalism (ON).3  EN, or the pejorative ‘scientism’, is the view that knowledge 
can only be acquired through the natural sciences.4  It is the view that ‘there is 
only one way of knowing: the empirical way that is the basis of science 
(whatever that may be)’ (Devitt 1998: 45).  Or, as Bertrand Russell put it, ‘what 
science cannot discover, mankind cannot know’ (1935: 243).5  Certainly we can 
come to have true beliefs on the basis of metaphysical argument, astrology or 
being struck on the head by a falling object, but these true beliefs are not justified 
and, therefore, not knowledge.  The second thesis, ON, holds that reality is 
exhausted by some combination of natural objects, properties, relations and 
events.  For example, David Armstrong advances the view that ‘the world, the 
                                                        
3 Axiological scientism is sometimes further distinguished, as the view that science is the most 
valuable part of learning and culture (see, for example, Stenmark 2001: 11–13). 
4 A stronger claim would be that we are rationally entitled to believe only what is scientifically 
knowable.  The conditions for knowledge and rational belief come apart in instances where we 
have good reason to believe what is in fact false.  For example, we might think that people were 
once rationally entitled to believe that the earth was flat or that space was globally Euclidean.    
5 Carnap advances the yet stronger thesis that ‘there is no question whose answer is in principle 
unattainable by science’ (1967: 290; emphasis removed).  Idealism aside, this might seem to be a 
rather naïve expression of optimism.  For, what reason do we have to suppose that humans are 
capable of knowing all there is to know?  In Carnap’s case the claim is grounded in his meaning-
empiricism, according to which the class of intelligible statements is exhausted by those 
statements which can in principle be verified by experience.  As the class of meaningful 
questions is exhausted by those which can be answered by intelligible statements, all meaningful 
questions can be answered by science. 
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totality of entities, is nothing more than the spacetime system’ (1997: 5).6  
Similarly, Jaegwon Kim tells us that ‘the physical world of spacetime is the 
whole world’ (2005: 157).  Although ON is frequently combined with the claim 
that all natural properties are reducible to physical properties, ON and 
physicalism are in fact distinct.  For instance, whilst Armstrong is a physicalist, 
he distinguishes his naturalism from his physicalism on the grounds that 
naturalism is not committed to the physical world being ontologically 
fundamental.  For Armstrong, the view that spacetime is ultimately analysable in 
terms of non-physical entities would still count as naturalistic.  Nevertheless, 
Armstrong’s naturalism is a substantive thesis concerning what exists and, thus, 
an ontological thesis.  
 
It might be thought all naturalists have some definite ontological commitments 
insofar as they uniformly reject the existence of the supernatural; spooky entities 
such as Cartesian souls, ghosts and spirits.  This is helpful only to the extent that 
nature can be distinguished from supernature and I shall look at some of the 
difficulties involved in drawing the distinction below.7  However, it is not clear 
in any case that a disavowal of the supernatural is sufficient for naturalism.  
Wherever the line between nature and supernature is finally drawn, we might 
expect God and transcendent universals to fall on the wrong side for the 
naturalist.  Let us imagine, for the sake of simplicity, that the putatively 
supernatural is exhausted by these two categories and consider a philosopher 
who denies the existence of entities falling under both.  Are we thereby entitled 
to categorise her as a naturalist?  It seems that we are not yet in a position to 
know.  The question we need to answer is not which entities appear in her 
ontology, but on what grounds they appear.  It may be that she is persuaded by, 
say, the problem of evil and the third man argument.  In this case it would be a 
mistake, I suggest, to conclude that she is a naturalist simply because she has no 
ontological commitments to the supernatural.  Unlike naturalists, she does not 
reject God and Platonic Forms on the basis of a principled opposition to the 
supernatural.                                                         
6 See also Armstrong (1980: 149). 
7 As Berkeley observed, ‘nature’ is apt to become ‘an empty sound, without any intelligible 
meaning annexed to it’ (Principles, paragraph 150).  Hume says of the term ‘nature’, that ‘there 
is none more ambiguous and equivocal’ (T III, 1, II, 7). 
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The difference emerges most clearly when we consider a shift in her ontological 
commitments.  Let us say that she currently holds mathematical objects to be 
naturalistically explicable.  Perhaps she holds an error theory of mathematics or 
thinks that mathematical discourse can be reduced to talk of sets constituted by 
physical objects.8  On further reflection, however, she reaches the conclusion that 
a particular form of mathematical Platonism is unavoidable.  She now comes to 
think that an appeal to transcendent universals is the only way to preserve the a 
priori nature of mathematical knowledge, or to explain the necessity of 
mathematical truth.  As she had no previous ontological commitments to 
supernatural entities, must she avoid Platonism on pain of inconsistency?  Given 
that her previously naturalistic ontology was not based on an over-riding 
naturalistic principle, there is no reason to think so.  There is nothing to prevent 
her transition from a natural to a supernatural ontology.  If, however, she had 
been a bona fide naturalist, with naturalism understood in terms of an opposition 
to a non-supernatural ontology, she would have had no such leeway.  She would 
then have been forced either to eliminate mathematical properties from her 
ontology or to redraw the boundary between nature and supernature. 
 
According to the above line of argument, then, a non-supernatural ontology is 
not sufficient for naturalism.  In due course I shall also argue that it is not 
necessary.9  First, however, I would like to consider how we might try to 
distinguish the natural from the non-natural, or the physical from the non-
physical.  As mentioned above, this is no easy task.  For instance, it is unhelpful 
to say that something is physical if and only if it is extended in space, when we 
have an inadequate idea of how to characterise space independently of physical 
extension.10  It would also be implausible to claim that a property is natural if 
and only if it figures in the theories of natural scientists, or that the physical is                                                         
8 See Maddy (1990) for a defence of this view. 
9 Hence, I do not share van Inwagen’s sense that ‘we should certainly be very puzzled if someone 
said, “I’m not a naturalist, but I’m a physicalist” – or “I’m not a physicalist, but I’m a naturalist’ 
(2006: 78). 
10 A further problem with the proposal is that would classify any irreducibly mental properties 
with spatial locations as physical.  For further discussion of defining the physical in terms of 
spatial extension see Crane (1993) and Pettit (1993) and Moser and Yandell (2000: 4).  
Markosian (2000) offers a defence of the proposal. 
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coextensive with the set of entities figuring in the theories of respected 
contemporary physicists.  The history of science gives us no good reason to 
suppose that early twenty-first century physicists have identified all and only the 
fundamental constituents of reality, and plenty of reasons to suppose otherwise 
given the changing subject matter of the discipline and the present lack of 
ontological consensus.11 Furthermore, this view would have the unpalatable 
consequence that any future extensions of physics would not describe the 
physical.12  Quite generally, moreover, it seems wrong-headed to think that 
ontological facts are determined by physicists’ theories of reality, rather than by 
reality itself.  At least, few naturalists would be content to embrace idealism.  All 
of this glosses over the considerable difficulties concerning how a scientist’s 
ontological commitments are to be read off from her theory.13 
 
In light of such considerations, it is sometimes suggested that we should place 
our ontological commitments on the side of a hypothetically completed physics 
of the future.14  For instance, one might claim that a predicate, such as ‘is a 
quark’, succeeds in picking out some aspect of reality just in case an ideal 
physics would rely on that predicate in its foundations.  Setting aside the 
question of whether we have good reason to believe that physics in anything like                                                         
11 See Ritchie (2008: 95-6) for more on naturalism and the so-called ‘pessimistic meta-induction’.  
Attempting to give some content to the term ‘physicalism’, Kim has claimed that ‘the broad basic 
features of the world as described by modern physics, what is intelligible and of interest to those 
of us who are not science specialists, has been relatively stable through the flux of changing 
physical theories’ (2005: 149).  I am not similarly sanguine concerning the stability of theoretical 
physics.  Although I do not know exactly what Kim means by ‘modern’, it is not difficult to think 
of substantial revisions within fundamental physics over most timeframes.  What seems 
especially odd, however, is Kim’s appeal to the picture of physics held by people who are not 
specialists.  If the appeal is to folk physics, then this stands apart from the cutting edge of the 
scientific enterprise.  Indeed, I would imagine that the folk conception has been more or less 
impervious to theoretical advances since around the time of Bohr’s model of the atom.  If, 
however, physicalism is supposed to derive support from the sciences, as Kim thinks it does, then 
it is hardly satisfactory to draw that support from ideas independent of the ‘flux of changing 
physical theories’, which is to say independent of our best current theories.  Ladyman and Ross 
have recently lampooned elements of contemporary analytic metaphysics as the ‘philosophy of 
A-level chemistry’ (2007: 24).  Regardless of the justness of their critique, it must be recognised 
that there is a pitfall to be avoided.  If one’s philosophical claims depend on premises drawn from 
the physical sciences, it does not do to proclaim them independent of any possible scientific 
advance. 
12 As Bas van Fraassen writes: ‘Whenever philosophers take some general feature of physics and 
use it to identify what is material, what happens?  Physics soon goes on to describe things that 
lack that feature and are altogether different.  When that happens, does materialism bite the dust?  
Surely not!’  (2002: 53).  See also Crane and Mellor (1990: 188). 
13 See Raley (2005) for more on this issue. 
14 See, for example, Smart (1963: 651), Petit (1992: 247) and Papineau (1993: 2). 
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its current form is in principle completable, it seems that the grounds on which 
we might be inclined to appeal to an ideal physics are once more epistemological 
rather than ontological.  As we have no guarantees concerning which entities a 
hypothetically completed physics of the future may contain, the idea seems to be 
rooted in the belief that the methods of the sciences will ultimately reveal the 
constituents of reality, whatever they may turn out to be.  For the present, 
however, we cannot be certain that the current subject properties of physics will 
turn out to be physical, for we cannot yet know that properties such as spin, mass 
and charge will feature in an ideal physics.15  If inclusion in a hypothetically 
completed physics of the future is advanced as the criterion for a substance or 
property being physical, we currently find ourselves in an uncomfortable position 
from which we can only speculate on the question of what is, and what is not 
physical.16  We cannot be sure, moreover, that an ideal physics will exclude 
paradigmatically supernatural entities.  For example, some philosophers, 
impressed by the argument from design, have argued that the existence of God 
can finally be confirmed by the natural sciences.  Thus, Richard Swinburne 
claims that the case for theism has the same structure as the ‘cumulative case for 
any unobservable entity, such as a quark or a neutrino’ (1983: 386).17  Now, it 
may of course turn out that Swinburne is wrong to suppose that science will 
ultimately support theism.  Perhaps physics will finally explain everything in 
terms of atoms and the void or strings vibrating in eleven dimensions.  
Nevertheless, the current state of scientific knowledge does not rule out the 
possible existence of any particular entity.  It cannot do, for scientific knowledge 
is contingent and corrigible.  Quine is particularly alert to this point: 
 
Even telepathy and clairvoyance are scientific options, however moribund.  
It would take some extraordinary evidence to enliven them, but if that were 
to happen, then empiricism itself – the crowning norm … of naturalised 
epistemology would go by the board.  For remember that that norm, and 
                                                        
15 Crane and Mellor (1990: 188) advance a similar argument. 
16 On a similarly gloomy note Hilary Putnam observes that ‘the idea that science leaves no room 
for an independent philosophical enterprise has reached the point at which leading practitioners 
sometimes suggest that all that is left for philosophy is to try to anticipate what the presumed 
scientific solutions to all metaphysical problems will eventually look like’ (1992: preface, x).  
This leaves traditional philosophy on a highly uncertain footing.  Philosophers are not especially 
well equipped to speculate on such matters, by method, by training and frequently by inclination. 
17 See Swinburne (1991: Ch. 8) for an influential presentation of this argument. 
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naturalised epistemology itself, are integral to science, and science is fallible 
and corrigible.  (1992: 20) 
 
If I saw indirect explanatory benefit in positing sensibilia, possibilia, spirits, 
a Creator, I would joyfully accord them scientific status too, on a par with 
such avowedly scientific posits as quarks and black holes.  (1995: 252) 
 
For Quine, this comes as a consequence of confirmational holism and the 
resulting impossibility of clearly defined a priori knowledge.  However, it also 
comes more simply from a commitment to EN.   
 
Notoriously, Quine included abstracta such as sets in his ontology because he 
considered them indispensable to our best scientific theories.18  One might 
simply discount Quine as a naturalist on this basis, despite his prominence in the 
tradition.  Jerold Katz takes this line: 
 
Naturalists cannot countenance the existence of universals and abstract 
objects, whose existence is independent of natural objects, without 
contradicting their monism, which denies that anything exists over and 
above natural objects.  (1990: 238) 
 
Of course, ‘naturalism’ is a term of art and naturalists are free to characterise it 
as they see fit.  Naturalism can be characterised as physicalist monism, perhaps 
combined with something like a deep-seated respect for the results of the natural 
sciences.  Still, there is no guarantee that the results of the natural sciences do or 
will cohere with physicalism.19  In such cases as there is or could be 
disagreement, it is pertinent to ask where a naturalist’s commitments would lie 
and upon what basis.  If the naturalist’s commitment to physicalism depends 
upon its alleged scientific support, then, that support being removed, he ought to                                                         
18 See Colyvan (2001) for extended discussion of the Quine-Putnam arguments for the 
indispensability of mathematical objects to scientific discourse. 
19 Perhaps one could avoid the appearance of such disagreement between ON and science by 
declaring by fiat that all scientific commitment is to natural properties, because the subject 
properties of the sciences are limited to natural properties.  If this is combined with EN, the view 
that all genuine knowledge is scientific knowledge, then we can only have knowledge of natural 
properties.  If we should only commit to the existence of those properties which we could in 
principle have knowledge of, then a commitment to ON follows from EN.  However, this is 
unsatisfactory for at least three reasons.  First, it is arbitrary to restrict science to natural 
properties.  Second, we do not have a firm grasp of the distinction between natural and non-
natural properties.  Third, it follows at best that we cannot have knowledge of non-natural 
properties, not that they do not exist.  For, science by this definition, remains mute on the subject 
of non-natural properties.  Hence, we do not know that non-natural properties do not exist; it is 
rather that we cannot know that they do exist. 
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abandon his commitment.  If he does not do so, it must be because he has further, 
non-scientific reasons.  That is, most plausibly, he needs a metaphysical 
argument.  Moreover, he must be willing to assign greater weight to the 
metaphysical argument than to the scientific evidence in this particular case, or 
see it as tipping the balance against mixed evidence.  If this position merits the 
label ‘naturalism’, however, it is not significantly different from philosophical 
materialism in the grand old tradition of Democritus and Hobbes.  It is true that a 
naturalist of this stripe will pay especially careful attention to scientific evidence.  
However, it is only sensible for any philosopher to consider empirical evidence 
for or against his theses where relevant.  Philosophical disagreements do not 
focus on whether to consider relevant empirical evidence, but on whether the 
evidence is indeed relevant and how much significance to assign it.  By contrast, 
the form of naturalism endorsed by philosophers such as Quine, the form of 
naturalism that has given rise to the naturalistic turn and a professed 
abandonment of first philosophy, is far more radical.  The principled 
epistemological naturalist shows no potential willingness to allow philosophical 
arguments to trump scientific evidence, for he does not recognise the validity of 
non-scientific methods.  He will follow science, even if science leads him to 
accept the existence of the supernatural, and he will certainly not lay claim to his 
title on the basis of a metaphysical defence of physicalism.20  As van Fraassen 
writes: 
 
If you press a materialist, you quickly find the most important constraint on 
the meaning of the thesis.  That constraint is simply that it should be 
compatible with science, whatever science comes up with.  (2002: 55–6) 
 
Compatibility, however, is too weak.  Assuming that science accurately describes 
the world within its domain of competence, everyone should intend his or her 
descriptions of reality to be compatible with science.  This is just as if a scientist 
should hope that his theories are compatible with our best philosophical accounts 
of the world – if, that is, he grants philosophy jurisdiction over a realm of facts                                                         
20 This does not, of course, prevent him from arguing that our best available scientific models 
suggest that the world is entirely physical and, so, to adopt physicalism as a working hypothesis.  
In fact, it may turn out that a naturalist, that is an epistemological naturalist, should also endorse 
physicalism; if, that is, our best scientific models suggest that physicalism is true.  What I am 
denying is that it is in virtue of a philosopher’s endorsement of physicalism that she is to be 
counted as a naturalist.  Rather, if there is any connection between physicalism and naturalism, it 
is that the former offers some defeasible reason to endorse the latter. 
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which scientific practice cannot describe.  However, the naturalist denies any 
such philosophical jurisdiction.  His quest is thus for scientific dominion, not 
alliance or mere compatibility. 
 
I have argued, then, that either naturalism is best characterised in epistemological 
terms, or otherwise that the self-professed naturalist is in fact a philosophical 
materialist in the grand old tradition.  It might be objected, however, that this 
provides the wrong order of explanation, that the truth of ON is the reason to 
endorse EN.  One argument to this effect starts by noting that the natural sciences 
exclusively study natural properties.  Given ON, there is nothing else to study.  If 
non-natural properties existed, they would lie outside the natural sciences’ 
domain of competence in any case.  Let us imagine, however, that ON is false, 
and, hence, that non-natural properties exist.  In this case, we could presumably 
acquire knowledge concerning at least some of these non-natural properties.  At 
least we could know that some non-natural property exists, for its existence 
would constitute the grounds for rejecting ON.  However, if ON were false and 
we could have knowledge concerning non-natural properties, then EN would also 
have to be false insofar as it is the view that all knowledge is scientific 
knowledge.  Our knowledge concerning non-natural properties would depend on 
non-scientific methods.  Therefore, if ON is false EN must be false.  The truth of 
EN depends upon the truth of ON. 
 
Mikael Stenmark defends the priority of ON along similar lines 
 
Ontological scientism entails epistemic scientism because we could not 
know anything about what does not exist.  We cannot know anything about 
a reality to which science does not have access, because there is simply no 
such reality.  (2001: 8) 
 
Aside from the now familiar difficulty of finding a principled distinction between 
natural and non-natural properties, the problem with this line of argument is that 
it is viciously circular.  If only natural properties exist, and if the only way to 
acquire knowledge of natural properties is through the methods of the natural 
sciences, then ON does indeed entail EN.  However, the question of whether the 
natural sciences and only the natural sciences can deliver knowledge of natural 
properties is open to dispute.  One might agree that only natural properties exist, 
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but also maintain that we can gain knowledge of natural properties through non-
scientific methods such as traditional philosophical theorising.  In later chapters, 
I seek to defend just such an account of the normative insofar as I make no 
appeal to obviously non-natural properties.  Yet, whilst I shall draw on empirical 
evidence at certain stages, most of my arguments will be distinctively 
philosophical.  Thus, my account of the normative will serve as a concrete 
example of the independence of EN from ON.  The example is slightly 
complicated by the fact that I am not, as it happens, willing to identify myself as 
an ontological naturalist.  I do not restrict my normative ontology to natural 
properties on principled naturalistic grounds.  Indeed, as I discuss in chapter six, 
I have a certain degree of sympathy for the view that my preferred account of 
normativity demands a larger supernatural framework.  Still, the bulk of my 
discussion is consistent with ON.  As a naturalist could endorse my ontology, but 
not my methodology, EN cannot follow from ON.  The argument in favour of the 
priority of ON would succeed if one had a prior commitment to EN, but that it 
precisely the point at issue.  Thus, the argument poses no threat to our 
characterisation of naturalism in epistemological terms. 
 
2.2 Is Epistemological Naturalism Self-Defeating? 
 
I have argued, then, that naturalism is best understood as an epistemological 
position.  Attempting to characterise ON, we are left either with a thesis devoid 
of definite ontological content or with a form of traditional materialism.  
Ontological considerations are neither necessary nor sufficient for naturalism.  
EN however faces an immediate and pressing difficulty, for it is apparently a 
philosophical thesis, not a scientific thesis.  As Stenmark writes: 
 
How do you set up a scientific experiment to demonstrate that science or a 
particular scientific method gives an exhaustive account of reality?  I cannot 
see how this can be done in a non-question begging way.  What we want to 
know is whether science sets the limits for reality.  The problem is that since 
we can only obtain knowledge about reality by means of scientific methods 
… we must use those very methods whose scope is in question to determine 
the scope of these very same methods.  (2001: 23) 
 
Science is an inappropriate tribunal to pronounce on its own global applicability.  
EN is a philosophical thesis.  As EN denies the authority of any extra-scientific 
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tribunal, it cannot be justified by its own lights.21  This kind of difficulty is 
familiar to restrictive methodological proposals.  Famously, the logical 
positivists’ verification principle is neither empirically verifiable nor a tautology.  
The verification principle is a descendant of Hume’s Fork, which is neither a 
relation of ideas nor a matter of fact.  Relativism faces peritrope arguments. 
 
There is a danger of reaching an unproductive standoff.  Naturalists are able to 
accept that EN cannot be justified by distinctively philosophical methods.  They 
claim that distinctively philosophical methods cannot generate knowledge in any 
case.  Hence, nothing can be justified on distinctively philosophical grounds, and 
it is no criticism that EN cannot be thus justified.  Non-naturalist philosophers 
agree that EN cannot be justified on philosophical grounds, but see this as 
damaging.  For they argue that EN is a philosophical thesis, and if it cannot be 
justified on philosophical grounds, it cannot be justified at all.  Both sides of the 
debate might thus be tempted to disengage.  The naturalist offers the non-
naturalist no reason to accept her philosophical thesis.  By the naturalist’s lights, 
the philosopher’s methods, and hence her criticisms, are unjustified and so do not 
call for rational debate. 
 
It seems that the only way to make sense of naturalism from a philosophical 
perspective is to suppose that is has some special status such that it does not 
stand in need of independent justification.  Perhaps EN is intended to show us the 
way and then be kicked away like Wittgentsein’s ladder, or to re-orientate our 
thinking towards methods which can then be justified by their fruits. Hilary 
Kornblith writes in this vein: 
 
What does have priority over both metaphysics and epistemology, from a 
naturalistic perspective, is successful scientific theory, and not because 
there is some a priori reason to trust science over philosophy, but rather 
because there is a body of scientific theory which has proven its value in 
prediction, explanation, and technological application.  This gives 
scientific work a kind of grounding which no philosophical theory has thus 
far enjoyed.  (1994: 49) 
                                                         
21 Almeder (1998: 64–74) develops this point at considerable length, considering it decisive 
against global epistemological naturalism. 
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The natural sciences, naturalists justly point out, have been enormously 
successful at ameliorating our epistemic position.  Even if the demand for 
external justification is impossible to meet, an advocate of EN can argue that he 
is under no obligation to do so.22  The demand is merely symptomatic of a 
stubborn refusal to abandon the project of first philosophy, a research 
programme now superseded by the natural sciences.  As Quine writes:   
 
If the epistemologist’s goal is validation of the grounds of empirical 
science, he defeats his purpose by using psychology or other empirical 
science in the validation.  However, such scruples against circularity have 
little point once we have stopped dreaming of deducing science from 
observation. (1969a: 75-6) 
 
It might be objected that the naturalistic proposal to exclude distinctively 
philosophical methods is unduly dogmatic.  However, traditional philosophy also 
places limits upon acceptable methods of enquiry.  Enquiry must begin from 
somewhere, and the methods of enquiry must be limited in some fashion.  All 
enquiries necessarily involve a prior disposition to respect some sources of 
evidence and not others.  For example, philosophers do not accept bare appeals 
to religious experience as evidence.  Perhaps, then, we can understand the 
naturalist’s puzzlement when faced with a demand for philosophical justification 
in the same way that we can understand a philosopher’s puzzlement if confronted 
with a demand that their rejection of divine revelation be justified by divine 
revelation.  On the word of which Deity, one might ask, do philosophers base 
their resistance to religious experience?  On the basis of which metaphysical 
argument, the naturalist is asked, do you reject metaphysics?                                                         
22 Another possible response to the circularity objection claims that as traditional philosophy has 
had little success in providing a justificatory framework for scientific enterprise, the naturalist is 
not, as a matter of fact, in a worse position.  Thus, Ronald Giere writes: ‘The enterprise of trying 
to justify science without appeal to any even minimally scientific premises has been going on 
without conspicuous success for three hundred years.  One begins to suspect the lack of success 
is due to the impossibility of the task.  Perhaps there just is no place totally outside science from 
which to justify science.  At the very least one might conclude that the task is not going to be 
accomplished any time soon by ordinary mortals.  I am willing to take this as sufficient grounds 
for an ordinary mortal to try something else.’  (1987: 148)  However, there are at least three 
reasons not to be persuaded by this argument.  First, it is unclear that the mainstream of 
traditional philosophy of science is in such poor shape as Giere contends.  Hotly disputed 
questions in epistemology, as elsewhere in philosophy, tend to attract the most attention and 
obscure domains of broad consensus.  Second, if anything Giere’s argument tends to support 
skepticism rather than naturalism.  Third, if the circularity objection works, it is decisive against 
naturalism.  If Giere’s response works, it only shows that the traditional approach has not yet 
succeeded.  Thus, there is an asymmetry between the initial objection and the tu quoque response. 
  44 
 
It might seem, however, that there is an important difference between the two 
cases.  EN is a philosophical thesis and therefore demands philosophical 
justification.  By contrast, a prohibition on religious experience as a source of 
evidence is not obviously a religious thesis, demanding religious justification.  
Indeed, it appears to be another philosophical thesis, concerning religion this 
time, rather than science.  From a theistic perspective, however, it is not at all 
clear that we are dealing with a non-religious thesis.  For, a theist might argue, 
the cogency of our commitment to various methodological research programmes 
can only be assessed and justified from within a theistic framework.  It may be, 
for example, that the omniscience and omnibenevolence of God, revealed 
directly through religious experience, is the only way in which to justify appeals 
to religious experience.  A non-theistic philosopher will certainly challenge the 
epistemological grounds for this assertion.  The theist, however, will argue that 
he lacks the resources to do so.  This mirrors the case of the naturalist 
marshalling scientific evidence for naturalism, without, the non-naturalist 
philosopher will say, the appropriate metaphysical framework.  We are drawn 
once more into a dialectical impasse.  Regarding EN as the statement of a 
research programme, to be assessed according to pragmatic criteria, might afford 
us greater hope of progress. 
 
As we have said, explanations and methods of justification must end somewhere.  
This does not mean, however, that it is a purely arbitrary matter where our spade 
turns.  Rather, we can pause, take stock and consider whether our methods are 
conducive to the end of enquiry, say knowledge.23  If we come to see that our 
methodological principles are not reliably conducive to knowledge acquisition in 
some domain, the rational course of action is to consider making changes to our 
set of methodological principles.24  This is not to suggest the possibility of                                                         
23 In chapter seven, I focus on the end of enquiry in some detail. 
24 Katz makes a similar point.  He begins by distinguishing three levels of theory, namely 
philosophical theories, metatheories and object theories.  Following his terminology, we might 
say that naturalism is a philosophical theory, which translates into a metatheory placing various 
constraints upon the special sciences, the contents of which are object-theories.  He then argues 
as follows: ‘If the constraints of a metatheory prove too strong for the construction of adequate 
object-theories, the metatheory loses creditability, and, as a consequence, the philosophical 
theory that sanctions the metatheory loses creditability, too.  For instance, when psychological 
theories constructed in accord with behaviourist metatheory turned out not to handle facts 
  45 
distancing ourselves from all of our methodological principles and considering 
them from neutral ground.  The evaluation of methodologies is itself a form of 
enquiry and as such involves prior dispositions to recognise some forms of 
evidence and not others.  We cannot, for instance, distance ourselves from our 
entire stock of logical principles in order to submit them to independent, non-
logical scrutiny.  We can, however, learn from the successes and failures of 
others who are already engaged in alternative research programmes.25   
 
The natural sciences have proven successful with respect to numerous questions 
which were once the province of philosophers. A glance at the history of 
philosophy reveals a diminishing region of jurisdiction as the natural sciences 
have been successively hived off.  The metaphor of philosophy as midwife to the 
sciences, abandoned after her services have been rendered, is an attractive one. 
Extrapolating from this grand narrative, resistance to the further scientisation of 
enquiry might seem destined towards deathly philosophy-of-the-gaps.  But, even 
if this line of thought does something to motivate the naturalistic research 
programme, it requires careful scrutiny.  Philosophers have of course advanced a 
number of arguments purporting to show why this or that field of research – 
modality, intentionality, mathematics, phenomenal consciousness, aesthetics – 
necessarily resists scientific treatment or reduction.  We also find more ambitious 
attempts to show that science as a whole depends on particular metaphysical or 
epistemological assumptions.  The scientist, it has been argued, has no choice but 
to take philosophical stands, either implicitly or explicitly, on matters such as 
fundamental ontology, modality or the nature of evidence.26  I have no general 
quarrel with these types of arguments.  The immediate problem, however, is that 
when it comes to a confrontation between naturalism and non-naturalism there 
are no commonly agreed rules of engagement.  If we are to take seriously 
naturalistic claims concerning the omnicompetence of science, we should ask                                                         
reflecting relations in higher linguistic and cognitive processes, behaviourism lost creditability.’  
(1990: 246).  Because I identify philosophical naturalism with its methodological constraints, 
there is no room in my account for distinguishing between the philosophical theory and the 
metatheory. 
25 It may also be that the same items of knowledge are accessible via multiple avenues of enquiry.  
In this case it may make no difference which method is employed.  Alternatively, other epistemic 
desiderata may be employed, such as simplicity, fecundity or conservativeness.  Non-epistemic 
desiderata, such as beauty or moral worth, may also be appropriate considerations. 
26 For examples of this approach see Lowe (1998), Rea (2002) and Plantinga (2002). 
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how successful science is or could be at accounting for issues at the current core 
of philosophy.  In line with the concerns of the present thesis, we need to 
consider whether naturalism has the resources to locate value-makers.  In order 
to identify those resources, however, we firstly need to address the question of 
how to distinguish science from non-science in the sense relevant to the 
characterisation of EN.  That will be the subject of the following chapter. 
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Chapter Three 
Naturalism and Scientific Practice 
 
In the previous chapter I argued that naturalism is best understood as an 
epistemological position which treats science as exclusively competent with 
respect to knowledge acquisition.  The question then arises as to what it is that 
naturalists mean by ‘science’ as opposed to ‘non-science’, such that the former 
should be uniquely potent.  Although this question is closely related to the 
classical ‘problem of demarcation’, it is not quite the same.  I am concerned with 
finding a characterisation of science appropriate to naturalism and as it bears on a 
naturalistic approach to normativity.  Just as in the previous chapter I considered 
characterising naturalism either in terms of its epistemological or ontological 
commitments, in section 3.1 I consider whether science should be characterised 
either in terms of its distinctive methods or its subject properties.  I argue against 
both proposals and present a case in section 3.2 for taking refereed scientific 
articles as proxy indicators of scientific practice.  Lastly, in section 3.3, I connect 
scientific papers to an objectifying stance which typifies scientific practice.   
 
3.1 The Properties and Methods of Science 
 
I would like to begin by considering the proposal that one can demarcate 
scientific disciplines from non-scientific disciplines in terms of their respective 
properties.  The natural thought is that physics studies the physical, chemistry the 
chemical, biology the biological and so forth.  More generally, whereas the 
natural sciences investigate natural properties, the subject properties of non-
scientific disciplines are non-natural.  This accords well with one of the intuitions 
which drives naturalism, namely that everything should be explicable in terms of 
the same sort of properties we require to explain paradigmatically physical 
objects, such as Austin’s medium-sized dry goods.  However, this view of 
science would fit poorly with the arguments of the previous chapter, suggesting 
that naturalism could after all be given an ontological basis.  Moreover, there are 
several independent reasons to think that it will not do to demarcate science from 
non-science in this way.  One now familiar reason is the difficulty of saying what 
it is that distinguishes natural from non-natural properties.  It would be circular 
to suggest that the former are those properties which figure in the theories of 
natural scientists.  More significantly, we can point towards instances of two 
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subjects, one scientific and one non-scientific, with the same subject matter.  
Richard von Mises provides an interesting example: 
 
The transition from green to brown is the river landscape, declares the 
landscapist Jacob van Ruisdael, and he accomplishes with this something 
similar to what the physicist does when he says that sounds are air 
vibrations.  Every painting, every artistic creation is a theory of a specific 
section of reality.  (1951: 303) 
 
This is a curious view of art, and a rather implausible one when one considers 
non-representational artists whose work is intended to provoke a purely aesthetic 
response.  Nevertheless, there is some plausibility to the claim that art can reveal 
something of the physical nature of the world, assuming we can make sense of 
non-propositional knowledge.  If so, von Mises is right that art cannot be 
distinguished from physics on the basis that only the latter is concerned with 
representing physical properties.  The important point, however, is that the 
overlap between scientific and non-scientific subject matter should be accepted 
by those engaged in naturalisation programmes.  It was because von Mises was 
engaged in the project of unifying human knowledge under the umbrella of the 
physical sciences that it was important to him to show that art and physics have 
shared subject matter.  Consider, for example, the project of naturalising 
epistemology.  Even if one is persuaded by Quine that the traditional project of 
epistemology is bankrupt, why replace it with psychology?  Why not pottery, 
dancing or physics?  The transition from a discipline to its successor is a non 
sequitur unless the successor addresses a recognisably similar set of questions.  It 
is for this reason that advocates of naturalised epistemology have been at pains to 
argue that psychology can answer the traditional epistemological questions 
concerning the conditions under which we are in a state of knowledge.1  Thus, 
Quine maintains: 
 
                                                        
1 The concern remains that rather than replacing traditional epistemology, naturalised 
epistemology merely institutes a shift from the normative question ‘what, if anything, can we 
have reason to believe?’ to the purely descriptive question ‘how do we arrive at our beliefs?’  I 
discuss this concern in chapter five and in Turp (2008). 
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A far cry, this, from the old epistemology.  Yet it is no gratuitous change of 
subject matter, but an enlightened persistence rather in the original 
epistemological problem.  (1974: 3)2 
 
All of this suggests, then, that naturalists cannot distinguish science from non-
science on the basis of their respective subject properties.  This is just what we 
would expect given our earlier argument that naturalism is not an ontological 
thesis. 
 
If science cannot be distinguished from non-science in terms of its subject 
properties, perhaps we should look to methodological differences.  There may 
also be differences in the resultant theories, but for EN to be justified there must 
be some reason why scientific theories should be preferred to non-scientific 
theories.  Most obviously, this preference could be explained in terms of the 
superiority of scientific method.  Of course, questions concerning scientific 
method constitute a major topic within the philosophy of science, beyond the 
scope of the present thesis.  Fortunately, however, we do not need to undertake a 
detailed analysis of the various rival theories.  For, whatever the respective 
merits of, say, the hypothetico-deductive, Bayesian-inductive or inference-to-the-
best-explanation models, EN does not depend on a formal account. 
 
One reason why standard philosophical method-based solutions to the problem 
of demarcation are not germane to the purpose of characterising EN is that 
naturalists cannot be committed only to those methods which are distinctive of 
science as opposed to non-science.  For EN to be defensible, scientific method 
must be understood widely enough to account for all obvious sources of 
knowledge.  Much of our knowledge is available to apparently non-inferential, 
pre-scientific or extra-scientific consciousness.  Examples include introspective 
statements such as ‘I know I exist’ or ‘I know I am in pain’, direct observational 
statements such as ‘I know Jack is sitting in front of me’, memory statements 
such as ‘I know I ate toast for breakfast’, or linguistic statements such as ‘I know 
what this sentence means’ or ‘I know that Jill said she would meet me for lunch’.  
One could easily multiply examples of such knowledge claims, which bear no                                                         
2 Similarly, Goldman (1993) insists that scientific epistemology, if it is still to count as 
epistemology, must begin with an account of our ‘epistemic folkways’, by which he means our 
standard repertoire of epistemic concepts; justification, knowledge, rationality and the like.  
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obvious dependence on scientific method formally construed in terms of 
inferences from model experimental situations.3 
 
None of this is to deny that scientists rely on these methods of knowledge 
formation in practice.  Of course, successful science presupposes our ability to 
reliably acquire knowledge in ways not unique to science.  As scientific practice 
extends to methods employed in common with other disciplines, and with no 
discipline in particular, so, then, should the appropriate characterisation of 
scientific methodology.  An account solely in terms of what is distinctive of 
scientific method will not do.  This must be the case for the epistemological 
naturalist to maintain that science is the one true path to knowledge.  However, 
we then return to the question of why those shared methods should be suitable 
for knowledge acquisition in a way that methods employed solely in non-
scientific contexts are not.  Given the apparent heterogeneity of distinctively 
scientific methods and methods shared with other disciplines, it might seem 
unlikely that they share a common property other than that of being employed by 
scientists.  However, EN requires that only beliefs arrived at through scientific 
methods are proper candidates for knowledge.  Thus, scientific methods must 
share some normative property in virtue of which they are uniquely suited to 
generate justified beliefs.  The bare fact that such methods are employed by 
scientists, unmotivated by other considerations, is an implausible candidate.  
 
For EN to be true, then, there must be something special about the methods 
employed by scientific practitioners, something to be captured in normative 
terms.  Moreover, it seems that the appropriate normative account must be drawn 
from scientific practice, as opposed to the philosophy of science, insofar as the 
latter is a distinct discipline employing distinct methods.  This provides us with 
another reason to doubt that standard methodological solutions to the problem of 
demarcation will help to characterise EN.  For, it would be dialectically 
counterproductive to insist on characterising the naturalist’s position employing                                                         
3 The psychologist Kevin Dunbar goes so far as to argue that there are no cognitive strategies 
unique to science, the difference between science and non-science resulting from the sequence in 
which various cognitive strategies are deployed: ‘Without question, human beings, including 
children, possess each of these cognitive skills.  The way that these skills are brought together is 
what makes the thinking of a baseball player different from a molecular biologist.’  (2002: 168) 
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philosophical or normative analyses which transcend actual scientific practice.  
The naturalist will not accept an external criterion based on methods she does not 
accept.  It is not the business of philosophy, she will insist, to tell scientists what 
they ought to be doing, or whether what they are doing counts as scientific.  
Indeed, it is something like this thought which motivates EN in the first place.  
Quine writes that naturalists have ‘the robust state of mind of the natural scientist 
who has never felt any qualms beyond the negotiable uncertainties internal to 
science’ (1981: 72).4  If ‘robust’ has a non-rhetorical function, it is likely that it 
refers to the naturalistic refusal to engage with traditional philosophy discussed 
in the previous chapter.  If we want to know what the naturalist considers special 
about science, we need to look to scientific practice, not to prior philosophy.  
 
3.2 Articles as Proxy Indicators of Scientific Practice 
 
We come, then, to the idea that the most promising way to characterise 
naturalism is as a commitment to the omnicompetence of a research programme 
governed by the norms internal to scientific practice.  How though are we to 
identify these norms?  Unfortunately, they cannot be straightforwardly read off 
from scientific practice.  Whilst scientists sometimes contaminate samples, 
distort data and forget crucial facts, such activities do not count as norm-
governed scientific practice.  This is not only because such behaviours are 
statistically uncommon.  Were a majority of working scientists to conduct their 
research by smashing culture tubes and divining theories from the scattered 
shards, culture tube smashing would not thereby count as scientific.  Culture tube 
smashing violates the internal norms which are partly constitutive of scientific 
practice.  One is not a scientist at all if one deviates too often from these norms, 
inculcated over a lengthy apprenticeship. 
 
Legislating and policing these internal norms is a matter for scientific 
practitioners, and describing them is most properly a matter for science studies 
and ‘lab anthropology’.  Providing a detailed descriptive account of scientific                                                         
4 Similarly, Penelope Maddy describes ‘the fundamental spirit that underlies all naturalism’ as 
‘the conviction that a successful enterprise, be it science or mathematics, should be understood 
and evaluated on its own terms, that such an enterprise should not be subject to criticism from, 
and does not stand in need of support from, some external, supposedly higher point of view’ 
(1997:184).  Again, Ritchie advocates that we ‘start thinking about science within scientific 
practice, not trying to provide a justification of science from outwith science’ (2008: 88). 
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practice is not the task of philosophers per se.  Moreover, the fact that we do not 
find any such account in the writings of self-proclaimed philosophical naturalists 
seems to indicate that it is not essential to the characterisation of their position.  
On the other hand, if we are to advance our understanding of the relationship 
between naturalism and the metaphysics of normativity, it is essential to do 
something more substantial than gesture towards scientific practice.  In lieu of a 
detailed descriptive account, I propose, therefore, that we take the refereed 
scientific journal article as a proxy indicator of scientific practice.  I shall spend 
the remainder of this section defending the proposal, before drawing out certain 
relevant consequences in section 3.3. 
 
Refereed articles are the premier form of knowledge dissemination within the 
scientific community and, as such, subject to the strictest standards of peer 
review.  Indeed, it is the purpose of the peer review process to ensure that the 
research under review conforms to the professional norms governing the 
discipline.  As Fred Suppe writes: 
 
The principal tasks of a scientific paper are to present knowledge claims 
and support them with sufficient explicit justification to enable discipline 
members and gatekeepers to evaluate whether to accept these claims and 
admit them into the discipline’s domain of putative knowledge.  (1998: 
384) 
 
Scientific articles are public and open descriptions of research, which have been 
judged by authoritative scientific practitioners to conform to the norms of their 
discipline.  I am not proposing that a biconditional holds between successful 
scientific practice and published research in refereed journals.  Obviously 
enough, publication is not sufficient.5  Reviewers are fallible and consequently a 
certain amount of pseudoscience slips past the gatekeepers into print.  This is 
perhaps most likely in journals with a relatively poor reputation, and also in 
certain prestigious letters journals in which truncated pieces can be rushed to 
press ahead of competitors.  As this is predictable to a certain degree, we might                                                         
5 Nor is it necessary.  It would seem arbitrary to bar research as scientific on the grounds that a 
researcher leaves it absent-mindedly in a drawer as opposed to an editor’s inbox.  Perhaps the 
more pertinent point is whether the research would be accepted for publication, were it to be 
submitted.  However, this type of modal claim seems far more problematic for a naturalist 
wanting a criterion involving only scientifically discoverable properties. 
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make the proposal more precise by counting only papers published in journals 
with a high impact factor, or papers of a certain length, or, retrospectively, papers 
with a certain number of positive citations. However this may be, the general 
principle is that non-science or pseudoscience ought not to appear in refereed 
journals.  If non-science appears, it is by error.  Moreover, the error of allowing 
the non-science into print is to be attributed to the reviewers and is to be 
corrected by their peers.  No appeal is made to an external philosophical tribunal.  
If the alleged research findings are important within the field, it is likely that they 
will be rebutted in future papers, providing a corrective mechanism internal to 
the practice. 
 
The primary advantage of taking refereed articles as proxy indicators of scientific 
practice is that it allows us to provide an account of the normative standards 
governing scientific practice without relying upon any prior philosophy.  
Although a normative realist might object that it conflates the norms which 
scientific practitioners take to govern their disciple with the norms that in fact 
govern it, naturalists would reject the presupposition of a two-level framework.  
On a naturalistic account, there is no normative standard external to scientific 
practice to be conflated with the norms internal to science.  Similarly, naturalists 
will not be in a position to object that the proposal is circular, for any account of 
science without recourse to extra-scientific resources must be circular.  
Therefore, if a naturalist were to disagree with my constructive proposal, it could 
only be on the grounds that scientific papers misrepresent the norms internal to 
scientific practice.  Before addressing this type of objection, we might note two 
further advantages of taking refereed scientific articles as our basis for 
identifying scientific norms. First, the proposal chimes well with our earlier 
conclusion that naturalism concerns methodology not ontology.  A scientific 
paper is selected for publication depending upon the cogency of its reasoning, 
rather than its results.  When science progresses, the results are not known in 
advance of the research.6  A second advantage of leaving the task of judging                                                         
6 This is not to suggest that scientists have no advance beliefs concerning the outcome of their 
experiments.  Indeed, experimental results are sometimes considered so unlikely that they are 
rejected or ignored without any methodological flaw being identified.  As Max Perutz observes, 
‘an experiment is an experiment and calls for an explanation, but it can be hard to discover the 
explanation for someone else’s spurious results, and without it they cannot be convincingly 
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what counts as scientific to the relevant gatekeepers is that it respects the clearly 
permissible differences in methodology between disciplines.  Particle physicists 
judge what counts as legitimate method within particle physics, molecular 
biologists within molecular biology, and so forth.  Thus, we can circumvent the 
potential objection to EN that the sciences are too diverse to exhibit a single 
methodological structure.7 
 
It might still be objected that taking refereed articles as proxy indicators of 
scientific practice is likely to mislead us insofar as there is a mismatch between 
what scientists do and what they say that they have done.  For instance, 
Schickore writes: 
 
Since the research reports [within published scientific articles] do not 
preserve the temporal order or logic of the thinking processes nor the steps 
of the experimental pathway, they do not provide any dependable 
information about the nature of scientific practice.  (2008: 330)8 
 
Whether or not one agrees that research reports provide no dependable 
information, it is true that scientific articles are not straightforward reports of 
research undertaken.  This should come as no surprise, for, as already mentioned, 
the purpose of a scientific paper is to provide evidence-based justification for 
knowledge claims.  We should be no more taken aback by the fact that scientific 
papers are not transparent reports of scientific practice than by the fact that a 
philosophy paper is a poor record of its author’s thought processes.  In both cases 
we are not being offered a record at all, but the marshalling of reasons in favour 
of knowledge claims.  Much of a scientist’s time is taken up pursuing lines of 
research which turn out to be irrelevant to the justification of her final claims, or 
which she misconstrues the significance of at the time.  In the context of 
justification the temporal order in which the evidence was obtained, or the 
temporal order in which the thoughts occurred to the author, is simply irrelevant.  
One way to make this clear is by noting that the term ‘science’ is ambiguous 
between activity and product.  So, we can just as properly say that an experiment                                                         
disproved’ (1998: 138).  It remains the case, however, that experimental data properly arrived at 
ought to trump prior expectations. 
7 See, for instance, Chalmers (1999: Ch. 11). 
8 Similarly, Peter Medawar writes that ‘it is no use looking to scientific “papers”, for they not 
merely conceal but actively misrepresent the reasoning that goes into the work they describe’  
(1961: 169). 
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is science as we can say that the resultant theory is science.  Epistemological 
naturalists, however, are committed to a view concerning knowledge, which is a 
scientific product. Although naturalists will point out that the product is justified 
by the activity, it is a truism that scientific activity can only justify a knowledge 
claim when that activity is relevant to its justification.  Insofar as scientific 
articles represent successful attempts to filter out of reports research activity 
which is irrelevant to the justification of the knowledge claims, they thereby 
filter out information which is also irrelevant to the naturalists’ claims.  In this 
way, scientific articles are better indicators of the scientific norms relevant to the 
justification of EN than a perfectly transparent research report would be. 
 
It must be conceded, however, that even if an article serves as a good indicator of 
norms, it is not an explicit statement of them.  It is no more the role of scientific 
articles to articulate the norms by which they are governed than it is the role of a 
game of chess to articulate its own rulebook. Moreover, the fact that certain 
norms or methodological standards are reflected in a scientific article does not 
entail that the research was conducted in consultation with those norms.  Would 
it not be better, therefore, to look directly at the scientific rulebook, to explicit 
statements of scientific method?  One difficulty is that scientific method is not 
itself part of the subject matter of the natural sciences.  It is the task of biologists 
to study living matter, not to study the general features of the methods that they 
employ to study living matter.  When scientists do write broadly concerning 
methodology it is generally for the benefit of their students.  Most common is a 
brief three or four page discussion at the beginning of a textbook.  Unfortunately 
these discussions rarely describe science as it is actually practised, most 
frequently garbling ideas from the philosophy of science instead.9  Indeed, the 
overwhelming impression is that most scientists have little serious interest in 
providing rigorous formal accounts of the methods they employ, or doubt the 
possibility of doing so.  The following comments come from philosophically 
reflective scientists, both Nobel laureates: 
 
There is indeed no such thing as “the” scientific method.  A scientist uses a                                                         
9 Blachowicz (2009) analyses 70 textbook discussions of scientific method, and has a certain 
amount of fun highlighting their inconsistencies and errors. 
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very great variety of explanatory stratagems, and although a scientist has a 
certain address to his problems – a certain way of going about things that is 
more likely to bring success than the gropings of an amateur – he uses no 
procedure of discovery that can be logically scripted. (Medawar 1984: 51) 
 
Scientists rarely follow any of the scientific methods that philosophers have 
prescribed for them.  They use their common sense.  (Perutz 1998: 123)  
 
Of course, the selection of appropriate scientific strategies is not really a matter 
of ‘common sense’, but rather a matter of the sense common to scientific 
practitioners who have undergone a standardised process of training.  Thus, 
Polanyi emphasises scientists’ reliance on ‘tacit knowledge’, the kind of 
unarticulated wisdom which allows an experienced physicist to see subnuclear 
events represented in a bubble chamber photograph where a novice would see 
only confusion.10  The importance of tacit knowledge, he maintains, means that 
‘the methods of scientific inquiry cannot be explicitly formulated and hence can 
be transmitted only in the same way as an art, by the affiliation of apprentices to 
a master’ (1962: 69).  A scientist’s possession of procedural knowledge does not 
entail possession of the corresponding propositional knowledge.    
 
The above is of course no demonstration of the impossibility of articulating a 
formal account of scientific method, although it does perhaps cast doubt on the 
project.  Rather it is to emphasise that scientific practitioners do not consciously 
rely on any such account and cannot be depended upon to provide one.  
Moreover, the norms governing scientific practice exhibit considerably greater 
plasticity than we see in a strictly rule-governed practice such as chess.  We need 
not say with Feyerabend that ‘anything goes’ in order to acknowledge that norms 
governing scientific method are related to the pursuit of changing scientific 
goals.11  Scientists do not respect these norms for their own sake, but because                                                         
10 See further Kuhn (1970: 111). 
11 Just what the aims of science are is of course a matter of considerable controversy.  Popular 
candidates include truth, verisimilitude, knowledge, explanation, prediction, puzzle-solving and 
empirical adequacy.  Resnik (1993), however, argues that science is without aims.  The core of 
his argument is that scientific aims must either be a matter of the goals scientists in fact have, or a 
normative matter to be settled by philosophers of science.  But, as a descriptive matter, there are 
no aims which are shared by all and only scientists (and nor does science have an appropriate 
hierarchy to attribute aims to a type of corporate structure).  Moreover, Resnik argues that the 
normative pronouncements of philosophers float free of scientific practice and are therefore too 
abstract and general to be of interest to working scientists.  Whatever the merits of his particular 
arguments, Resnik is correct in his insistence that an account of scientific practice should meet 
the dual desiderata of reflecting what it is that scientists actually do and holding their activities to 
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experience indicates that they lead to the satisfaction or partial satisfaction of 
scientific aims. Thus, scientific methodology allows for the innovation and 
change that modifies but does not destroy the practice.12  We might think, for 
instance, of the move away from the direct evidence of the senses to the evidence 
of instruments such as telescopes, the debate between Galileo and his 
Aristotelian peers being a much discussed example.13  Although scientific 
journals are essentially conservative, it is reasonable to suppose that they respond 
to changes in scientific practice more quickly and accurately than textbooks. 
 
3.3 Scientific Articles and Objectification 
 
I have proposed, then, that we take refereed scientific articles as proxy indicators 
of norm-governed scientific practice.  In the course of the argument, I addressed 
two potential objections, namely (i) that scientific papers misrepresent scientific 
practice and (ii) that scientific papers are worse indicators than scientist’s explicit 
methodological statements.  Earlier I rejected the view that scientific practice can 
be characterised in terms of its ontological commitments or in terms of an 
atemporal methodology.  As the norms governing scientific papers are related to 
the pursuit of changing proximate goals, acceptable methods vary across 
scientific disciplines and over time.  Nevertheless, I think it is possible to discern 
certain essential features of science reflected in the norms governing scientific 
publication.  Of particular significance, as I shall now explain, is the objectifying 
character of the scientific stance. 
 
In a guide to scientific publication, primarily written for the benefit of junior 
research scientists, Robert Day states that a paper must fulfil the following 
criteria: 
                                                         
normative standards.  The present move towards scientific practice, with refereed articles as 
success indicators, provides, it seems to me, the appropriate combination of normative and 
descriptive criteria.  
12 As Polanyi writes: ‘The professional standards of science must impose a framework of 
discipline and at the same time encourage rebellion against it.  They must demand that, in order 
to be taken seriously, an investigation should largely conform to the currently predominant 
beliefs about the nature of things, while allowing that in order to be original it may to some 
extent go against these.  Thus, the authority of scientific opinion enforces the teachings of science 
in general, for the very purpose of fostering their subversion in particular points.’ (1962: 58–9) 
13 See, for example, Feyerabend (1975) and Chalmers (1999: 163–8). 
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Sufficient information must be presented so that potential users of the data 
can (i) assess observations, (ii) repeat experiments, and (iii) evaluate 
intellectual processes.  (1979: 2)14 
 
On a reasonably broad interpretation, (i) and (iii) are simply requirements of 
clarity and transparency in content and logic respectively.  We should expect this 
from philosophy as much as from science.   Let us, then, concentrate on (ii), the 
requirement of reproducibility.   As Day emphasises later: 
 
The cornerstone of scientific method requires that your results, to be of 
scientific merit, must be reproducible … The fact that experiments are 
unlikely to be reproduced is beside the point; the potential for producing the 
same or similar results must exist.  (1979: 26) 
 
The deontological terms ‘requires’ and ‘must’ – Day’s italics – can be taken to 
indicate that we are dealing with necessary conditions for engaging in scientific 
practice, rather than recommendations related to local scientific goals.15  If one’s 
research is not in principle reproducible, it is not scientific.  In order to meet the 
demand of reproducibility, however, agents within a scientific research 
programme must adopt a particular epistemic stance towards the world, 
excluding certain putative methods of knowledge acquisition and sources of 
content.  One distinguishing feature of the scientific stance is that it is 
objectifying.  The sense of ‘objectifying’ I have in mind refers to the distinction 
between objects and persons, although the distinction between objectivity and 
subjectivity is a close conceptual relation.  In adopting an objectifying stance, a 
scientist describes and acts upon the world as if it were wholly populated by 
disenchanted objects, standing in value-free, causal and constitutive relations, 
                                                        
14 Day adopts these criteria from a definition of a scientific paper proposed by the Council of 
Biology Editors, now the Council of Science Editors, a professional organisation for editors of 
scientific journals. 
15 There is of course a sense in which philosophy is also reproducible.  At least, philosophers are 
generally able to follow one another’s lines of thought.  On one view, this is a matter of 
entertaining a series of numerically identical propositions.  The trouble is that even when 
philosophers follow the same line of thought, they frequently do not agree on its significance or 
non-formal implications.  Equally, philosophers often agree concerning the validity of an 
argument, but not its soundness.  This is rather as if a scientists successfully reproduced the 
methods sections of each other’s papers, but with no consistency in terms of results. One possible 
explanation is that philosophical questions do not, by and large, allow for the control of variables.  
Related to this, there is no clear limit to what is potentially relevant to a philosophical argument, 
or at least no generally agreed-upon procedure for determining what is relevant.  As a result, 
individual philosophers appeal to those arguments and features of the world which strike them as 
most salient. 
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potentially amenable to experimental intervention.16  Employing Sellars’ 
distinction, it is a turn from the manifest image to the scientific image of man-in-
the-world, with things not persons as its objects.  As persons are objectified, they 
are no longer recognised as sui generis elements of the world, but reduced to 
biological or perhaps psychological processes.  It is this approach which, seeking 
to demystify the mind, generates familiar philosophical issues such as the 
problem of intentionality and the hard problem of consciousness.   
 
The objectification of the perceptible world is a familiar element of the Modern 
Scientific Worldview and leads more or less immediately back to the problem of 
locating value-makers discussed in chapter one.  It is difficult to see how the 
constituents of a disenchanted world could have the requisite normative force to 
guide thought or action.  Normative properties begin to look queer.  Instead of 
labouring this point further, however, I would like to turn to look at another 
aspect of the scientist’s objectifying stance.  This is the idea that for scientific 
work to be reproducible, the elimination of persons in favour of objects must be 
carried through consistently.  In particular, the scientist is himself a person with a 
unique point of view on the world, and so must make every effort to remove 
himself from the scene of his investigations.  Looking at scientific writing, this 
aim is reflected in the convention that papers are written in the third person, 
despite the research having been conducted by particular scientists in particular 
settings.17  It is also reflected in the norm of avoiding indexical expressions.  As 
Russell writes: 
 
No egocentric particulars occur in the language of physics.  Physics views 
space-time impartially, as God might be supposed to view it; there is not, as 
in perception, a region which is specially warm and intimate and bright, 
surrounded in all directions by gradually growing darkness.  A physicist will 
not say “I saw a table”, but like Neurath or Julius Caesar, “Otto saw a 
table”; he will not say “A meteor is visible now”, but “A meteor was visible 
at 8h. 43m. G.M.T.”, and in this statement “was” is intended to be without 
tense.  (1962: 102) 
                                                         
16 Following a decade of observing laboratory meetings, Dunbar reports that ‘causal reasoning is 
one of the key types of cognitive activity that … scientists engage in – accounting for over 80% 
of the statements made at a meeting’ (2002: 157). 
17 The convention is of course disingenuous and seems to be falling out of fashion.  Nature has 
for some years now cultivated the editorial policy of encouraging the use of the active voice and 
consequent first person (usually plural).  Science has more recently followed suit. 
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As there is only one here and now, at the time and place of utterance, indexical 
elements cannot be reproduced.18  Pace Russell, the ‘was’ of ‘a meteor was 
visible at 8h. 43m. G.M.T.’ should be tensed, but only as a temporary matter of 
publishing etiquette.  At the time of writing, a scientific paper has not been 
published and so its contents have not yet been accredited as scientific 
knowledge.  When scientists refer to previously published work, including their 
own, they employ the present tense in order to indicate that they are referring to 
timeless knowledge.  For instance, it would be correct to write “x upregulates y 
(Smith 2010)”, but incorrect to write “Smith (2010) found that x upregulated y”. 
 
Although superficial features in themselves, these stylistic conventions are 
indicative of the self-effacing nature of the scientific stance.  The cumulative 
result is the impression of a paper’s author fading to an extensionless point.19  
Thus, Popper asserts that ‘“scientific knowledge” may be regarded as 
subjectless’ (1970: 57).  Although one might doubt whether there is much literal 
sense to be made of subjectless knowledge, this does appear to be the regulative 
ideal governing scientific practice and made manifest in scientific papers.  At 
least, the presentation and interpretation of research in a scientific paper should 
not depend upon the idiosyncrasies of a particular subject.  Consider, for 
instance, Day’s comment: 
 
The preparer of a scientific paper is not really an “author” in the literary sense.  
In fact, I go so far as to say that, if the ingredients are properly organized, the 
paper will virtually write itself.  (1979: 4) 
 
It is revealing in this respect that science departments sometimes hire third-party 
specialists for the purpose of writing up experiments, a situation predicated upon 
the interchangeability of one ‘preparer’ with another.  Whatever the egocentric 
particulars of the researcher, and however vital these may have been in the                                                         
18  Some philosophers have questioned the intelligibility of adopting an indexical-free stance.  
The concern is that agency requires a view from somewhere.  Thus, McGinn writes that ‘when I 
imagine myself divested of indexical thoughts, employing only centreless mental representations, 
I eo ipso imagine myself deprived of the power to act’ (1983: 104).  For the original statement of 
the problem of the essential indexical see Perry (1979). 
19 Whilst in the biological sciences there remain conventions enabling one to discern something 
of the respective inputs of the named authors on a paper, high-energy experimental physics has 
reached the point at which authors are listed alphabetically.  This can run to several hundred 
names at large collaborations such as CERN.  For detailed discussion see Knorr Cetina (1999: 
167). 
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context of discovery, they cannot be replicated at will and are therefore excised 
from the published report.  
 
Moreover, just as the organisation of the ingredients should not depend on the 
peculiarities of persons, neither should the production of the ingredients.  Whilst 
skilled, the physical work of experimentation in modern laboratories is highly 
automated and frequently devolved away from group heads to doctoral or 
postdoctoral students.  For instance, a biologist’s contact with her subject matter 
is normally mediated by gel apparatuses, PCR (polymerase chain reaction) 
machines, electron microscopes and the like.  The resulting data is then 
processed using standard analytical tools, such as Southern blots and western 
blots, once more automated.  In large pharmaceutical laboratories cell cultures 
are mechanically exposed to millions of biochemical compounds whilst a 
computer programme ‘searches’ for significant patterns.  The researcher only 
becomes involved after the computer ‘discovers’ something of potential interest.  
Although it is true that the automation of research is motivated by considerations 
of speed and efficiency, it also reflects once again the regulative ideal of 
subjectless knowledge.  As Joseph Hanna writes, ‘science makes progress 
through the replacement of subjective protocol judgments by objective artifactual 
data’ (2004: 342; emphases removed).  As with the objectifying stance quite 
generally, automation has the significant epistemic benefit of promoting 
distributed cognition.20  Individual scientists become more or less 
interchangeable nodes in a cognitive network, collectively performing more 
work as a result.  It helps to foster what Dewey described as the ‘cooperative 
tendency towards consensus which marks inquiry in the natural sciences’ (1929: 
30). 
 
Given the account of normative epistemology I shall be developing in chapter 
nine, it is also worth highlighting that whilst emotional responses play a 
significant role in the context of discovery, they are excluded from scientific 
                                                        
20 See Giere (2006) for a detailed discussion of the Hubble Space Telescope programme as an 
example of distributed cognition. 
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articles.21  As well as the distorting effect emotions can have upon cognition, 
emotional responses are unlikely to be consistently repeated and confirmed, and 
unlikely, therefore, to receive experimental backing.  One reason for the 
disturbing influence of the emotions is their function of highlighting aspects of 
the world as salient and valenced.  As the perceived salience of some feature 
depends on contextual factors and background interests, the objectifying stance 
cannot take note of emotional responses.  Borrowing a phrase from the 
particularism debate, we are left surveying a flattened normative landscape. 
 
I have argued, then, that the rhetoric of scientific papers suggests a regulative 
ideal of subjectless knowledge, which is one facet of an objectifying stance that 
takes things rather than persons as its objects.  This stance enables 
reproducibility; an essential feature of scientific practice which facilitates 
distributed cognition.  It might be objected, however, that this is a misleading 
caricature of scientific practice.  For instance, methods sections rarely provide 
sufficient detail to replicate an experiment precisely and it is in any case 
uncommon for an experiment to be replicated.  Pragmatically, there is little point.  
If the results match, the research will not normally be interesting enough to 
publish.  If the results do not match, this can be attributed to minor 
methodological differences.  Protocols invariably underdetermine action, and no 
two laboratories are identical.  Perhaps more seriously, it might be objected that 
scientists are not interchangeable automata and that it is fortunate that they are 
not, given that science is sometimes driven forwards by radical shifts of 
perspective initiated by individuals.  This is a phenomenon we associate with 
great scientists such as Copernicus, Darwin and Einstein, men who lived in 
different worlds according to Kuhn.  Yet, even if a psychological or historical 
explanation of their advances would make reference to the genius peculiar to 
these men, their theories were not justified by their peculiarities.  Indeed, I have 
already agreed that the norms governing scientific publication do not reflect 
scientific practice.  This is because the norms relate to the context of 
justification, not to the context of discovery.  The context of justification is the 
appropriate place to look for naturalistically acceptable norms given that                                                         
21 For a discussion of the role of affective states in scientific research see Hookway (2002) and 
Thagard (2002). 
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naturalism amounts to a claim concerning scientific knowledge.  If subjectless 
knowledge is a regulative ideal governing the context of justification, it is no 
objection that this is not fully reflected in the context of discovery. 
 
Even if it is granted that science is appropriately characterised in terms of its 
objectifying stance, one might nevertheless protest that this is an incomplete 
characterisation.  And indeed, this would be true.22  For I have not attempted to 
provide a solution to the problem of demarcation in the form of necessary and 
sufficient conditions.  In fact, I would treat such a project with suspicion given 
the non-rigid identity conditions of scientific practice.  Rather, I have attempted 
to identify the most promising approach to constructing a naturalistically 
acceptable account of science and to provide that account with substantive 
content relevant to the programme of developing a naturalistic account of 
normativity.  In the previous chapter I argued that naturalism is a commitment to 
scientism.  I have now proposed that a naturalistically acceptable account of 
science could profitably take refereed scientific articles as proxy indicators of the 
normative standards governing scientific practice.  Thus, naturalism becomes the 
view that all knowledge is of the sort which could in principle meet the peer 
review standards of scientific journals.  All knowledge must be acquirable from 
the perspective of an objectifying stance which effaces the subject and 
disenchants the world.  I shall begin to consider the prospects of such an account 
in the next chapter by looking at the concrete proposal of naturalising 
epistemology and the manner in which proponents of naturalised epistemology 
propose to account for epistemic normativity. 
 
 
 
                                                        
22 One obvious omission from my discussion is the putatively empirical character of science.  In 
fact, scientists are more likely to be concerned with the question of whether research is 
experimental than with whether it is empirical.  However, these questions appear to collapse 
when we notice that empirical knowledge is most plausibly understood in terms of the existence 
of a causal chain linking an object and a mental state.  As experimentation requires interaction, 
possibly indirect, with some part of that causal chain, it is empirical.  However, it might be better 
not to insist on characterising science in empirical terms given naturalists’ reliance on the formal 
disciplines of logic and mathematics. 
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Chapter Four 
Naturalised Logic and Normativity 
 
In chapter two I argued that naturalism is best construed in terms of its 
epistemological commitments.  In chapter three I offered an account of the 
distinction between science and non-science.  Whether or not my constructive 
proposal for a naturalistic solution to the demarcation problem is the best 
available, my claim that an objectifying stance is a regulative ideal of scientific 
practice should appear independently plausible.  It is in part a function of the 
public nature of science and its methodological dependence on distributed 
cognition.  I also argued in chapter two that the most productive manner in 
which to judge naturalism is according to its fruits.  In the next two chapters I 
shall take up this task and examine the resources naturalists might bring to bear 
on the problem of explaining normativity.  In chapter five, I shall consider the 
popular strategy of reducing normative reasons to instrumental reasons.  First, 
however, I propose to look closely at Penelope Maddy’s project of constructing 
naturalistic foundations for logic.  I shall begin in section 4.1 by sketching out 
her account.  This will provide us with a concrete example of naturalised 
philosophy.  In section 4.2 I shall consider whether Maddy’s naturalised logic 
contains within it an explanation for the normative force of logical inference.  
After distinguishing between explanatory and justificatory reasons, I conclude 
that it does not.  In section 4.3, I take a look at logical psychologism and 
consider whether it is possible to bridge the gap between explanations and 
justifications.  I conclude than an independent normative standard is required 
and lead into the next chapter by considering Maddy’s view in relation to 
instrumentalism. 
 
4.1 Maddy’s naturalised philosophy of logic 
 
I argued in chapter two that it is dialectically counterproductive to insist on 
assessing the cogency of naturalism in an extra-scientific, philosophical tribunal.  
Naturalists reject any such two-level system, and should not attempt to mount a 
philosophical defence of their position.1  For, as we have said, if naturalism is a                                                         
1 This dialectic has not of course prevented self-proclaimed naturalists illegitimately advancing a 
number of philosophical arguments.  See Almeder (1998: Ch. 1) for synopsis and criticism of the 
most common of these. 
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thesis, it is a philosophical thesis and thus only directly justifiable by methods 
which the naturalist rejects.  Nevertheless, I have urged a charitable 
interpretation, highlighting parallels with the epistemic position of theorists 
within the philosophical research tradition as viewed from a theistic perspective.  
Rather than defending naturalism directly, naturalists should concentrate on 
pursuing their research programme and offering illuminating accounts of 
traditional philosophical problems.  Perhaps in that way they will have no need 
of philosophical hypotheses. 
 
In this light, Penelope Maddy (2007) offers the most fully developed and 
consistent naturalistic attempt to resolve traditional philosophical questions that I 
know of.  One aspect of her discussion is the invention of a character who has 
fully taken to heart Quine’s rejection of first philosophy.  This character, the 
‘Second Philosopher’, is ‘born native to the laboratory’ (2007: 91) and draws all 
her inspiration from her birthplace.2  Consequently, she ‘doesn’t speak the 
language of contemporary science “like a native”, she is a native’ (2007: 308).  
Her warrant for belief in some proposition just is the scientific evidence in favour 
of that proposition.3  Thus, Maddy draws our attention to  ‘the distinction 
between “I believe in atoms because I believe in science and it supports their 
existence” … and “I believe in atoms because Einstein argued so-and-so, and 
Perrin did experiments such-and-such, with these results”’ (2007: 85-6).4  When 
the Second Philosopher justifies her beliefs, it is on the basis of scientific data, 
not on the basis of more fundamental epistemological principles.  The only 
epistemic norms she accepts are those internal to scientific practice.  She is lost if                                                         
2 As it is sometimes archly remarked, Quine’s writings are more suggestive of inspiration from 
the library than from the laboratory.  See Fogelin (1997: 561). 
3 Thus, Maddy’s position seems to have immunity against Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument 
Against Naturalism (1993, 2002), which I look at in section 5.4 below.  According to Plantinga, 
naturalism and evolution form an unstable coalition.  If evolutionary theory is true then our 
cognitive faculties have been selected for fitness, rather than designed for reliability with respect 
to truth.  This constitutes a defeater for the belief that our cognitive faculties are reliable, and so a 
defeater for our belief that naturalism is true, given that this belief was formed by cognitive 
faculties which we cannot generally take to be reliable.  In response, it seems that Maddy could 
deny that we need any general warrant for the belief that our cognitive faculties deployed in the 
scientific context are reliable. 
4 We find a similar point being made by Dewey: ‘If the empirical method were universally or 
even generally adopted in philosophizing, there would be no need of referring to experience.  The 
scientific inquirer talks and writes about particular observed events and qualities, about specific 
calculations.  He makes no allusions to experience; one would probably have to search a long 
time through reports of special researches in order to find the word.’ (1929: 2) 
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asked for external, non-scientific justification and she consequently declines to 
engage in second-order debates concerning the epistemic framework within 
which she operates.  She attempts no general defence of scientific method other 
than evaluating its conduciveness to the goals internal to scientific practice.  If 
she is guilty of dogmatism, it should also be noted that the Second Philosopher 
can do no other than appeal to her own methods, for she recognises the validity 
of no others.  As Maddy writes, ‘the Second Philosopher has no perspective but 
her own to offer’ (2007: 312).5  In brief, Maddy’s Second Philosopher adopts 
precisely the epistemic standpoint I have been urging upon clearheaded 
naturalists. 
 
Let us, then, consider a concrete example of Maddy’s Second Philosopher at 
work, namely the project of constructing a naturalised account of elementary 
logic.  Logic is normative if anything is, and so a fully naturalised account of 
elementary logic is ipso facto a naturalised account of one aspect of normativity.  
Although there is more technical detail in Maddy’s account than presented 
below, my primary concerns are with the general structure, method and outcome.  
Essentially, Maddy attempts to defend three claims, which she takes to provide 
the basis for a philosophy of logic.  They are as follows: 
 
(1) Logic is true of the world because of its underlying structural features 
(2) Human beings believe logical truths because their most primitive 
cognitive mechanisms allow them to detect and represent the 
aforementioned features of the world 
(3) Human beings are so structured cognitively because they live in a world 
that is so structured physically. (2007: 226) 
 
Thus, we have claims concerning (1) the truth conditions of logic and (2) the 
epistemology of logic.  We also have in (3) a principle connecting (1) and (2). 
 
Maddy’s first step in defence of this account is to describe a simplified, abstract 
‘KF-world’ consisting of elements corresponding to the elements of a 
                                                        
5 Although, it is worth adding, naturalists do have recourse to intra-scientific criticism.  A critique 
of one scientific discipline can be mounted from within another.  See further Roland (2007: 430-
3) who discusses the possibility of naturalistic intra-scientific criticism under the rubric of 
‘disciplinary holism’. 
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rudimentary system of logic.6  In particular, A KF-world contains objects, a, b, c, 
…, which bear various properties, P, Q, …, and stand in various relations with 
various numbers of arguments, R, S, …  (2007: 228).  From an object failing to 
enjoy some property or stand in some relation, we have the idea of negation.  
From an object standing in relation to more than one other object, or being 
related either this way or that, we have the ideas of conjunction and disjunction 
respectively.  Also, properties can hold universally in a KF-world, with 
existentials accompanying universals in the standard way (i.e. ∀xPx ↔ ¬∃x¬Px).  
Maddy discusses the interconnections between these element in considerable 
detail, explaining how situations in the KF-world correspond to logical 
connectives, and indicating how this world differs from an alternative world 
modelling intuitionistic logic.   
 
With this model in hand, Maddy argues that the actual world contains elements 
corresponding to those of a KF-world.  Beginning with objects, Maddy argues 
that ‘common sense clearly endorses the idea that the world contains many 
medium-sized physical objects’ (2007: 234).  As well as common sense, 
scientific discourse makes apparently ineliminable reference to a great many 
objects, from cells to stars.  Physics also provides an account of objects as 
complicated arrangements of atoms held together by atomic bonds, distinct from 
neighbouring atoms and regions of space, and generating electromagnetic fields.  
The Second Philosopher is not interested in, and indeed can make no sense of, 
the sort of hyperbolic doubt concerning the existence of objects which would 
undermine all of her methods.  So, there is no room for scepticism concerning 
the existence of macroscopic objects.7  Again, the fact that objects enjoy 
properties and stand in relations is both reflected in scientific discourse and a 
straightforward matter of common sense (2007: 237–9).  If it seems laboured, the                                                         
6 The designation ‘KF’ derives from the historical roots Maddy traces in the work of Kant and 
Frege, but nothing substantial turns on the terminology. 
7 At the subatomic level matters become more complicated, and Maddy sides with those who 
argue that objects, properties and relations break down at this point (2007: 239-40).  She also 
argues that there is vagueness and indeterminacy through and through (2007: 240-4).  As a 
consequence, Maddy modifies (1) to ‘(1’): rudimentary logic is true of the world insofar as it is a 
KF-world, and in many but not all respects, it is’ (2007: 244), and also modifies (2) and (3) 
accordingly.  When K-F structuring is not present, Maddy argues, our logical intuitions are likely 
to fail us (2007: 272).  Nevertheless, the direct objects of human cognition are at the macro level.  
Although these complications are important, they do not affect the thrust of her account in a way 
that is relevant to the concerns of this chapter. 
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purpose of this defence is to show that KF-structures are naturalistically 
respectable.  There is no call for a transcendental or otherwise spooky analysis.  
There is also no recourse, explicitly at least, to prior metaphysical analyses of the 
relevant ontological categories of objects, properties and relations.  Overall, the 
presence in the actual world of elements corresponding to the elements of a pared 
down logic supports the view that the former provides the truth conditions for the 
latter. 
 
In defence of claim (2), concerning the logical structure of cognition, Maddy 
draws on findings from developmental psychology.8  For instance, there is strong 
evidence that infants are able to individuate objects from a very young age.  In 
particular, it seems that infants as young as three months are able to pick out so-
called ‘Spelke objects’.  These are connected and bounded regions of matter that 
move as one.9  Factors such as similarity, continuity and regularity of form are 
less important than the ‘common fate’ of the parts of the object when it moves.  
Based on Spelke’s research, Maddy writes: 
 
It seems humans are so configured, biologically, that they come to perceive 
a world of Spelke objects, without instruction, given ordinary maturation in 
a normal environment.  Or, in the Second Philosopher’s terms, the ability to 
perceive Spelke objects is part of a human being’s most primitive cognitive 
equipment. (2007: 258) 
 
Building on the capacity to recognise Spelke objects, a grasp of the criteria of 
individuation associated with sortal concepts is acquired from around twelve 
months.  This is correlated with, and may depend upon, language comprehension 
of the relevant count noun.10  It takes a certain level of conceptual sophistication                                                         
8 Caution is in order when interpreting (2) because ‘primitive’ is ambiguous.  Maddy’s intended 
thought is presumably that the primitive cognitive mechanisms are deep because our mature 
cognitive mechanisms are built upon them.  This is in a manner similar to, say, emotional 
consciousness depending upon the limbic system, the broad architecture of which is shared with 
our evolutionary ancestors and mammalian cousins.  However, what she shows, at best, is that 
these cognitive mechanisms arise relatively early in cognitive development.  It remains possible 
that the physical and/or psychological architecture of our mature cognitive mechanisms replaces 
our primitive cognitive mechanisms.  Moreover, even if the aetiology of our mature faculty for 
theoretical reasoning makes reference to infantile cognitive mechanisms, it does not follow that 
there are illuminating theoretical or conceptual connections between the two. 
9 Named after Elizabeth Spelke.  See, for example, Spelke (1990). 
10 See Xu (1997: 378–9, 390).  Earlier work by Bower (1974) suggested that infants are able to 
individuate objects in their environment from around five months.  Xu (1997) also argues that 
one can profitably view ‘physical object’ as being a very general sortal expression, grasped by 
much younger infants.  One might object, however, that sortals are intended to provide criteria 
  69 
to recognise that an object cannot be both a ball and a bottle, or that a sapling and 
a mighty oak can be numerically identical.   
 
There is also evidence that infants are able to individuate and classify objects 
according to their properties from around three months.  Moreover, three-month-
old infants appear to be aware of spatial relations such as aboveness and 
betweenness.11  Slightly older infants, aged between seven and ten months, 
appear to individuate objects on the basis of conjunctions of properties.12  
Furthermore, they seem to notice dependencies between the properties and 
relations of one object and the properties and relations of another object.  For 
example, infants aged ten months appear surprised when shown a video of 
atypical causal relations between billiard balls.  A time lag between one billiard 
ball striking another, and the second billiard ball beginning to move, elicits 
greater than habitual attention.13   
 
In short, the evidence from developmental psychology suggests that infants 
recognise in the actual world the elements of a KF-world: objects, properties, 
relations and dependencies.14  In defence of (3), Maddy combines this finding 
with the earlier conclusion that KF-structuring is present in the physical world. 
The presence of KF-structuring in the physical world results in a strong 
evolutionary pressure in favour of logical cognition which is responsive to that 
structuring.  Indeed, this type of logical cognition may be innate.15  For, to 
paraphrase Quine, creatures inveterately wrong in their deductions have a 
pathetic but praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing their kind.16  Or, as 
Maddy remarks, ‘as long as KF-structuring is present, logic will serve us well’ 
(2007: 272).  Experiencing the world in terms of Spelke objects exemplifying the                                                         
for counting objects of a particular kind and that the putative sortal ‘physical object’ fails in this 
respect.  A demand that one counts the physical objects in a given area seems underspecified. 
11 Quinn (1994). 
12 Younger and Cohen (1983). 
13 Leslie and Keeble (1988). 
14 Notably absent, as Maddy allows, is an explanation of quantification in terms of our early 
cognitive capacities (2007: 262).  This, she suggests, requires further empirical research. 
15 At least, many aspects of infants’ logical cognition are apparently pre-linguistic and universal 
abilities, shared with animals such as monkeys, pigeons and chicks (Maddy 2007: 268–9). The 
evidence concerning neonates is inconclusive, partly because of neonates’ limited visual 
sensitivity and consequent inability to respond to experimenters’ visual stimuli. 
16 See Quine (1969b: 126).  See, however, Stich (1985, 1990) and Plantinga (2002) for reasons to 
doubt whether true beliefs enhance fitness. 
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properties, relations and dependencies of a KF-world, is at least a useful heuristic 
in this regard.  It gives us largely reliable information from the outset, and helps 
us to navigate our early environment successfully.  It is also worth noting that for 
the most part Spelke objects are portable or animate.  Consequently, they are the 
sorts of objects which are most likely to relate to our basic survival needs.   
 
We have, then, an interesting and provocative sketch for a naturalised philosophy 
of logic. In its favour, it seems correct that there should be some sort of 
correspondence between the structural features of logical cognition and the 
structural features of the world.  For, if this were not the case, and if we assume a 
correspondence theory of truth, deductive validity would not necessarily preserve 
truth.  Moreover, it is unsurprising that we are equipped from an early age with 
the cognitive tools for recognising logical structures in the world.  We know that 
children have grasped the basic principles of logic from around the age of two, 
because they are beginning to use language by that point.  It is unlikely that 
infants’ logical reasoning capacities develop offline before that point, 
disconnected from experience and action.  Aside from the aetiology, Maddy also 
offers us a controversial account of the truth conditions for logic.  Although I 
shall return briefly to the topic of logic and physicalism, I do not intend to 
challenge either element directly.  Rather I propose to look at what is absent from 
Maddy’s account, namely an explanation of logic’s prescriptive force.  
 
4.2 Justificatory and explanatory reasons 
 
For any given domain there are indefinitely many interesting and legitimate 
philosophical questions.  It strikes me, however, that three types of questions are 
especially central to the philosophical enterprise – and, hence, to the enterprise of 
naturalised philosophy if it is to be a candidate successor discipline.  We can ask 
whether the referents of the domain of discourse exist (and we can inquire into 
their mode of existence).  We can ask about the relationships between our mental 
states and the objects within that domain, and in particular our cognitive access 
to them.  And, we can ask about the value or normative status of objects within 
that domain.  These questions roughly correspond to the sub-disciplines of 
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metaphysics, epistemology and ethics.17  Moreover, assuming that the world does 
not harbour contradictions, the answers to the metaphysical, epistemological and 
ethical questions must be consistent.  This requirement is widely recognised and 
enables intra-disciplinary criticism.  For instance, moral realism is often 
criticised on the metaphysical grounds that it requires an extravagant and queer 
ontology.18  And, mathematical platonism is often criticised on the 
epistemological grounds that we could have no cognitive access to causally inert 
objects.19  Although it is perhaps less common to criticise metaphysical or 
epistemological theses on ethical grounds, there is no principled reason why we 
should not do so.  For instance, Lewis’ modal realism might be subject to the 
charge that it is incompatible with changes in the balance of good and evil in the 
pluriverse, and, so, forestalls the possibility of moral agency. 
 
As I have sketched it above, Maddy’s philosophy of logic is limited to 
addressing the first two types of question.  This is not a criticism.  If successful, 
an ontology and epistemology of logic would be achievement enough.  
Nevertheless, her account does need to be consistent with certain truths 
concerning the value and normative status of logic.  For instance, it must be 
compatible with the fact that we are justified in reasoning logically.  
Alternatively expressed, it must be consistent with a vindicatory explanation of 
our logical practices.  For, a non-vindicatory account would be self-defeating.20  
It is one thing to reason in a circle by relying on the logical principles that one 
then goes on to justify.  Naturalists have no choice but to proceed thus, and can 
attempt to argue that the circle is a virtuous one.  Indeed, given that rational 
thought and discourse presupposes logic, this appears to be a perfectly general 
predicament.21  It is quite another thing, however, to rely on principles which one 
then undermines.                                                         
17 I am not of course suggesting that this tripartite division is the only useful way to conceptualise 
the subject matter of philosophy.  For instance, a further very good question is whether the 
objects are beautiful.  Aesthetic value is importantly distinct from the sort of normativity under 
discussion insofar as its existence does not place obligations upon us – although it does of course 
give us reasons to act. 
18 I am of course thinking of Mackie’s (1977) ‘argument from queerness’, which I shall discuss at 
length in chapter nine. 
19 Benacerraf (1973) is the modern locus classicus for this argument. 
20 See Williams (2000: 36–7) for more on vindicatory explanations. 
21 One manifestation of this predicament is the ‘Cartesian Circle’.  See further Frankfurt (1965). 
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A philosophy of logic, then, must provide an explanation of logic’s prescriptive 
force, or be consistent with a complementary explanation.  This explanation 
might be either intrinsic or extrinsic to logic.  Employing the terminology of 
chapter one, either the truth-makers for logical propositions possess the requisite 
normative force to perform dual service as value-makers, or they connect up 
appropriately with an extra-logical source of justification.  As we shall see 
below, Maddy is inclined towards the second option, justifying logical practice in 
terms of its instrumental relation to external, non-logical goals.  For now, though, 
I propose to look at the first possibility and consider whether the above story 
might contain within itself a justification of our logical practices.  That is, I 
would like to look at whether Maddy’s naturalistic truth-makers for logic could 
serve as value-makers.   
 
As claims (2) and (3) offer some appearance of a normative explanation, I would 
like to examine them in greater detail.  In particular, I am interested in the type of 
reasons on offer.  Although what I have to say concerns the nature of reasons in 
general, I shall focus on (2) for the sake of having a concrete example.  Recall, 
then, that (2) is the claim that human beings believe logical truths because their 
most primitive cognitive mechanisms allow them to detect and represent the 
aforementioned features of the world.  Now, this claim might be interpreted in at 
least two ways.  The term ‘because’ invites a reason, but it is familiar that 
reasons can be explanatory or justificatory.22  Whilst there is scope for debate 
concerning the best way to understand this distinction, I propose that we 
understand justificatory reasons as standing objectively in favour of an action or 
mental state.23  By contrast, we can then understand explanatory reasons as 
merely allowing us to understand why someone did so-and-so, or believed such-
and-such.  Consequently, explanatory reasons do not necessarily have normative                                                         
22 One sometimes encounters a similar distinction between normative and motivating reasons 
(e.g., Smith 1994, Schroeder 2007).  I think this is potentially more problematic insofar as it can 
embody a commitment to motivational internalism.  The idea behind the normative/motivating 
distinction is that we recognise a normative reason, which objectively stands in favour of an 
action, and that this recognition then constitutes a motivating reason.  However, this 
contentiously assumes that external facts do not motivate directly. 
23 I do in fact favour externalism with respect to justificatory reasons.  See Dancy (2000) for a 
full defence of this view.  See also Parfit (2011: 31–8).  In chapter eight, I defend the related view 
that reasons are not based on desires. 
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force or significance.  If we learn that Nick deceived us because he is a 
compulsive liar, we gain an explanation but not a justification of his behaviour. 
 
When Maddy argues that we believe logical truths because of our most primitive 
cognitive mechanisms, she is advancing a causal explanation. Although the 
relationship between the two is complicated, causal explanations are logically 
independent of justificatory reasons.  It is true that discovering the causal 
explanation for a belief-forming mechanism can be relevant, in one sense, to 
whether one is justified in holding the resulting beliefs.  For example, if one were 
to discover that one’s confidence in the epistemic authority of a cult leader was 
the result of brainwashing, then the apparent warrant for the beliefs one had 
adopted on the basis of the leader’s authority would be thereby undermined.24  If 
one’s reason for believing p was the leader’s testimony then, upon discovering 
that one had been brainwashed, one would lose what one had taken to be the 
warrant for the belief that p.  The reason for one’s belief would have been 
debunked and, so, in the absence of further reasons, the rational course of action 
would be to withhold belief.25  But, whilst this discovery bears on whether or not 
one ought to persist in the belief, the ‘ought’ in this case is subjective.26  It is a 
matter of what one ought to belief given the available information.  The question                                                         
24 More commonly, it is difficult not to harbour the suspicion that one’s moral or political beliefs 
might well have been different had one been brought up in a different environment.  Similarly, 
one might uneasily recognise that commitments to philosophical theses tend to cluster 
geographically.  For instance, G. A. Cohen (2000) observes that Oxford graduates of his 
generation were far more likely than their Harvard counterparts to accept the analytic/synthetic 
distinction.  See White (2010) for further discussion. 
25 Whilst this would be the rational course of action, there is evidence of a widespread tendency 
towards belief perseverance in the face of disconfirming evidence (e.g. Jennings et. al. 1981).  
Harman (1984) plausibly attributes this phenomenon to the fact that people do not generally keep 
track of the justification for their beliefs once the belief is formed.  This has the benefit of 
reducing mental clutter. 
26 Schematically, an objective ought has the form ‘since x is the case, S ought to ф’, whereas a 
subjective ought has the form ‘since S believes x to be the case, S ought to ф’.  Thus, an objective 
ought is grounded in what is the case, whereas a subjective ought is grounded in what an agent 
believes to be the case.  More colloquially, we might speak of ‘there being a reason’ as opposed 
to ‘having a reason’ respectively.  The locus classicus for discussion of the distinction between 
objective and subjective oughts is Prichard (1932).  Prichard asks us to consider whether the 
driver of a car ought to stop, or at least slow down, when approaching an intersection.  Although 
it is natural to say ‘yes’, Prichard argues that from a certain objective standpoint ‘there will be a 
duty to slow down only if in fact there is traffic’ (1932: 93).  The thought is that if a driver speeds 
through onto a main road which is in fact bare of oncoming traffic, no negative consequences 
will ensue.  Hence, it will appear from a Gods-eye perspective, or with retrospect, that there 
could have been no duty to slow down in the first place.  More recently, Williams (1981: 102) 
raises a related set of concerns by considering whether one has reason to drink what one takes to 
be gin and tonic, but which is in fact petrol. 
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of whether or not one (objectively) ought to believe that p is independent of 
one’s prior belief in the epistemic authority of the cult leader.  It depends on the 
strength of the reasons for belief that p.27 
 
There must be some set of explanatory reasons for the development of our 
capacity for logical thought and very likely some of these reasons will be in the 
vicinity of Maddy’s suggestions.  However, there is no guarantee that the 
explanatory reasons will be justificatory, or even relevant to the justification of 
our logical practices.  In order to have normative force, the ‘because’ must be 
followed by a justificatory reason.  However, it is unclear how the fact of our 
primitive cognitive mechanisms detecting and representing KF-structures could 
justify our logical practices.  Consider, by way of analogy, a putative explanation 
of the widespread phenomenon of attributing greater weight to self-regarding 
reasons than to other-regarding reasons given in terms of the cognitive processes 
of vulnerable and dependent infants.  Whatever the merits of this as an 
explanation, however deep human selfishness runs and however early it arises, it 
is no argument against ethical impartiality.  This is not to deny that our cognitive 
development bears on ascriptions of praise and blame.  We cannot appropriately 
blame someone for failures of thought or action entirely due to innate 
psychological limitations or a markedly impoverished environment.  For, ought 
implies can and difficulty mitigates blame.  In this way, facts concerning our 
cognitive development can serve as background conditions or enablers of 
justificatory reasons.  Nevertheless, facts concerning our cognitive development 
do not determine the standards against which our thoughts and actions are 
measured.  For, to repeat, explanatory and justificatory reasons belong to 
logically distinct categories.28                                                         
27 This stands in contrast with epistemological internalists who hold that an agent’s justification 
for her beliefs are necessarily cognitively available because internal.  It seems to me, however, 
that internalism erroneously conflates subjective and objective oughts, or being justified in the 
beliefs one holds and holding justified beliefs.  The latter, I take it, is the distinctively 
epistemological question because it is truth-orientated.  Internalists pick up on something 
important and interesting by questioning whether someone is justified in holding one belief given 
her other beliefs.  This question is particularly relevant to the epistemic evaluation of agents.  
But, to suppose that this exhausts the question of epistemic justification, or answers the question 
of whether the agent is justified in their belief tout court, is, I suggest, an error. 
28 Nagel illustrates this point with the following example: ‘If … someone says to me, “You only 
believe that 2 + 2 = 4 because you were in love with your second grade arithmetic teacher,” that 
fails to count as a challenge.  I may call up the long-buried image of Miss Gardbaum, with her 
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4.3 Bridging the Gap with Psychologism 
 
One way in which one might attempt to bridge or collapse the gap between 
explanatory and justificatory reasons would be by endorsing logical 
psychologism.  On this view, commonly attributed to Mill, the subject 
properties of logic are psychological.29  Thus, logic concerns the laws of actual 
thought, as opposed to putatively independent laws governing thought.  If this 
view were correct, then the prescriptive laws of logic would refer to descriptive 
psychological laws and we would at least know where to look to justify our 
logical reasoning practices.30  Logical norms would either be relative to the 
particularities of an individual’s psychology, or, more plausibly, grounded in 
patterns of reasoning common amongst a population.  The existence of common 
reasoning practices might then be explained in terms of Maddy’s proposed 
primitive cognitive mechanisms or perhaps an innate logic module.31 
 
But, whilst logical psychologism is a possible move at this point in the dialectic, 
it is a highly unfashionable view.32  This is largely due to a number of Fregean 
criticisms, which have persuaded most philosophers that the logical and the 
psychological are fundamentally incompatible.33  For instance, Frege argued 
that whereas logical laws are universal, certain and precise, psychological laws                                                         
soft hair, prominent bosom, and dark blue skirt powdered with chalk dust, and acknowledge that 
yes, I was in love with her and wanted to believe everything she told me – but these reflections 
will be powerless to make me reconsider my conviction that 2 + 2 = 4, because it lies beyond 
their reach and does not depend on anything which they call into question.’  (1997: 56) 
29 The appropriateness of this association is denied by some Mill scholars, perhaps most notably 
by Skorupski (1989).  Godden (2005: 115–7) provides a clear overview of the debate.  In all 
likelihood, Mill was not fully consistent on the issue. 
30 In the broader context of naturalised epistemology, Kornblith characterises psychologism in 
similar normative terms as ‘the view that the processes by which we ought to arrive at our beliefs 
are the processes by which we do arrive at our beliefs’ (1994: 8).  Such a perfect coincidence 
may appear vanishingly unlikely, unless as the result of stipulative definition.  However, 
Kornblith suggests that the prospects are much improved by evolutionary considerations 
concerning the fitness-enhancing qualities of true beliefs. 
31 See, for instance, Rips (1994).  Hanna (2006: 46–52) also argues that we have an innate 
capacity for logic, partly on the basis that this is presupposed by Chomsky’s theory of universal 
grammar. 
32 As Aach (1990: 315) bluntly puts it ‘psychologism is the view that logic can be explicated by 
psychology, and though it was widely accepted during the last century, today it is considered 
dead’. See further Jacquette (1997) on the historical development of the negative connotations 
attaching to the term ‘psychologism’ – connotations which he then suggests are not entirely fair.  
See also Pelletier, Elio and Hanson (2008) for an extensive survey article. 
33 Husserl’s Prolegomena to Pure Logic is also important in the history of anti-psychologism.  
See Kusch (1995: 203–10), for a discussion of the relative significance of Frege’s and Husserl’s 
anti-psychologistic in the early decades of the twentieth century. 
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are particular, merely probable and imprecise.  Perhaps most influential, 
however, has been Frege’s argument that psychologism conflates being true 
with being taken to be true.34  In this context, he offered the following attractive 
metaphor:  
 
If being true is thus independent of being recognized as true by anyone, 
then the laws of truth are not psychological laws, but boundary stones set 
in an eternal foundation, which our thought can overflow but not dislodge. 
(1893: xvi)   
 
Frege meant of course to affirm the antecedent.  The idea is that whereas 
descriptive psychology is confined to studying the conditions under which we 
take inferences to be valid, logic concerns the conditions under which inferences 
are in fact valid.  Consequently, to reduce the logical to the psychological is to 
conflate the objective with the subjective.  This is a disturbing prospect given 
that logic is widely held to be paradigmatically objective.  Subjectivism with 
respect to logic appears just a short hop from global epistemological relativism, 
and an attendant pernicious scepticism. 
 
In defence, however, an advocate of psychologism can point out that even if the 
content of logic depends on subjective mental states, the facts concerning those 
mental states need be no less objective than other scientific facts.  Moreover, he 
might argue, the fact that reality is mind-independent does not entail that being 
true is mind-independent.  For, he might continue, being true is a property of 
beliefs, not a property of a mind-independent reality.  It is a substantive further 
question whether truth is objective or, as it sometimes put, verification-
transcendent.  Here, the advocate of psychologism might find support in the 
kind of anti-realist considerations which motivated Brouwer’s intuitionistic 
logic and Dummett’s identification of truth with warranted assertability.  
Although this raises questions far beyond the scope of the present discussion, it 
does at least seem that psychologism has more resources than is commonly 
appreciated in relation to the charge of subjectivism. 
 
                                                        
34 The same objection can be traced back at least to Kant.  See further Jacquette (2001: 262–6). 
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On the subject of normativity, Frege criticises psychologism on the grounds that 
it conflates justificatory reasons with explanatory reasons: 
 
With the psychological conception of logic we lose the distinction between 
the grounds that justify a conviction and the causes that actually produce 
it.  This means that a justification in the proper sense is not possible. 
(1897: 147) 
 
This is essentially the same type of argument I have been trying to make.  We 
should, however, note that collapsing this distinction between justification and 
cause is precisely what might motivate logical psychologism as a way of 
accounting for the normativity of logic.  To criticise logical psychologism 
simply on the grounds that it conflates justification and cause is therefore to beg 
the question.  Although psychologism removes any further question concerning 
the justification of our logical convictions in terms of correspondence with, or 
the prescriptive force of, non-psychological logical content, two possibilities 
remain.  On the one hand, it is compatible with our logical convictions being 
justified by non-logical facts.  I shall come to this possibility shortly, and 
discuss it at length in the following chapter.  On the other hand, it is possible 
that the causal reasons coincide with the justificatory reasons.  The alleged 
conflation then becomes an identity claim.  To head off this possibility we need 
to show, as I attempted above, that it is a distinction with a difference and that 
justificatory reasons are required for explaining the normative force of logical 
inference independently of the causal or explanatory reasons.  This is what I 
understand Frege to mean by the qualification ‘justification in the proper sense’. 
 
Although I think that psychologism is more defensible than commonly assumed, 
I am not aware of any contemporary philosopher who is prepared to endorse it.35  
Maddy is certainly in the mainstream insofar as she is persuaded against 
psychologism by Frege’s arguments (2007: 200–1).  Whilst she bases her 
account of logical cognition on developmental psychology, she maintains that                                                         
35 The following are near misses. Dale Jacquette (1997; 2001) defends psychologism without 
going so far as explicitly endorsing it.  Robert Hanna’s (2006) ‘logical cognitivism’ is 
psychologistic insofar as it takes logic to be constructed by a logic faculty in the mind.  Hanna 
denies, however, that logic is explanatorily reducible to empirical psychology (2006: 27).  Pascal 
Engel (2005) proposes a psychologistic account of logical reasons, but not of logical content.  It 
is also natural to read Quine’s (1969a) essay ‘Epistemology Naturalized’ as a pro-psychologism 
rallying cry.  See, however, Margolis (1997: 300–6) for an alternative reading. 
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logic is made true by structural features of the physical world.36  Nevertheless, 
psychologism and physicalism have important features in common, allowing us 
to carry forward and generalise some aspects of our discussion.  Notably, both 
positions are attempts to provide truth conditions for logic which are contingent, 
a posteriori and fit into the causal structure of the world as described by the 
natural sciences.  These common features make psychological or physical facts 
the obvious choices for the content of a naturalised philosophy of logic.  
However, it is difficult to see how either category of facts could function as 
value-makers in addition to truth-makers.  As argued above, they do not do so 
just in virtue of their causal/historical relationship to our logical reasoning 
capacities.  For, when we look solely at the fact that we have come to reason in 
a particular way due to a particular chain of events, it is perfectly compatible 
with it being the case that we ought not to reason thus.  This is because there is 
no necessary connection between explanatory reasons and justification. 
 
It is also difficult to see how physical or psychological states could function as 
value-makers on the basis of intrinsic properties that are cognitively available 
from a naturalistic, objectifying perspective.  Here, we might recall the Humean 
considerations described in chapter one.  The recognition of, say, KF-structuring 
from an impersonal, scientific perspective does not have normative authority 
over us and does not oblige us to reason in particular ways.  Given our 
recognition that the physical world is structured in a particular way, or that 
people generally reason in accordance with particular logical norms, it remains 
an open question whether one ought to reason in this way or that.  But, if this is 
especially clear in the case of contingent physical facts and mental states, the 
issue does not essentially depend on the naturalists’ preferred ontology of logic. 
Indeed, it is common ground that a strictly scientific perspective does not 
recognise the intrinsic magnetism of sui generis norms.  Like the moral property                                                         
36 Of course, physicalism with respect to the content of logic comes with its own well-known set 
of difficulties.  For instance, if K-F structures are to have the right modal properties to function as 
truth-makers for logical propositions, then logical truths had better be contingent.  If the physical 
world could have been different, as is apparently the case, then so could the content of logic.  
Maddy accepts these revisionary consequences and attributes the widespread conviction that 
logic is necessarily true to ‘psychological realities’ rather than any deeper metaphysical truth 
(2007: 273).  See also Bigelow (1988) for a defence of physicalism in the philosophy of 
mathematics and consideration of parallel debates. 
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of to-be-pursuedness, the property of to-be-thoughtness is queer and alien to the 
scientific world-view with its focus on causal and constitutive relations.  I shall 
offer some explanation of this scientific alienation in chapters six and nine when 
I discuss the nature of practices and the role of the emotions in normative 
cognition respectively.  As there is general agreement, however, I shall not 
dwell further on the issue here. 
 
Whilst I have already argued that there is no necessary covariance between 
explanatory reasons and justifications, it remains possible that they coincide in 
particular cases.  Even if naturalistically construed truth conditions for logic are 
not intrinsically prescriptive, a naturalist might argue that as a matter of fact the 
explanation and justification of our logical beliefs coincide.  Given that we are 
dealing with normative reasons, it is difficult to find a non-contentious example 
of coincidence between explanation and justification.  In general, however, if 
we have a theory which makes success contingent upon something being done 
in the right sort of way, or as the result of the right sort of process, then there is 
the possibility that explanations and justifications will coincide when the 
success conditions are met.  For instance, one plausible analysis of knowledge is 
as true belief acquired through the exercise of intellectual virtue.37  If this 
analysis is correct, intellectual virtue can both explain and justify belief.  For 
instance, my belief that there is a plant on my desk is both explained and 
justified by the skilful exercise of my perceptual capacities.  Might it not be, 
then, that certain psychological or physical explanations similarly justify and 
explain our practices of logical reasoning?  Well, for all I have said so far, this 
could indeed be the case.  However, as I shall know argue, these examples of 
coincidence between explanation and justification require a further source of 
justification. 
 
In order to see that these examples of coincidence depend on an independent 
normative standard, consider a case in which I come to believe that p through 
the exercise of intellectual virtue, but in which, due to sheer bad luck, my belief 
that p is false.  Perhaps I have been tricked by an evil demon or dropped into                                                         
37 See, for instance, Zagzebski (1996) and Sosa (2007).  I defend a version of virtue epistemology 
in chapter seven. 
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Goldman’s notorious Barn County.  Is my belief that p justified in this scenario?  
Clearly, given that the belief is the product of intellectual virtue, there is a sense 
in which I am justified in holding the false belief.  I am not blameworthy for 
being the victim of epistemic bad luck and, indeed, I subjectively ought to 
believe that p.  However, the fact that I am justified in holding the belief does 
not entail that the belief is justified, unless one fails to distinguish between 
subjective and objective oughts.  
 
As p is false, we know that it is neither justified in virtue of its correspondence 
with the way things stand in the world, nor logically entailed by the content of 
some true foundational belief.  Perhaps it will be claimed that p is justified 
because it coheres with (some subset of) my other beliefs, the conjunction of 
which we might call q.  There are of course a number of ways in which we 
might understand the coherence relation.  The approach does not, however, look 
promising.  If, for example, we understand coherence in a strong sense 
according to which a proposition coheres with a set of propositions just in case 
it is entailed by that set, then clearly p cannot receive any justification from q.  
For, if q is false then q entails both p and not-p.  And, if q is true than it entails 
not-p (because p is false).  Even if we understand coherence in a weaker sense, 
such as, say, mutual explanatory support, it does not seem to provide any 
justification.  For, it seems plausible that any explanatory support for p must 
proceed through the truth of q.  If q were false it could hardly explain or justify 
p.  A false proposition entails everything and so does not explain anything in 
particular.  But if the falsehood of q cannot justify p then neither can the truth of 
q.  For, coherence is a symmetrical relation.  So, if the truth of q provides 
explanatory support for the falsehood of p, then the falsehood of p must provide 
explanatory support for the truth of q.  But we have already denied that the 
explanatory support or justification for one proposition can come through the 
falsehood of another. 
 
If my belief that p is not justified by the way matters actually stand, or by its 
coherence with the content of my other beliefs, perhaps it is justified simply 
because it is the product of intellectual virtue.  For, certainly, I have suggested 
that in cases of the successful exercise of intellectual virtue the justification and 
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explanation of a belief coincide.  However, an intellectual virtue only counts as 
virtuous because of its relationship to some epistemically valuable end such as 
truth, knowledge or what we might generally call cognitive gain.  If some 
disposition were not reliably conducive to cognitive gain, then quite clearly it 
would not be an intellectual virtue.  The disposition might be beautiful, or 
moral, or otherwise valuable, but intellectual virtues are identified as such from 
a truth-orientated, epistemic perspective.  Thus, justification is transmitted from 
the epistemic good of cognitive gain to intellectual virtue.  Intellectual virtue 
does not constitute an independent source of epistemic justification in addition 
to the justification transmitted from the goal of cognitive gain. That would be a 
case of double counting, for a stable disposition would not be a virtue at all if 
not appropriately related to the right end.  Consequently, the fact that a belief is 
acquired through the exercise of intellectual virtue does not guarantee that the 
belief is justified.  Certainly, it does nothing to justify the content of the belief, 
which can only be justified by objective reasons standing in its favour.  So, 
intellectual virtue will only serve naturalised logic as a model of coincidence 
between explanation and justification if there is an independent source of 
justification linking them together. 
 
We have seen that the naturalised truth conditions Maddy proposes for logic are 
not intrinsically normative and that the psychological explanation she gives us 
of our capacity for logical thought is insufficient to justify our logical beliefs.  
We have also seen, however, that explanations and justifications can be linked 
together by an independent source of normativity.  Although Maddy does not 
provide an explicit account of the normative force of logical inference, we can 
reasonably anticipate the approach she would take from her discussion of 
another gap in her model.   
 
There is some distance to travel between rudimentary logic based on K-F 
structures and full-blown classical logic.  Although objects, properties, relations 
and certain dependencies are present in infant cognition, we do not as yet have 
our full complement of connectives and relations of implication.  Nevertheless, 
Maddy claims that we are entitled to introduce such features: 
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For the purposes of logic, of course, it is a boon, bringing the last of the 
basic connectives into the truth-functional fold and supporting the full range 
of classical tautologies, including the interdefinability of the connectives. 
(2007: 287) 
 
Again: 
 
The justification must be, as always, that they make it possible to achieve 
results that would otherwise be impossible or impractical, and that they do so 
without introducing any relevant distortions. (2007: 288) 
 
Thus, the justification for moving from rudimentary logic to classical logic 
depends on normative considerations, and assumes that the normativity involved 
is instrumental.38  Accepting certain principles is a ‘boon’ because it enables us 
to achieve certain desired results.  From context, the word ‘relevant’ in the 
second of the above quotations means something like ‘relevant relative to our 
background concerns’.   
 
Maddy does not develop this instrumentalist approach to normativity or attempt 
to supplement her naturalised account of logic with it.  Nevertheless, it is a 
popular strategy and it is easy to see how it could be employed to yoke a certain 
sort of justificatory reason to the explanation Maddy offers for our beliefs 
concerning logic.  Our logical convictions, she might suggest, are both explained 
and justified by their instrumental relation to the role true beliefs play in 
satisfying our practical and theoretical interests.  Rather than evaluating this 
possibility immediately, however, I propose to shift into the territory of 
naturalised epistemology in order to focus on the more fully developed accounts 
of instrumental normativity offered by Stich, Kornblith and Papineau amongst 
others. 
                                                        
38 Maddy explicitly proposes an instrumentalist approach to axiom justification in her work on 
mathematical naturalism.  She suggests that we should ‘frame a defense or critique of a given 
[axiom candidate] in two parts: first, identify a goal (or goals) of [set-theoretic] practice, and, 
second, argue that [adopting the axiom] in question either is or is not an effective means towards 
that goal’ (1997: 97). 
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Chapter Five 
Naturalised Epistemology and Instrumentalism 
 
W. V. Quine exerted perhaps the strongest influence on the ‘naturalistic turn’ of 
the mid to late twentieth century.  A central element of his programme was an 
insistence on the possibility and desirability of naturalising epistemology.1  This 
chapter looks at whether naturalised epistemology can account for epistemic 
normativity.  In the previous chapter I considered the prospects for identifying 
naturalistically acceptable explanatory reasons with normatively significant 
justificatory reasons.  In this chapter I propose to examine the strategy of 
reducing epistemic normativity to instrumental normativity.2 
 
In Section 5.1, I look at the relationship between naturalised epistemology and a 
traditional understanding of the nature of epistemology.  I also argue that 
epistemology is an essentially normative discipline.  In section 5.2, I describe 
Quine’s proposal that we reduce epistemic normativity to instrumental 
normativity, and the more fully developed accounts of Stich (1990), Kornblith 
(2002) and Papineau (2003).  In section 5.3, I argue that we are in fact subject to 
epistemic norms regardless of instrumental considerations.  In part, I defend this 
view by looking at the case of trivial knowledge.  Finally, in section 5.4, I argue 
that instrumentalists are unable to justify their appeals to truth and consequently 
unable to explain the distinctively epistemic dimension of epistemic normativity.  
As a result, instrumentalism does not provide an adequate account of epistemic 
normativity, and, so does not provide support for naturalism. 
 
5.1 Naturalised Epistemology and Normativity 
 
In his seminal essay on the subject, Quine described the programme of 
naturalising epistemology as follows: 
 
Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a chapter of 
psychology and hence of natural science.  It studies a natural phenomenon, 
viz., a physical human subject.  The human subject is accorded a certain 
experimentally controlled input – certain patterns of irradiation in assorted                                                         
1 I borrow the phrase ‘naturalistic turn’ from P. M. S. Hacker (2006: 231). 
2 See, for example, Brown (1988), Giere (1989), Laudan (1990), Maffie (1990), Papineau 
(2003a), Solomon (2001), Hubin (2001), Kornblith (2002), Janvid (2004) and Huss (2009).  
Berger (2003: 372) prefers the label ‘if-thenism’. 
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frequencies, for instance, and in the fullness of time delivers as output a 
description of the three-dimensional world and its history. (1969a: 82–3) 
 
In a later essay, he wrote as follows: 
 
Naturalism does not repudiate epistemology, but assimilates it to empirical 
psychology.  Science itself tells us that our information about the world is 
limited to irritations on our surfaces, and then the epistemological question 
is in turn a question within science: the question how we human animals can 
have managed to arrive at science from such limited information. (1981: 
72)3 
 
So, Quine saw the central task of epistemology as understanding the causal 
relations between the evidence of our senses and our mental representation of the 
world.  He argued that this relationship between the ‘meagre input and the 
torrential output’ (Quine 1969a: 83) should be investigated wholly within the 
remit of empirical psychology.  Thus, the philosophical problems associated 
with the theory of knowledge should be tackled using empirical methods, and a 
constrained epistemology should be subsumed by the natural sciences.  
Metaphysics or first philosophy should no longer be pursued, and distinctly 
philosophical methods should be consigned to the unenlightened past.   
 
In short, Quine proposed that we replace epistemology, or its rump, with 
empirical psychology.  However, as I argued in chapter three, if one discipline is 
to replace another then there must be substantial continuity between the original 
discipline and its successor.  Thus, it would be a serious objection to Quine’s 
proposal if psychology and epistemology dealt with largely different questions.  
Although Quine’s proposal was deliberately revisionary, he still needed to show 
that psychology answers questions drawn from the core of traditional 
epistemology.  For, otherwise, his claim that we should pursue psychology 
because traditional epistemology has failed would be a non sequitur.  
Recognising this requirement, he wrote: 
 
                                                        
3 Quine similarly claims that it is a scientific finding that ‘information about the world reaches us 
only by forces impinging on our nerve endings’ (1981: 181).  Although this is not the place to 
pursue the matter, I seriously doubt that Quine is entitled to these claims.  If, however, he were so 
entitled, the simple expedient of providing references to the relevant scientific research would 
have established his point. 
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A far cry, this, from the old epistemology.  Yet it is no gratuitous change of 
subject matter, but an enlightened persistence rather in the original 
epistemological problem. (1974: 3) 
 
When Quine referred to the ‘original epistemological question’, he had in mind 
the following: ‘Given only the evidence of our senses, how do we arrive at our 
theory of the world?’ (1974: 1).  This, he suggested, was the question pursued by 
Berkeley, Locke and Hume, and the question which should once more become 
the focal point of epistemology.  But, setting aside Quine’s rather suspect, broad-
brush view of early modern empiricism, it is surprising to encounter the proposal 
that epistemology can be reduced to a single question.  In his last book, William 
Alston suggested that ‘a broad conception of epistemology would be 
philosophical reflection on the cognitive aspects of human life’ (2005: 3).  This 
seems closer to the mark.  Since antiquity, epistemologists have been interested 
in understanding the nature of knowledge and related cognitive states quite 
generally.  Under what conditions are we in a state of knowledge?  Does 
knowledge require certain foundations, or is coherence among a set of beliefs 
sufficient?  How does knowledge differ from mere (true) belief or opinion?  Is it 
possible to provide an analysis of knowledge?  Is certainty possible and, if so, in 
which fields of enquiry? 
 
Most importantly for present purposes, epistemologists have been centrally 
concerned with normative questions.4  Under what conditions are we justified in 
believing some proposition?  What, in any case, does epistemic justification 
primarily bear upon?  Acts?  Beliefs?  Agents?  Are the facts which justify 
beliefs internal or external to the knower’s mind?  Why is knowledge 
distinctively valuable as opposed to, say, true belief?5  Beyond these 
foundational concerns, applied questions also arise.  For, once the conditions for 
being in a state of knowledge are understood, and given that knowledge is a 
valuable cognitive state, the epistemologist may find himself in a position to 
recommend certain strategies of belief formation and caution against others.  He                                                         
4 Whilst normative questions have always occupied epistemologists, it is possible to discern a 
recent heightening of interest, possibly associated with the renaissance of virtue epistemology.  In 
an essay of the same name, Riggs (2008) has labelled this trend ‘the value turn in epistemology’. 
5 This has recently become known as ‘the value problem’ in epistemology.  See Pritchard (2007) 
for an overview. 
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may, for instance, have advice to offer concerning the social dynamics of belief 
formation.  Or, he may be alert to instances of epistemic injustice.6 
 
There is, then, a widespread sentiment that epistemology has legitimate 
normative concerns.  Moreover, there are good reasons to suppose that this 
sentiment is warranted.  For instance, we might notice that normative concepts 
are ubiquitous features of epistemic discourse.  We make statements such as 
‘you ought to apportion your beliefs to the evidence’.  We call beliefs 
‘appropriate’, ‘fitting’ and ‘reasonable’, as well as making the converse negative 
judgments.  We use normative vocabulary to describe an agent’s epistemic 
character.  One can, for example, be ‘honest’, ‘responsible’, ‘courageous’ or 
‘negligent’ in pursuing one’s inquiries.7  Even Quine refers to a type of 
epistemic ‘duty’: 
 
The purpose of concepts and of language is efficacy in communication and 
in prediction.  Such is the ultimate duty of language, science, and 
philosophy, and it is in relation to that duty that a conceptual scheme has 
finally to be appraised. (1980: 79) 
 
Even if the wording is slight carelessness on Quine’s part, the temptation to 
employ the language of duty is revealing.8 
 
We might also take into consideration a line of argument suggested by Jaegwon 
Kim, which goes some way to explaining why epistemology is a normative 
concern.  Taking as his starting point the classical tripartite conception of 
knowledge as justified true belief Kim observes that justification is the only 
distinctively epistemic component.9  As he notes ‘neither belief nor truth is a                                                         
6 See, for example, Fricker (2007). 
7 See Haack (1997: 30) for further discussion of normative language and epistemic virtue. 
8 Morton White (1986: 652) draws our attention to this passage as an illegitimate (for Quine) use 
of deontological vocabulary.  In response, Quine tells us that when he referred to duty he ‘was 
using the word somewhat as when we speak of a heavy-duty cable or tractor.  It was what 
language, science, and philosophy are for, as eyes are for seeing’ (1986: 665).  I shall consider 
the teleological aspect of Quine’s position in the next section. 
9 Or, if not ‘justification’, then some close normative relative.  Plantinga, for example, holds that 
the difference between knowledge and mere true belief is a matter of warrant.  He also 
emphasises the normative aspect of epistemology: ‘To say that a belief is warranted or justified 
for a person is to evaluate it or him (or both) positively, his holding that belief in his 
circumstances is right, or proper, or acceptable, or approvable, or up to standard.’ (Plantinga 
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specifically epistemic notion: belief is a psychological concept and truth a 
semantical-metaphysical one’ (1988: 383).  It is true that Gettier cases have 
convinced most philosophers that knowledge is not exactly justified true belief.  
Nevertheless, there is good reason to suppose that whatever it is that makes the 
difference between knowledge and mere true belief is normative (or that 
knowledge is an essentially normative mental state).  For the possession of 
knowledge brings credit to an agent in a way that the possession of mere true 
belief does not.10  Moreover, shifting the focus of evaluation from the agent to 
his mental states, knowledge appears to confer added value upon true beliefs.11  
As Kornblith observes, ‘to say that a belief is an item of knowledge is to praise it 
in a certain way; it is to approve of it as meeting our cognitive ideals; it is to 
recommend it’ (2002: 159).  Hence, the distinctively epistemic component of 
knowledge must be normative insofar as being in a state of knowledge is subject 
to positive epistemic appraisal in a way that mere possession of a true belief is 
not. 
 
I am emphasising the fact that epistemology is a normative discipline because it 
has struck a number of philosophers that the normative is absent from Quine’s 
account.12  Moreover, it is not surprising that they have thought this.  Scientific 
theory, Quine tells us, ‘stands proudly and notoriously aloof from value 
judgements’ (1973: 49).  Consequently, it might appear that naturalised 
epistemology must stand similarly aloof if it is to become ‘a chapter of 
psychology and hence of natural science’ (1969a: 82).  As Larry Laudan writes: 
                                                        
1993: 3).  Although Sartwell (1992) has argued that knowledge is simply identical to true belief, 
he does not deny that an account of what justifies knowledge, rather than true belief, is both 
necessary and important to epistemology.   In this context, see also Goldman (1999: 23–6) for 
discussion of (mere) true belief as ‘weak knowledge’ or ‘W-knowledge’. 
10 The so-called ‘credit thesis’ is widely accepted amongst epistemologists. For a full defence see 
Greco (2003).  See, however, Lackey (2007, 2009) for a dissenting voice. 
11 I return to this idea later in the chapter.  However, The full explanation will have to wait until 
section 7.3 below. 
12 See, for example, Putnam (1982: 19) and Kim (1988: 388–9). 
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The likes of Descartes, Leibniz and Kant were keen to say how we ought 
to form our beliefs and how we should go about testing our claims about 
the world.  Science, by contrast, does not appear to traffic in such 
normative injunctions; it describes and explains the world but it does not 
preach about it.  (1990: 45)  
  
Pace Quine, Laudan might have added Berkeley, Locke and Hume to his list of 
preachers.  The concern is that naturalised epistemology can only be descriptive, 
explaining how, as a matter of fact, we acquire beliefs.  If naturalised 
epistemology is to count as epistemology at all, it must address this concern.  In 
the next section, I look at how this might be done. 
 
5.2 Instrumentalist Approaches to Epistemic Normativity 
 
Even if the normative tasks of epistemology are displaced from the foreground in 
its naturalised variant, some account is required.  For, as we have noted, 
naturalised epistemology cannot replace traditional epistemology unless it 
addresses the same subject matter.  And, as I have just argued, traditional 
epistemology has normative concerns at or near its core.  Consequently, despite 
Quine’s general indifference towards normative philosophy, he does make a 
natural and influential suggestion.  It requires that we bring into focus the end or 
telos of epistemology: 
 
Naturalization of epistemology does not jettison the normative and settle 
for the indiscriminate description of ongoing procedures.  For me 
normative epistemology is a branch of engineering.  It is the technology of 
truth-seeking, or, in a more cautiously epistemological term, prediction.  
Like any technology it makes free use of whatever scientific findings may 
suit its purpose … There is no question here of ultimate value, as in 
morals; it is a matter of efficacy for an ulterior end.  The normative here, as 
elsewhere in engineering, becomes descriptive when the terminal 
parameter is expressed. (1986: 664–5) 
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Quine seeks to keep science aloof from value judgements by denying that there 
are sui generis norms within science.  There are no intrinsically normative 
epistemic properties which it is the purpose of a naturalised epistemology to 
disclose.  Rather, scientific values are contingent upon the aims of science, and 
apparently normative discourse turns out to be merely descriptive. 
For Quine, identifying the ‘terminal parameter’ is a relatively straightforward 
empirical matter.  One must find out what it is that scientists aim at in their 
practice.  The answer Quine gives is that the primary scientific aim is to 
‘maximise prediction’ or, to develop a theory ‘that will anticipate as many 
observations as possible, getting none of them wrong’ (1973: 137).13  In line with 
the conclusions of chapter three, a better characterisation of the aims of science 
might be the production of knowledge in accordance with the changing norms of 
professional scientific journals and the regulative ideal of subjectless knowledge.  
In any case, questions of justification are reduced to questions concerning the 
reliability of belief-forming mechanisms with respect to scientific aims, and 
these can be answered empirically and independently of any particular stance or 
perspective.  There is no further distinctively philosophical work to be done.  As 
Alcázar (1993: 315) describes it, one ‘can happily give normative advice since 
this is the result of combining two elements which are not normative at all’.  
Epistemic rationality turns out to be a variety of instrumental rationality, or the 
rationality of taking the appropriate means to one’s ends. 
 
Before looking in more detail at particular instrumentalist proposals, a few 
comments on the nature of instrumental value might be helpful.  In particular, we 
might note that instrumental value is not the opposite of intrinsic value as some 
instrumentalists seem to think.14  The appropriate contrast is between intrinsic 
and extrinsic value on the one hand, and instrumental and final value on the other 
hand.15  The instrumental/final distinction distinguishes between two ways in                                                         
13 Laudan (1990: 48–9) advocates an instrumentalist position, but maintains that the aims of 
science, and therefore epistemic norms, change over time as scientific practice changes.  
Although I set aside this complication in the following discussion, it does seem that Laudan’s 
‘historicism’ is the appropriate position to take given a naturalistic denial of extra-scientific 
norms.  Scientific practice is historically contingent and so must be its norms, within certain 
continuity constraints. 
14 See, for instance, Kornblith (2002: 161) and Stich (1990: 131). 
15 See Korsgaard (1983) for detailed discussion of these distinctions. 
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which something might be valued, either as a means or as an end.  This type of 
value can only arise in relation to some goal.  By contrast, the intrinsic/extrinsic 
distinction distinguishes two ways in which something might be valuable, 
respectively in virtue of its non-relational or its relational properties.  These 
distinctions cut across one another.  For instance, a gun may have instrumental 
value as a means to a murder.  However, this does not entail that the gun has 
extrinsic value.  The murder may be an end entirely without value.  So, the gun, 
whilst instrumentally valuable, can hardly be extrinsically valuable in virtue of 
its relation to the murder.16  Although it is true that instrumental value can be a 
species of extrinsic value, this is not always the case.17 
 
Let us return from our brief excursus into value theory and consider how 
instrumentalism with respect to epistemic normativity might be developed.  
Although Quine advocated instrumentalism with little elaboration or defence, it 
has struck many naturalists as a promising approach.18  As we saw at the end of 
the previous chapter, Maddy relies on instrumentalism as she fills out her 
naturalised account of logic.  However, the question arises, ‘how and why does 
an epistemic end oblige us?’  If naturalists can escape the charge of eliminating 
normativity by appealing to instrumental norms contingent upon the aims of 
scientific practice, they still require an account of the normative force of those 
aims.  If scientific practice is directed towards the production of particular types 
of true propositions, whence does that end derive its normative force?19  As 
Hilary Kornblith observes: 
 
We cannot rest content with Quine’s seemingly innocent suggestion that 
epistemic norms ‘become descriptive when the terminal parameter is 
expressed’, for we need to know what the source of this terminal parameter 
is.  What, ultimately, is the source of epistemic normativity? (2002: 139)                                                         
16 It might be suggested that something with instrumental value must always have extrinsic value 
insofar as it bears a relation to the satisfaction of an agent’s desires.  In response, I would deny 
that there is value to the satisfactions of an agent’s desires per se, unless the desire is for 
something we have reason to value, i.e. something which is valuable.   I shall return to this topic 
in chapter eight when I consider the relationship between reason and desire. 
17 Riggs (2008: 315) is mistaken in thinking that instrumental value is always a type of extrinsic 
value. 
18 See footnote 2 above. 
19 As Nietzsche asked in the opening section of Beyond Good and Evil, ‘Granted we want truth: 
why not rather untruth?  See Williams (2002: 13–19) for a very good account of Nietzsche’s 
position on the value of truth.  
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I shall look at Kornblith’s answer a little later.  Although I shall argue that his 
answer is unsatisfactory, the question is a good one. 
 
The important point, then, is that normative reasons cannot be endlessly 
transmitted without some genuinely normative origin.20  A natural way in which 
we might try to locate the source of epistemic normativity is by considering the 
value of true beliefs.21  If true beliefs are instrumentally valuable, we have a 
certain sort of reason to acquire them.  Moreover, it is highly plausible that true 
beliefs are instrumentally valuable, for it seems likely that without an accurate 
map of our environment we would fare very badly.  The thought then emerges 
that we should adopt particular patterns of inference because they are conducive 
to forming true beliefs, which, in turn are conducive to satisfying our goals. 
 
I shall look directly at truth-orientated accounts of epistemic normativity shortly.  
By way of an approach to this topic, however, I want to look at a form of 
instrumentalism which does not treat truth as the end of epistemic activity.  In 
particular, Stephen Stich (1990) has argued against the plausible claim that the 
possession of true beliefs has pragmatic value.  Indeed, he has claimed that on 
becoming clear about the nature of truth, one sees that true beliefs have no value 
whatsoever.  Essentially, he argues that there are many truth-like relations, and 
no good reason to prefer one to another other than their propensity to enable us to 
satisfy our goals.  The details of his arguments are not entirely germane to our 
theme, but the relevant upshot is Stich’s recommendation that we replace the 
idea of truth as the terminal parameter of enquiry, with other valuable ends.  He 
writes: 
 
In evaluating systems of cognitive processes, the system to be preferred 
is the one that would be most likely to achieve those things that are 
intrinsically valued by the person whose interests are relevant to the 
purpose of evaluation.  So, for example, if the issue at hand is the 
evaluation of Smith’s system of cognitive processes in comparison with 
some actual or hypothetical alternative, the system that comes out higher                                                         
20 Cp. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 1094a18-23. 
21 One might want to deny that beliefs are strictly true or false.  It might be more accurate then to 
say ‘the value of possessing beliefs with true propositional content’ than the ‘value of true 
beliefs’. 
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on the pragmatist account of cognitive evaluation is the one that is most 
likely to lead to the things that Smith finds intrinsically valuable. (1990: 
131) 
 
Now, we might interpret this in two ways: according to its letter or according to 
its spirit.  Thus, by ‘the things that Smith finds intrinsically valuable’, we might 
understand either ‘the things that Smith finds to be valuable in virtue of their 
non-relational properties’ or ‘the things that Smith finds valuable regardless of 
whether they promote some further end of his’.  As it is hard to see how the 
intrinsic/extrinsic distinction would be relevant to Stich’s position, I suspect he 
intended the latter.  But, if this is correct, Stich has conflated intrinsic value with 
final value as cautioned against above.  Although this could be dismissed as no 
more than carelessness, it may also be the result of adhering to a position that ties 
value to the satisfaction of personal goals.  Otherwise, it is hard to see why the 
very different distinctions would be run together. 
 
In any case, Stich’s account has several more worrying features.  We might 
notice, for example, that it is a relativistic account of epistemic normativity in the 
sense that two individuals ought to have different beliefs depending on their 
respective systems of values.  This, however, is incompatible with the highly 
plausible thought that epistemic justification is universalizable.  As Ernest Sosa 
writes, ‘if a belief is epistemically justified, then any belief similar to that belief 
in all relevant respects would be equally epistemically justified’ (1993: 50).  If 
Smith and Jones both hold the same belief on the same grounds then they are 
equally justified in holding it, whatever its relation to the achievement of their 
goals.  If it were suggested that Smith’s, but not Jones’, belief is epistemically 
justified, then it seems to me that we would have lost our grip on the notion of 
epistemic justification altogether.  Better by far to say that epistemic justification 
and pragmatic utility can come apart.  Moreover, just as epistemic justification is 
constant between persons, so it is independent of the fact that an individual’s 
goals can vary over time.  A belief which once frustrated my goals may later 
further them, but the belief does not thereby enjoy epistemic justification which 
it did not previously have.  For, otherwise, one could justify one’s beliefs by 
working on one’s desires. 
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One manifestation of the failure to account for the universalizability of epistemic 
reasons is that Stich’s account does not seem to allow for the right account of 
what psychologists call ‘motivated’ or ‘hot’ reasoning.22  Hot reasoning occurs 
when lines of thought are promoted on the basis of emotional salience, or when 
cognition is directed towards non-cognitive ends.  It is true that all conscious 
human cognition is hot in the sense that it is guided or influenced by feelings 
such as certainty.23  However, cognition directed at non-cognitive ends is widely 
derided as ‘sham’ reasoning.24  Our practices of epistemic evaluation indicate 
that we evaluate a subject’s beliefs regardless of what we think of her motivation 
or desires, or whether indeed we know anything about them.  At least, this is the 
regulative ideal we are guided by when, for instance, we evaluate philosophical 
writing.  We do not think that laudable ends can shore up a muddled line of 
argument.   
 
It is a problematic consequence of Stich’s pragmatism that it does not appear to 
afford us the resources to identify sham reasoning.  Perhaps Smith thinks that 
accepting some false belief will promote his ends of peace, love and harmony.  
Perhaps he is right.  On Stich’s view, given Smith’s ends, Smith would have no 
reason at all to seek out evidence against his belief.25  Furthermore, Smith would 
be justified in persisting in his false belief even in the face of disconfirming 
evidence.  In such cases, however, I think the most natural response is to draw a 
distinction between different types of justification.  Let us allow that Smith is 
morally justified in persisting in his false belief in the face of disconfirming 
evidence.  At least, it would take serious argument to rule out the possibility.  
However, this would not mean that Smith is epistemically justified.  For, 
intuitively, beliefs are epistemically justified to the extent that they are based on 
                                                        
22 See Goldman (1999: 234–8) and especially Kunda (1990) for more on motivated reasoning. 
23 See Damasio (1997). 
24 I take the term ‘sham’ reasoning from C. S. Peirce.  According to Peirce, sham reasoning 
occurs when ‘it is no longer the reasoning which determines what the conclusion shall be, but it is 
the conclusion which determines what the reasoning shall be’ (1931: 1. 57).  He attacks sham 
reasoning as a corrupting influence on intellectual enquiry.  See Haack (1998: 8–10) for further 
discussion. 
25 Smith might have a reason to seek out prima facie evidence against his belief simply in order 
to overcome it and fortify his original belief.  Whilst this method of belief formation and 
maintenance is not unheard of in philosophy, it is of course just another form of sham reasoning. 
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epistemic reasons, which stand in favour of the truth of a proposition.26  Peace, 
love and harmony may be reasons that bear on belief, but they do not affect the 
likelihood of the belief being true and they are not thereby epistemic reasons.  
The difficulty is that this natural distinction is not available to Stich because he 
has eliminated truth as the end of enquiry, and replaced it with the all-embracing 
category of everything an agent values.  For Stich, belief in a proposition is 
justified tout court in light of an agent’s values.  As there is no longer any 
distinctively epistemic criterion of justification, it becomes impossible to say that 
a belief is epistemically justified, but not morally justified, or vice versa.27 
 
For these reasons, it seems to me that Stich’s account is unsatisfactory.  
Nevertheless, establishing a connection between the end of epistemic activity and 
what an epistemic agent values or desires is a common strategy for explaining 
epistemic normativity within a naturalistic framework.  Whilst Stich is unusual in 
denying that the property of being true is relevant to the evaluation of beliefs, 
naturalists frequently maintain that the value of true beliefs is contingent upon 
non-epistemic ends.  For instance, Kornblith offers an account of epistemic 
norms as ‘universal hypothetical imperatives’ (2002: 157).  On Kornblith’s view, 
as on Stich’s, it is important to have beliefs that enable us to satisfy our goals.  
However, Kornblith emphasises the importance of true beliefs as a means to that 
end.  Although I shall later question whether instrumentalists are entitled to 
appeal to true beliefs in this way, Kornblith’s view does seem at first blush to 
have the merit of retaining the distinctively epistemic aspect of epistemic 
justification. 
 
For Kornblith the value of true beliefs derives from their contribution to 
decision-making.  He envisages choosing between available courses of action as 
involving a process that is appropriately modelled by cost-benefit analysis.  
Thus, he describes the homely example of choosing to buy one toaster or 
another: 
                                                         
26 I defend this view with appropriate detail in chapter seven. 
27 See, however, Horwich (2006: 351) who takes the position that whilst truth has non-
instrumental value, the value is a species of moral value. 
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We must figure out the consequences of the two purchases; we must assign 
values to each of them; we must do some arithmetic. (2002: 155) 
 
So, when we decide how to act we multiply the expected value of a set of 
outcomes by the probability of the outcomes obtaining.  In order to succeed in 
this piece of prudential arithmetic, Kornblith argues that we will typically need to 
have true beliefs: 
 
It is thus of the first importance that our cognitive systems remain suitable 
for the purpose of performing the relevant cost-benefit calculations.  And 
what this requires is that our cognitive systems be accurate, that is, that 
they reliably get at truth. (2002:  158) 
 
Thus, Kornblith looks to yoke naturalised epistemology to the idea of subjective 
expected utility within decision theory.28  Indeed, this will strike many as an 
attractive coalition of theories (and strike many others as an unholy alliance).  
For instance, it is one of the supposed attractions of decision theory that 
questions concerning final ends, traditionally the subject of philosophical 
enquiry, are replaced by more psychologically tractable questions concerning the 
ends we in fact have.29 
 
Another apparent advantage of Kornblith’s approach concerns motivation.  As 
the ends of instrumental reasoning are by definition valuable to us, the mystery 
concerning the normative force of epistemic norms is supposed to be removed.  
At least we have a plausible looking explanation of motivational force.  As 
Kornblith writes: 
 
Someone who cares about acting in a way that furthers the things he cares 
about, and that includes all of us, has pragmatic reasons to favor a cognitive 
system that is effective in generating truths, whether he cares about the truth 
or not. (2002: 156) 
 
Because we value the end, we will also value the means to that end; and here the 
means are true beliefs and reliable methods for acquiring them.  As true beliefs 
                                                        
28 See Hollis and Sugden (1993) for insightful criticism of decision theory.  I shall briefly return 
to the subject in chapter eight. 
29 I say ‘supposed’ attraction because I argue against this sort of ant-rationalism in section 8.2 
below. 
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are a precondition for the sort of cost-benefit analysis necessary for attaining 
whatever we value, we will always value truth.30 
 
David Papineau (2003a) offers a very similar account to Kornblith’s.  Once 
more, for Papineau the aim of epistemic activity is truth, and patterns of 
reasoning which are reliably conducive to truth have normative force because 
true beliefs enable us to satisfy our desires.  Thus, he writes: 
 
On my view, what makes it the case that you ought to judge in certain ways 
on specific occasions is that this will be a means to your judging truly.  
There is nothing circular about this analysis, provided truth itself can be 
analysed without appealing to norms of judgement, and the adoption of 
truth as an aim is in turn explained by reference to moral or personal value 
attached to truth.  (2003a: 20) 
 
Moreover:  
 
There is always a species of derived personal value to having true beliefs that 
are relevant to action, for such truth will always help you to find a way to 
satisfy whatever desires you have. (2003a: 17)   
 
So, as with Kornblith’s account, it is supposedly no mystery that the normative 
force of epistemic norms is felt universally.  For, it is supposedly no mystery that 
we are motivated by our desires.31 
 
Interestingly, Papineau also proposes that the value of true beliefs derived from 
non-epistemic goals allows naturalists to avoid certain difficulties raised by the 
rule-following considerations (2003a: 19–20).  We might recall from chapter one 
that whilst the rule-following considerations primarily bear upon determining the 
truth conditions for propositions about meanings, much of the difficulty lies in 
identifying truth-makers with normative force – or, what I called value-makers.  
Consequently, Papineau is right to identify ‘the question of why we ought to 
judge so-and-so on specific occasions’ (2003a: 19) as an important issue 
stemming from Kripke’s argument.  Papineau’s answer, in line with his account                                                         
30 Although truth is ‘pre-eminent’, other epistemic values such as simplicity and conservativeness 
still have their familiar roles to play in epistemic justification insofar as they too are necessary for 
cost-benefit analysis.  As Kornblith notes, ‘a system of evaluation that was perfectly accurate but 
could not perform its evaluations in real time would be of little value’ (2002: 158–9). 
31 I challenge this view in chapter eight where I discuss and reject desire-based theories of 
reasons. 
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of epistemic normativity, is that we should make arithmetical judgements in 
accordance with plus, rather than in accordance with a deviant quus-like 
function, because doing so pays off in terms of our further aims.   
 
Although he does not fill in the details, it is not hard to see why Papineau might 
tend towards this sort of solution.  It is, of course, quite natural to think that we 
ought to judge, and assert, that 68 + 57 = 125 because to do so is to judge truly.  
However, if we are to believe Kripke’s interpretation, Wittgenstein’s arguments 
show that we must replace truth conditions for sentences with assertability 
conditions, or, as Kripke also refers to them, ‘justification conditions’ (1982: 74).  
Kripke goes on to explain the justification conditions of an utterance in terms of 
its utility within a social practice (1982: 75–7).32  This is supposed to be the 
‘sceptical solution’ to the ‘Wittgensteinian paradox’.  I do not in fact think that 
this is an adequate solution, not least because most of this chapter will be 
devoted to arguing against instrumentalist accounts of epistemic normativity.  
Nevertheless, Papineau’s contention suggests that the discussion is proceeding in 
the right direction and that I am not simply talking past naturalist concerns. 
 
5.3 Categorical Epistemic Norms and Trivial Knowledge 
 
Advocates of naturalised epistemology frequently commit themselves, then, to a 
teleological theory of epistemic normativity.  Truth-conducive norms of reason 
are valuable and motivating insofar as they promote the ends we have.  However, 
a straightforward analogy with ethical theory suggests a possible concern 
resulting from the different normative properties of rules and ends.  Ethical 
deontologists, for example, maintain that an action is justified insofar as it 
conforms to some categorical norm, and are then left with the tasks of explaining 
how we come to have knowledge of such apparently queer entities and 
explaining how they bind us.  By contrast, advocates of teleological ethics, such 
as consequentialism or eudaimonism, argue that an action is good insofar as it is, 
or can reasonably be expected to be, conducive to some end, such as the greatest                                                         
32 See, however, Winch (1983: 402–3) who takes Kripke to task for failing to distinguish between 
two ways in which it might be necessary to consider usage in order to identify the meaning of an 
expression.  On the one hand, we might need to look at how an expression is used.  On the other 
hand, we might need to look at the utility of an expression, or what use it is.  Winch argues that 
Kripke wrongly attributes the latter position to Wittgenstein.  
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happiness of the greatest number or a flourishing life.  The instrumentalist 
account of epistemic normativity appeals to a telos of epistemic practice as a 
source of normativity and so falls into the second category.  However, one worry 
facing teleological accounts of normativity in general is the prima facie existence 
of categorical norms.  For example, it is sometimes objected that because 
utilitarians hold that an action is only ever contingently right, they must be 
willing to countenance acts that strike us as unconditionally obligatory or 
impermissible.  For instance, it appears morally impermissible to take an 
innocent man from the street for the purpose of forced organ donation.  This 
intuition tends to hold despite the apparent utility of the action.33  The thought is 
that the injunction not to take innocent life is categorically binding, regardless of 
any instrumental value attached to disregarding it.   
 
Although this is only a bare sketch of a controversy, it suggests that there is a 
concern to be addressed.  Moreover, if this is how matters stand in the moral 
case, there may be more pressure on those who deny the categorical force of 
epistemic norms.  Anticipating the next two chapters, I should say that my 
sympathies are with the view that certain epistemic norms, i.e. those of basic 
logic, are categorically binding and that truth is a final end.  In my view, rather 
than it being the case that our reasoning ought to conform to logic in order that 
we are better able to achieve our desired ends, part of what it is to be an 
epistemic agent is to be subject to certain logical norms and for one’s belief 
formation to be regulated by the end of truth.  One cannot be an epistemic agent 
unless one is rational in the sense of being accountable to and responsive to 
epistemic reasons. A non-rational creature or device, by contrast, can only 
passively record representations of the world.  Consequently, it cannot be 
justified or unjustified in doing so. Thus, I agree with Emer O’Hagan when he 
writes: 
 
It is not possible for an agent to engage in the practice of reasoning without 
being accountable to rational norms since such accountability is constitutive 
of agency. (2005: 42)                                                         
33 Utilitarians do, of course, have resources to draw upon here.  For example, they might point out 
that the disutility to a society in which people lived in constant fear of being snatched from the 
street is likely to outweigh the utility of saving the lives of a relatively small number of people 
needing organ transplants. 
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I also agree with Thomas Nagel: 
 
In order to have the authority it claims, reason must be a form or category of 
thought from which there is no appeal beyond itself–whose validity is 
unconditional because it is necessarily employed in every purported 
challenge to itself.  (1997: 7) 
 
If this is right, norms of judgement are internal to epistemic practice, not 
external, as instrumentalists would have it.  Hence, a rational agent would still be 
bound by epistemic norms even if violating them promoted his non-epistemic 
ends.  Although non-epistemic reasons can trump epistemic reasons, they are not 
the source of epistemic normativity and, so, cannot negate them.  As I shall 
defend these claims in the following chapters, the concern that instrumentalists 
fail to account for the categorical force of certain epistemic norms will 
strengthen in retrospect.  Nevertheless, the above sketch at least suggests that it 
is coherent and plausible to think that there are categorical norms of reason.  
 
Papineau responds to this sort of concern by asking us to consider a case in 
which it intuitively seems that we ought not to conform to the norms of 
judgement. The case is simply described and suggests that there are no 
categorical, sui generis norms bearing on belief formation.  We are invited to 
consider the case of an elderly man who, aware that knowledge of a real 
probability of developing cancer would cause him considerable upset, arranges 
matters so as to avoid any such distressing evidence (2003a: 14).  His behaviour 
is not obviously blameworthy and Papineau further claims that he does not seem 
to be ‘violating any prescriptions at all’ by adopting this ‘sensible’ strategy 
(2003a: 16).  He describes the elderly man’s behaviour as ‘quite proper’ (2003a: 
15).   
 
Thus, Papineau sets up a thought experiment and gambles on our intuitions going 
in a particular direction.  Although this is a perfectly reasonable strategy, I think 
that the particular example is unhelpful.34  Because of the significance of the                                                         
34 The reliability of philosophical intuitions has attracted considerable attention recently, largely 
as a result of so-called ‘experimental philosophy’ or ‘X-Phi’ advocated by some naturalists (see, 
for instance, Knobe and Nichols (2008)).  I do not, however, see that these studies should 
occasion general scepticism with respect to philosophical intuitions, as I do not see how folk 
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moral reasons bearing on the case, intuitions are likely to vary about whether 
there really are no epistemic norms in play, or whether they are over-ridden.  
Indeed, given that the case is sketchily specified, it is far from clear to me that 
elderly man wouldn’t be well advised to find out the truth, however distressing.  
Perhaps it would be better to prepare psychologically and set his affairs in order 
(or to have his nagging doubts allayed) than to live in a fools’ paradise.  Perhaps 
he would even have an obligation to do so in certain circumstances.35  I am 
unsure and, as a practical matter, I would be reluctant to offer third party advice.  
Weighing such slight epistemic reasons against such important moral and 
prudential considerations is a formidably difficult task, rather like attempting to 
distinguish between fine wines adulterated with vinegar.  Small differences in 
epistemic value are likely to be swamped. 
 
So, I have reservations concerning the likely reliability of our intuitions bearing 
on the particular case.  I do not, however, intend to challenge the claim that it is 
sometimes in our overall best interests to have false beliefs.36  Instead, I would 
like to propose an alternative way to understand the case.  Even if we allow that 
there is no epistemic norm telling against the elderly man’s strategy, it is not 
clear that this establishes Papineau’s point.  For it is not clear that Papineau is 
describing a case of epistemic behaviour at all.  Rather it might seem better to 
describe the man as refraining from epistemic activity with regard to the subject 
of his developing cancer.  We do, after all, decline to investigate the truth of a 
great number of propositions without this implying that we thereby violate any 
norms of judgement.  We might do so because the propositions are trivial, or 
because the investigation would be inappropriately time-consuming, or for                                                         
judgements undermine the intuitive judgements of careful, reflective philosophers.  We do not, 
after all, appeal to the ballot box in order to settle philosophical disputes.  I am also persuaded by 
Williamson (2005) that, at least very often, there is nothing especially mysterious about 
philosophical intuitions beyond an ability to handle counterfactual conditionals. 
35 See Lynch (2004: 131–6) for a general defence of the importance of self-knowledge to a 
flourishing life. 
36 Interesting in this context is the example of so-called ‘depressive realism’.  Taylor and Brown 
(1988) provide an overview of the (contested) phenomenon.  In summary they write that 
‘considerable research evidence suggests that overly positive self-evaluations, exaggerated 
perceptions of control or mastery, and unrealistic optimism are characteristic of normal human 
thought.  Moreover, these illusions appear to promote other criteria of mental health, including 
the ability to care about others, the ability to be happy or contented, and the ability to engage in 
productive and creative work’ (1988: 193).  See, however, Flanagan (2007: 170–81) for further 
discussion and criticism of the methodology of these studies.  
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moral, prudential or aesthetic reasons.  For example, it would be unreasonable to 
dissolve a painting by Caravaggio in order to investigate its chemical 
composition.  However, a decision to refrain from some activity does not 
constitute a rejection of the norms that govern it.  If one decided that the 
aforementioned artistic destruction was a reasonable project, then one would be 
governed by the applicable epistemic norms, as in all one’s epistemic 
endeavours.  
 
Because examples requiring us to weigh different categories of reasons can be 
difficult to evaluate, I would like to consider an apparently simpler, less morally 
loaded, example, namely the case of unimportant or trivial knowledge.37  The 
case is particularly interesting because trivial knowledge is frequently taken to 
count against the view that truth is of non-instrumental value.  For it seems 
obvious to many philosophers that there are very many true propositions which 
we have no reason, let alone obligation, to come to know.  This is taken, 
moreover, to demonstrate that there is no value to holding true beliefs except 
when they are instrumental to the satisfaction of our desires.  For example, 
Stephen Grimm writes as follows: 
 
If you propose an evening memorizing the phone book for Topeka, Kansas, 
and I decline, have I really missed an opportunity to enrich myself, from an 
epistemic point of view?  If the truth is always intrinsically worth pursuing, 
then it seems that I have.  And yet that conclusion seems ridiculous.  (2008: 
726)38 
 
Contrary to these claims, however, I would like to argue that upon closer 
inspection cases of trivial knowledge provide very good evidence of the reverse, 
namely that the epistemic norm of truth applies regardless of instrumental 
considerations.  Of course, partly for the reasons given above, this is not to say 
that we have an all-things-considered duty to pursue every truth.  Nor is it even 
to say that we have an all-epistemic-things-considered duty to pursue every truth, 
for time is limited and many avenues of epistemic endeavour appear                                                         
37 Similar considerations may apply to cases of knowledge which cannot even in principle further 
our non-epistemic interests.  For example, knowledge of non-causal entities or entities that are 
causally isolated from our world. 
38 Zagzebski (2003: 20–1) and Pritchard (2007: 102) also appear to endorse the view that trivial 
knowledge is without value. 
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unpromising.  We can reasonably judge in advance that many true beliefs are 
unlikely to be epistemically fruitful in the sense that they are unlikely either to 
enable the acquisition of further true beliefs or to promote understanding by 
laying bare the connections between beliefs.  Instance of trivial knowledge are 
very likely to be epistemic dead ends.39 
 
With these qualifications in mind, let us consider a particular example, say, the 
number of blades of grass on Parliament Square in London.  Let us also agree for 
the sake of argument that this is a question about which we feel entirely 
indifferent.  We do not value the answer, and, furthermore, there is no prospect 
that it will help us to attain any of the goods that we do in fact value.  It is trivial 
knowledge without instrumental value.  I take it, nonetheless, that the fact that 
we do not care about the matter does not simply settle the matter of whether we 
have reason to care.  Imagine, for instance, that despite our complete 
indifference, we encounter reliable and conclusive evidence that there are 
precisely 100,000,000 blades of grass on Parliament Square.  A meticulous team 
of philosophically inclined protesters assures of the fact (they have also resolved 
any questions of vagueness).  Under such circumstances, I suggest that it would 
be irrational to fail to form a true belief about this matter of fact and continue to 
profess ignorance or to falsely believe that the answer was some other figure.  
For, according to one plausible view, rationality is, inter alia, a matter of 
recognising, and responding appropriately to reasons.40  And, in this case, the 
testimony constitutes a decisive reason for belief. 
 
Moreover, we should notice that the usual norms of reason apply to trivial 
beliefs.  For example, we know that if there are 100,000,000 blades of grass on 
Parliament Square there are not 200,000,000 blades of grass.  We know that the 
answer to the question of how many blades of grass are on Parliament Square is a 
number and not, say, a colour or an adverb.  We know that the number of blades                                                         
39 Indeed, it is difficult to rule out the possibility that there are some true propositions which 
should never be known all-things-considered.  I have in mind examples such as propositions 
concerning destructive technologies or fundamentally demoralising facts concerning the human 
condition. 
40 Rationality is sometimes used in a highly restrictive sense to mean the rationality of finding 
and adopting means to some independently given end.  I discuss the limitations of this sort of 
instrumental rationality in chapter eight. 
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of grass is either even or odd.  We also know that the number is a good deal 
higher than one, and a good deal lower than the number of blades of grass in the 
whole of London.  If the instrumentalist view were correct, however, there would 
be no epistemic norms bearing on our judgement in these matters, for each of 
these beliefs would be irrelevant to the satisfaction of our desires.41  The fact that 
some beliefs are true and based on good reasons would not even weigh in the 
balance. As Papineau writes, the ‘prescription [to believe the truth] only applies 
to those beliefs that are relevant to your actions’ (2003a: 17).  In fact, however, 
epistemic norms apply to beliefs quite generally and not only to instrumentally 
valuable beliefs.  We cannot simply excuse ourselves from the demands of 
reason when they are irrelevant to our purposes. 
 
The example of trivial beliefs suggests that we are subject to sui generis 
epistemic norms regardless of our desires.  Although Papineau finds this 
counterintuitive, it seems to me that the view coheres well with our background 
intuitions.  John Dewey once wrote that ‘man naturally prizes knowledge only 
for the sake of its bearing upon success and failure in attaining goods and 
avoiding evils’ (1929: 51).  I think Dewey was wrong.  Not only are we subject 
to epistemic norms whether or not we care about them, we are also naturally 
curious beings who tend to prize knowledge for its own sake.   One indication of 
this is the thought that if of one had unlimited time and mental capacity, it would 
be a good to possess as much trivial knowledge as possible.  Knowing every true 
proposition about the world except the number of blades of grass in Parliament 
Square is intuitively a worse state than omniscience.  As ignorance is an 
epistemic imperfection, the possession of trivial knowledge always has some 
value.42 
                                                         
41 It might be objected here that these are not trivial matters, but instances of very general 
considerations which have pragmatic significance elsewhere in our lives.  This is closely related 
to the kind of rule-consequentialist response, which I come to in the next section. 
42 The method I am employing here to establish the non-instrumental value of true beliefs is very 
similar to G. E. Moore’s ‘method of isolation’ (PE 187–8).  Perhaps Moore’s clearest use of the 
method is his attempt to establish that the value of beauty is not merely instrumental to the 
pleasure to be obtained from its appreciation (PE 83–6).  To this end, Moore invites us to 
consider two worlds, one of superlative beauty, the other of supreme ugliness.  Both worlds are 
permanently devoid of humans or other beings capable of aesthetic judgement.  Moore argues 
that if we are inclined to view the former world as the more valuable, it must be because beauty 
has non-instrumental value. 
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Michael Lynch also provides an example which appears to show that we value 
true beliefs, irrespective of their instrumental value: 
 
Suppose that, unbeknownst to us, the world began yesterday – it seems 
older, but it isn’t.  If I really lived in a Russell World, as I’ll call it, almost 
all my beliefs about the past would be false.  Yet my desires would be 
equally satisfied in both worlds.  This is because the future of the two 
worlds unfolds in exactly the same way … Yet given the choice between 
living in the actual world and living in a Russell World, I strongly prefer the 
actual world.  (2004: 18) 
 
My intuition is the same as Lynch’s.  Although these beliefs about the past are 
not trivial, they share with trivial knowledge the feature of not connecting up 
with any of our non-epistemic desires.  Nevertheless, I would strongly prefer not 
to live in a Russell World.43  Furthermore, I suspect that very few people would 
be content to decide the matter on the flip of a coin, as one should expect if it 
were a matter of indifference.  We do in fact value true beliefs, or getting things 
right, independently of utility.  Examples such as Papineau’s in which the value 
of truth is swamped by other considerations do not tend to show otherwise.  
Moreover, contrary to a common view of the matter, examples of trivial 
knowledge tend to reinforce the thought that truth is valuable for its own sake. 
 
5.4 Instrumentalism, Contingency and Truth 
 
According to instrumentalists, epistemic norms are binding insofar as 
conforming to them makes it more likely that we will form beliefs that promote 
our ends.  Papineau and Kornblith both argue that beliefs are more likely to 
promote our ends if they represent the world as it is, thus making true beliefs 
contingently valuable proximate goals.  In response, I have motivated the thought 
that certain norms of reason are categorical and I have also argued that true 
beliefs have non-instrumental epistemic value.  To this end, I have argued that 
examples such as Papineau’s elderly man and cases of trivial knowledge do not 
tell against true beliefs possessing non-instrumental value.  Indeed, I have 
suggested that cases of trivial knowledge indicate the reverse.  In this section, I 
would like to present several further worries for the view that epistemic norms 
can be reduced to instrumental norms.  In particular, I would like to argue that it                                                         
43 Or be a brain in a vat, or the victim of a Cartesian Demon or subject to any other form of 
systematic illusion. 
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is far more difficult than instrumentalists suppose to find an instrumental role for 
truth when the final goal of belief formation is non-epistemic. 
 
Instrumental reasons are not only contingent upon having a particular end, but 
also upon having further beliefs.  In particular, they are only rationally 
compelling if accompanied by the belief that the course of action is actually a 
means to the end in question.  For instance, the prescription ‘if you value car-
speed, then you ought to tune your car well’ is only a reason to act if you believe 
that tuning your car well will make it go faster.  By contrast, the prescription ‘if 
you value car-speed, then you ought to tune your violin well’ has no rational 
force because it is apparently predicated upon a false belief.  We have no reason 
to believe that there is any connection between engine performance and well-
tuned violins.  So, given that instrumentalists recommend that we form true 
beliefs as a means to pragmatic ends, it needs to be the case that a reliable 
means-end relationship holds between the two. 
 
We have already touched on one reason for doubting that the possession of true 
beliefs tends to promote pragmatic ends.  This was Stich’s argument that true 
beliefs are no more likely to get us what we want than beliefs instantiating any 
number of nearby truth-like functions.44  Although I have objected to Stich’s 
account of epistemic normativity, his concerns about the relation between true 
belief and successful action merit independent consideration.  It could be, for 
instance, that true beliefs have final epistemic value, but, for just the reasons 
Stich offers, no instrumental value with respect to the satisfaction of non-
epistemic goals.  This would constitute a decisive reason to reject the type of 
truth-tropic instrumentalism defended by Papineau and Kornblith. 
 
Although Stich’s arguments constitute an interesting area for exploration, I do 
not propose to study them here in any detail.45  I would, however, like to develop                                                         
44 Stich takes this to show that we have no particular reason to value true beliefs.  A more 
appropriate moral, it seems to me, would be that we have no reason to value true beliefs in 
particular.  If Stich’s argument were sound, true beliefs and beliefs instantiating nearby truth-like 
functions would have instrumental value. 
45 One reason for my reluctance is that Stich’s arguments depend on a number of substantive 
claims about the metaphysics of belief, which I am not prepared to defend.  See Goldman (1991) 
for further criticism along these lines. 
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one strand of Stich’s discussion.  In particular, I would like to pay attention to the 
nexus between mental states on the one hand, and action on the other.  Consider, 
in this light, the following statement from Patricia Churchland: 
 
Boiled down to essentials, a nervous system enables the organism to 
succeed in the four F’s: feeding, fleeing, fighting and reproduction.  The 
principal chore of nervous systems is to get the body parts where they 
should be in order that the organism may survive.  Insofar as 
representations serve that function, representations are a good thing … 
Truth, whatever that is, definitely takes the hindmost.  (1987: 548–9) 
 
Churchland is pointing out that evolutionary pressures bear directly on behaviour 
and only indirectly on representations.  From an evolutionary perspective, 
Churchland suggests, representations should be evaluated against the standard of 
fitness rather than against some poorly understood notion of truth.  Furthermore, 
even though we need representations of our environment in order to act, there are 
many ways in which a representation could be fitness enhancing other than 
through its truth or accuracy.46  In the evolutionary case, for instance, it is very 
likely that we have inherited a number of quick and nasty cognitive strategies, 
which are adaptive despite frequently producing false beliefs.47  Indeed, this is 
one plausible explanation for many of the psychological findings concerning 
systematic biases in human cognition.48  Time is short, cognitive resources are 
limited and it is sometimes better to rely on rules of thumb than careful 
reasoning. 
 
Although Churchland is concerned with evolutionary fitness, her observations 
apply to goal-orientated behaviour quite generally.  Successful action is neither 
determined by nor always depends upon true beliefs.  Rather, it depends on the 
interplay between a number of mental, behavioural and environmental factors.  
Consequently, there are always ways in which an action predicated on a false 
belief can succeed.  Indeed, we can vary the factors around the nexus of thought                                                         
46 Rorty (1995: 282–3) also thinks that evolutionary considerations scotch the idea that there is 
any particular connection between truth and pragmatic value. 
47 For instance, Dennett (2006) offers an explanation of the origins of religious belief along these 
lines.  He points out that whereas failing to detect a predator (or a potential mate) can be a fatal 
error, a false positive is likely to cost very little.  Consequently, it is adaptive to err on the side of 
caution and identify living creatures on the basis of slender evidence.  This is an instance of what 
is sometimes called the ‘Garcia effect’.  Dennett suggests that it might explain primitive forms of 
animism upon, which other religions have built. 
48 See, for instance, Nisbett and Ross (1980), Stich (1985), Wilson (2002) and Papineau (2003b). 
  107 
and behaviour in order to construct any number of examples of successful action 
without true belief.  In this vein, Plantinga (1993b: 226; 2002) highlights 
examples of gerrymandered belief-desire systems which produce adaptive 
behaviour.  For instance, a desire to be eaten alive could be combined with the 
belief that the best way to approach a tiger is to run away from it.49  Of course, it 
is difficult to see how these gerrymandered belief-desire systems could be 
adaptive in the long run.50  I shall come to general policies shortly.  But my 
interest here is not to argue against the view that evolutionary processes tends to 
produce true beliefs, any more than I want to argue against the view that true 
beliefs are more likely than false beliefs to lead to the satisfaction of our desires.  
Rather, I am attempting to bring out the structure of the instrumentalist position 
in order to focus more clearly on the role that truth plays.  
 
Churchland’s proposal concerning the value of representations mirrors the 
instrumentalist’s proposal that we evaluate processes of belief formation against 
the standard of pragmatic value.  The key structural difference is that 
instrumentalists such as Kornblith and Papineau retain the proximate goal of 
truth.  For Churchland, by contrast, truth is of little or no concern.  If, however, 
the final goal of epistemic activity is not true belief, why don’t instrumentalists 
follow Churchland in abandoning concern for the means?  The answer is not that 
there is a necessary connection between true beliefs and pragmatic value.  As we 
have already seen, true beliefs and pragmatic ends are contingently related at 
best.51  Indeed, Papineau relies on this fact when he argues that there are no 
categorical norms of judgment applying to the elderly man in fear of the 
possibility of cancer.  I have of course argued that Papineau is mistaken in 
believing that there are no epistemic norms bearing on cases in which true beliefs 
do not tend to satisfy our desires.  Nevertheless, the question remains, if 
epistemic normativity is not finally grounded in truth, what is the benefit of 
relating epistemic norms to the proximate aim of truth? 
                                                         
49 This is in the course of Plantinga’s ‘Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism’. 
50 Ramsey (2002: 20–5) argues this point at length. 
51 Maddy (2007: 155–6) describes a particularly good example of this contingency, namely 
Joseph Priestley’s false beliefs concerning phlogiston successfully leading to a method for the 
production of oxygenated air. 
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One possible answer would involve shifting the focus from individual beliefs to 
rules or general epistemic policies.  Even if we would be better off having false 
beliefs in particular cases, perhaps a general policy of forming true beliefs would 
satisfy our desires better than a case-by-case policy.  This looks quite plausible 
and, if correct, it would seem to provide a clear role for true beliefs within an 
instrumentalist account.  The problem is that it is difficult to see why we should 
evaluate general policies in the light of promoting our desires, but not evaluate 
individual beliefs in the same way.  It is analogous to the difficulties indirect- or 
rule-consequentialists face in motivating their position.  If the ultimate source of 
normativity is pragmatic value, then there is no obvious reason why an individual 
belief should not be evaluated according to that standard.  It appears ad hoc to 
invoke rules or general policies when it is ultimately the consequences of holding 
true beliefs that matter.  If, on the other hand, it is the epistemic rules that matter, 
we have a completely different type of theory, namely a deontological account.52 
 
It might be suggested that even if any particular true belief is not necessary for 
fulfilling our ends, and even if it is not possible to appeal to general policies of 
belief formation, it is still more valuable when our ends are in fact fulfilled on 
the basis of true beliefs.  After all, it seems better on the whole to proceed on the 
basis of knowledge than to rely on chance or gerrymandered belief-desire 
systems.  Although I think this is right in a certain sense, I do not think that the 
observation helps instrumentalists to establish a role for truth in their account of 
epistemic normativity.  For, as a general principle, it is not true that a means 
provides a reason for action in addition to the end it serves.  If, for example, I 
need a library book, I do not have two reasons to visit the library, namely my 
need for the book and the fact that I must visit the library to obtain the book.  Nor                                                         
52 Hooker (2000) challenges the argument that rule-consequentialism collapses into act-
consequentialism by denying that rule-consequentialists have an overarching commitment to 
maximising the good.  Rather, he suggests that the commitment is to do what is impartially 
defensible (2000: 101).  This is interestingly similar to Parfit’s recent defence of rule-
consequentialism on Kantian grounds. Thus, Parfit writes: ‘Everyone ought to follow the 
principles whose being universal laws would make things go best, because these are the only 
principles whose being universal laws everyone could rationally will’ (2011: 418).  Although the 
further details of the debate are complicated, I do not see how instrumentalists could construct a 
parallel defence.  For, once the overarching commitment to acting in a way that satisfies desires 
is abandoned, I do not see how naturalists could motivate a commitment to believe what is 
impartially defensible or, indeed, how they could explain what it is to be impartially defensible.  
Perhaps, though, this is just a lack of imagination on my part.  For further discussion of the 
ethical case, see Hooker’s (2007) exchange with Card (2007). 
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is obtaining the book more valuable for the fact that I have successfully visited 
the library in order to acquire it.  Insofar as the value of obtaining the book is 
concerned, it would be just as well if it fell into my lap from the heavens.53   
 
Furthermore, it does not matter here if the means is reliably related to the ends.  
Consider the following example from Linda Zagzebski: 
 
A reliable espresso maker is good because espresso is good … The good of 
the product makes the reliability of the sources that produces it good, but 
the reliability of the source does not give the product an additional boost of 
value.  The liquid in the cup is not improved by the fact that it comes from 
a reliable espresso maker.  If the espresso tastes good, it makes no 
difference if it comes from an unreliable espresso machine. (2003: 13) 
 
Although Zagzebski is highlighting a particular difficulty for reliabilism, her 
point depends on a general principle concerning the transmission of value 
between means and ends.  The example is intended to show that the fact that a 
true belief has been produced by a reliable cognitive process does not make it 
any more valuable than if the true belief had been produced in an unreliable 
way.54  As with my example of the library book, all the value comes from the 
end which is the source of normativity.  Although the means is instrumentally 
valuable insofar as it produces the end, it is not an additional source of value.  
When the value of a good is transmitted from means to end, we do not benefit 
twice over from the means and the end. To think otherwise would be double 
counting. 
 
We can apply this point to instrumentalism as follows.  Instrumentalists claim 
that the proximate goal of truth is valuable because it reliably enables us to 
satisfy our non-epistemic ends.55  Very likely this is so.  For example, the 
prospect of developing a vaccine is an excellent reason to form true beliefs 
concerning the genetic code of a particular strain of the influenza virus.                                                          
53 There are of course other reasons why the particular means can affect the value of the means-
end whole.  For instance, the means could be wicked, or involve the exercise of virtue or not 
worth the candle. But these do not result from the means-end relationship itself. 
54 This is a problem for reliabilism because it challenges the idea that the justification condition 
for knowledge can be met by the reliability of the process which results in a true belief.  
55 Of course, we might (and do) also desire to have true beliefs.  Papineau (2003b) emphasises 
this fact and tells an evolutionary story to explain our curiosity.  However, as long as the 
normativity is grounded in the desire for truth rather than the truth itself, this is no more than a 
variation on a theme. 
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However, if the instrumentalist view were correct, all of the value of the true 
beliefs would be explained by the value of the non-epistemic end.  For, the 
lesson of the example above is that the means per se have no value or disvalue.  
We do not have the epistemic value of the means as well as the pragmatic value 
of the end.  But, if no distinctively epistemic value results from the employment 
of particular means, it looks difficult to justify the instrumentalist’s emphasis on 
true beliefs.  It would be just as well if an agent’s desires were satisfied through 
any other mechanism, such as Plantinga’s gerrymandered belief-desire systems.  
It is hard to see, then, how the instrumentalist’s model is supposed to explain 
epistemic value, when the value is entirely accounted for by non-epistemic ends.  
It is not enough to claim that the value is epistemic simply in virtue of the fact 
that it is beliefs which are being evaluated.  For, we can evaluate beliefs on 
moral, aesthetic and any number of other non-epistemic grounds. 
 
A couple of paragraphs back, I did allow that it is better in a certain sense if we 
achieve our practical goals as a result of having true beliefs.  This is because 
otherwise we are merely lucky, and, as any gambler will testify, luck rarely 
holds.  Moreover, we do not deserve credit for satisfying our goals by chance.  
Any such success is not due to our agency and cannot be depended upon in 
future.  By contrast, someone who satisfies her goals by skilfully acquiring true 
beliefs is likely to satisfy her future desires and those of others.  Just as reliability 
is a desirable feature in an espresso maker, but does not affect the value of the 
finished product, so the knack of producing valuable outcomes is a desirable 
feature in a member of a community.  But, although these facts are important 
when it comes to the appraisal of epistemic agents, they do not affect the value of 
true beliefs per se.  If a true belief does not have epistemic value in virtue of 
enabling us to satisfy a particular desire, then neither do any number of true 
beliefs have epistemic value in virtue of enabling the wider community to satisfy 
any number of desires. 
 
We have seen, then, that according to the instrumentalist picture particular true 
beliefs are not the ultimate source of epistemic normativity, and that they are 
uncertainly correlated with pragmatic value.  We have also seen that an appeal to 
a more general epistemic policy of forming true beliefs is under-motivated and 
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appears to fall foul of a dilemma frequently posed of rule-consequentialism.  
Finally, we have seen that true beliefs do not add epistemic value beyond the 
non-epistemic, instrumental value they inherit from pragmatic ends. These 
conclusions call into question whether instrumentalists are entitled to appeal to 
true beliefs.  And, if they are not entitled, it is unclear on what grounds they may 
be said to offer an account of epistemic normativity, as opposed to merely 
drawing our attention to the pragmatic norms which bear on belief. 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, the natural sciences are able to provide 
explanatory reasons for our cognitive practices.  Such reasons are, however, 
logically distinct from normative reasons.  They do not necessarily justify our 
cognitive practices.  Instrumentalists, then, attempt to pass the buck by 
connecting our cognitive practices to a further end.  The end of truth does 
provide the right sort of epistemic reason, which can be transmitted back to our 
cognitive practices thereby justifying them.  However, the naturalist is unable to 
provide a satisfactory account of why the end of truth is normative, except in 
terms of our pragmatic goals.  In this chapter I have tried to show that this 
provides the wrong sort of reason.  In fact, I think the problem is much worse 
than this. As I shall argue in chapter eight, desires do not count as reasons.  
Consequently, instrumentalism offers us no real normativity at all. 
 
Given these difficulties, it seems better to sever the link with pragmatic value 
and simply ground epistemic norms directly in truth as a final value.  Indeed, this 
is the view I shall defend in chapter seven.  So long as we are not trying to 
ground the normative force of true beliefs in further desires, the difficulties we 
encountered above do not arise.  In particular, there is no tension between 
holding truth as the end against which epistemic activity is evaluated and 
recognising that truth is only contingently related to desire.  In the following 
chapters I shall defend such an account. I should also like to hold onto the 
instrumentalist insight that there is an important category of normative force 
derived from the ends of a practice or mode of activity.  Much of my work will 
consist in explaining how this can be a source of normativity without passing the 
buck or appealing to the inappropriate category of desire.  I should also like to do 
justice to the intuition that there are categorical as well as hypothetical norms, 
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explain their origin and locate their value-makers.  Finally, I should like to 
explain how these categories of norms fit together and why they escape a 
naturalistic worldview.  This will be the burden of the following chapters. 
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Chapter Six 
A Sketch of the Good and the Right 
 
In previous chapters, I studied the tension between naturalism and normativity, 
the nature of naturalism and the limitations of certain naturalistic approaches to 
normativity.  In this chapter I begin to construct a positive account of the nature 
of normativity.  Some aspects of my view have already been stated or implied.  I 
shall be defending an objective, externalist theory of reasons and I shall not be 
relying on a scientific perspective.  I shall, however, retain the instrumentalist’s 
insight that there is an important connection between acting well and achieving 
goals.  But I would like to combine this with an explanation of the sense in which 
some norms are categorical.  In later chapters, I shall explore questions 
surrounding normative force, motivation and normative epistemology.   
 
I shall proceed by examining a number of important normative concepts.  In 
particular, I would like to focus on the relationships between the good, the right 
and practices with their associated ends.  In section 6.1, I look at the logical 
grammar of evaluative terms, paying particular attention to Geach’s (1956) 
proposal that ‘good’ is an attributive adjective.  In section 6.2, I look at the neo-
Aristotelian idea that the relationship we can understand goodness in functional 
terms.  In sections 6.3 and 6.4, I sketch an account of the good and the right 
respectively, using the game of chess as an example.  Finally, I broaden out my 
discussion to consider the extent to which chess is analogous to epistemic and 
ethical activity.  This leads to me to consider the nature of needs and finally the 
meaning or value of life as a whole.  I approach these questions in section 6.5. 
 
6.1 The Logical Grammar of Evaluative Terms 
 
What is goodness?  I would like to start with some comments about the logical 
grammar of ‘good’ and ‘bad’.  Grammarians distinguish between attributive and 
predicative adjectives.  In his paper ‘Good and Evil’, Peter Geach (1956) drew 
philosophers’ attention to this distinction and argued that it could be extended 
and applied to our understanding of the logic of evaluative terms such as ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’.  So, consider a complex predicate of the form ‘is an AN’ where A is 
an adjective and N is a noun.  For example, ‘is a red book’, ‘is a sharp spade’ or 
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‘is a good move’.  Now, we can draw a distinction between two types of 
adjectives by looking at the way complex predicates behave.  In some instances 
the predication ‘x is an AN’ logically decomposes into the two predications ‘x is 
an N’ and ‘x is A’.  So, using Geach’s example, ‘x is a red book’ logically 
decomposes into ‘x is a book’ and ‘x is red’.1  In these cases, the truth-value of 
the complex predicate is simply the truth-value of the conjunction of its 
component predicates, i.e. ‘x is an N’ and ‘x is A’.  If it is true that x is red and 
that x is a book, then it is true that x is a red book.  When complex predicates 
behave in this way, we can say that the adjective is predicative. 
 
However, not all adjectives behave like ‘red’.  Some complex predicates are 
inferentially irregular in the sense that their truth-values are not given by the 
conjunction of their components. Importantly for present purposes, Geach 
observed that the predicates ‘is good’ and ‘is bad’ are inferentially irregular.  
Thus, the predication ‘x is a good book’ does not logically decompose into the 
predications ‘x is a book’ and ‘x is good’.  Clearly, it fails in the case of the 
adjective ‘good’ rather than the noun ‘book’.2  We can infer from the truth of the 
proposition ‘x is a good book’ that ‘x is a book’, but not that ‘x is good’.  Or, 
consider the proposition ‘x is a good poison’.  We clearly cannot make two 
unqualified inferences that ‘x is a poison’ and that ‘x is good’.  Rather we mean 
something like ‘x is good as poison’ or ‘x has all the properties poison should 
have’ or ‘x is well-fitted to doing those things which poison is for’.  In this sense 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ are like ‘big’ and small’.  We cannot infer from ‘x is a big flea’ 
that ‘x is big’.  Even big fleas are rather small creatures.  Rather, we should 
understand something like ‘this is a big example of a flea’ bearing in mind that it 
is in the nature of fleas to be small by most standards.3                                                         
1 Geach’s example is complicated by the fact that ascriptions of colour terms such as ‘red’ seem 
to be context dependent.  For instance, ‘x is a white wine’ does not decompose into ‘x is white’ 
and ‘x is a wine’.  For white wine is actually a yellowish liquid.  For more on this point see 
Thomson (2008: 233–48). 
2 Rind and Tillinghast (2008: 85–6) argue that this is a contingent feature of natural languages 
and that it is possible to construct nouns that are inferentially irregular in the same way. 
3 Mightn’t we sometimes want to say that something is big without qualification, as, for example, 
when we contemplate a mountain and say “Goodness, that’s big!”?  One response would be to 
insist that what we really mean is something like “Goodness, that’s big for a mountain!”  But, of 
course, it might be rather small for a mountain and we might still be inclined to say “Goodness, 
that’s big!”  It is natural, then, to think that what we mean is simply ‘Goodness, that mountain is 
a big thing’, employing ‘big’ as a predicative adjective.  We are simply in awe of its size.  This is 
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I think that Geach is right that the underlying logical form of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
suggest that they are attributive adjectives.  Or, at least that this is the case when 
evaluative terms such as ‘good’ are used to qualify nouns.  What this shows is 
that the predication ‘x is good’ is always, or very often, incomplete.  Geach puts 
the point as follows: 
 
Even when ‘good’ or ‘bad’ stands by itself as a predicate, and is thus 
grammatically predicative, some substantive has to be understand; there is 
no such thing as being just good or bad, there is only being a good or bad 
so-and-so. (1956: 34)4   
 
Although I do not want to commit myself to Geach’s view that ‘good’ always 
functions in this way – I discuss a predicative use of the term in the final section 
of the chapter – it is clear that predicative uses of ‘good’ do not normally make 
sense as they stand.  Philippa Foot (2001: 2) described how she sometimes 
secured recognition of this point when giving talks by holding up a small piece 
of torn paper and asking whether or not it was good.  An offer to pass it round so 
the audience can get a better look provoked a laugh in recognition of the 
absurdity.  It is meaningless to talk about scraps of paper being good in an 
unqualified sense.  Similarly, Judith Jarvis Thomson offers the following 
example: 
 
You are standing in front of the array of melons at your grocer’s, feeling 
helpless.  Your grocer notices.  He points to one in particular and says, 
“That one’s good.” … It would be utterly astonishing if when you asked, 
“Do you mean that that’s a good melon?” he replied, “Oh dear me no, I 
haven’t the faintest idea whether it’s a good melon, I meant only that it’s a 
good thing.  (2008: 13) 
 
Again, this is comical and the comedy comes from the fact that it (generally) 
makes no sense to say that some thing is simply good.                                                         
plausible until we remember that mountains, even big ones, are not big things in comparison to, 
say, continents and that they are very tiny in comparison to planets, galaxies or the universe.  
What we really mean is something like ‘this is a big feature of the landscape’ or ‘this is big on the 
human scale of things’.  Perhaps one could say of the universe that it is big without qualification, 
but it is not at all clear what that claim would amount to, for it is not clear what it would be for 
the universe to count as small. 
4 J. L Austin employs the metaphor of ‘good’ being ‘substantive-hungry’. He also speaks of 
‘good’ as ‘crying out for substantives’ (1962: 68–9).  In this sense, Austin suggests, ‘good’ is 
similar to ‘real’.  Something of the same idea can be found in Hare (1952: 133).  See Hare (1957: 
103 fn. 2) for a little more on the prehistory of Geach’s idea.  
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One way in which Geach explains the idea that ‘good’ is an attributive adjective 
is as follows: 
 
I could ascertain that a distant object is a red car because I can see it is red 
and a keener-sighted but colour-blind friend can see it is a car; there is no 
such possibility of ascertaining that a thing is a good car by pooling 
independent information that it is good and that it is a car. This sort of 
example shows that ‘good’ like ‘bad’ is essentially an attributive adjective.  
(1956: 33–4) 
 
Geach’s comments may provide a partial explanation of why evaluative 
properties are so difficult to accommodate in a naturalistic picture of the world.  
Geach is suggesting that the task of determining whether some thing is good 
cannot be parcelled out among friends.  In this respect, evaluative properties 
seem like aesthetic properties.  However, I emphasised in chapter three that 
scientific enterprise depends upon distributed cognition and is predicated upon 
the interchangeability of investigators.  The problem is not that there are any 
spooky facts involved or that some special faculty of intuition is needed in order 
to discern whether a car is good.  For, imagine that Geach has another friend who 
is an experienced mechanic and can hear that the car’s engine is running 
smoothly (and let us agree for the sake of simplicity that this is all there is to a 
car being good).  In this case, I don’t see any objection to saying that it would be 
possible to pool the information that the distant object is a car and that its engine 
is running smoothly and conclude that it is a good car.  It would be necessary, 
however, for knowledge of the empirical facts concerning the functioning of the 
engine to be combined in practical reason with an understanding of what makes a 
car a good one.  Although there is nothing supernatural about these 
considerations, one cannot simply see what makes a car good in the same way 
that one sees that it is red.5 
                                                         
5 Of course, the phenomenology of perception depends on one’s background knowledge and 
experience.  An experienced mechanic may sincerely assert that she simply hears that a car 
engine is not running well.  Similarly, strong chess players report ‘seeing’ that a move or position 
is ‘strong’ or ‘weak’.  This helps to explain the relatively high standard of ‘blitz’ chess in which 
all the moves are made in less than five minutes and ‘positional sense’ is all-important.  See 
further Chase and Simon (1973) for research into chess masters and perceptual processing.  I 
return to these topics in chapter nine when I argue that emotional experience is analogous to 
perceptual experience in a number of ways. 
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The above considerations suggest an epistemological test for determining 
whether an adjective is predicative or attributive.  However, it has occurred to a 
number of philosophers that there may be a further metaphysical explanation.6  It 
is widely believed that goodness is a property.7  Surface grammar suggests no 
difference between the predicate ‘is good’ and predicates such as ‘is red’ and ‘is 
spherical’.  As it is normally the function of predicates to denote properties, it is 
natural to think that a sentence such as ‘x is good’ has the function of attributing 
the property of goodness to x.  For instance, if properties are universals, then to 
say that ‘x is good’ is to say that x instantiates the universal of goodness.  It is 
then very natural to think that the primary task of ethics is to identify the 
universal of goodness, or whatever property the predicate ‘is good’ denotes.  
Once we have done so, we can ask where this property is instantiated and how 
this is relevant to our conduct. 
 
This view is certainly attractive and a great deal of philosophical writing has 
presupposed it, either explicitly or implicitly.  Influentially, G. E. Moore held 
this sort of view of ethics.  When he wrote that ethics is ‘the general enquiry into 
what is good’, (PE 2) he was using the ‘is’ of identity before the ‘is’ of 
predication.  Thus Thomson (1997: 273) calls the sort of view I have been 
sketching ‘Moore’s story’, although it is very far from being peculiar to Moore.  
Thomson also suggests that Moore’s commitment to the view that goodness is a 
property had a baleful influence on twentieth century metaethics.  For it is 
extraordinarily difficult to see what property could be exemplified by all of the 
things that are good or how we should go about identifying this property.  In 
particular, locating the property of goodness in the natural order is a daunting 
task.  Consequently, as Thomson puts it, the property of goodness is 
epistemologically and metaphysically ‘dark’ (2008: 11). 
 
We have already approached these issues from one perspective during our 
discussion of the Open Question Argument in chapter one.  I suggested that what 
makes normative properties especially difficult to identify with scientifically                                                         
6 The following line of argument is strongly influenced by Thomson (1997) and (2008).  See also 
Foot (2001). 
7 Or that it is a property if it is anything.  Error theorists such as Mackie (1977) and Joyce (2006) 
argue that moral predicates fail to refer. 
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available properties is the phenomenon of normative force.  Moore’s own view, 
of course, was that goodness could only be a non-natural property revealed by a 
dedicated cognitive faculty of intuition.  A more common response has been the 
non-cognitivist line that what is shared by all of those things we call ‘good’ is not 
some mysterious property of goodness, but the fact that we approve of them in 
some way.  Thus, normativity is built into judgement rather than the world.  If, 
however, Geach was right that ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are attributive adjectives it 
appears that Moore’s story rests on a mistake.  The fact that we are wont to say 
‘x is good’ disguises the fact that ‘is good’ is an incomplete predicate.  Much 
worse, it sends us off on a wild-goose chase looking for the property denoted by 
the predicate ‘is good’, such as the universal goodness that all good things 
instantiate.  However, it is no more plausible to think that there is a property of 
goodness that all good things instantiate, than to think that there is a property of 
bigness instantiated by big fleas, big noses and big attics.8  The metaphysical 
explanation, then, for the fact that we cannot pool our knowledge that ‘x is a car’ 
with our knowledge that ‘x is good’ to get the conclusion that ‘x is a good car’ is 
that there is no property of goodness for the predicate ‘is good’ to denote and, so, 
no truth-maker for the proposition ‘x is good’.  If this is right, it is little wonder 
that Moore struggled to find a real definition of the good. 
 
Saying that there is no property of goodness is not to say that the term ‘good’ is 
meaningless or that there is no property denoted by particular attributive uses of 
the term.  Nor is to say, with non-cognitivists, that there is nothing in virtue of 
which propositions including the term ‘good’ are true.  Nor, finally, is it to 
concede that the term ‘good’ involves us in a hopeless hotchpotch of 
equivocation.  We are still free to consider how attributive uses of ‘good’ 
function and under what conditions it is true to say that something is good.  I 
approach this task below, but with the qualification that we should not assume 
that there is single, legitimate way in which ‘good’ functions in English, let alone 
a single way in which cognate and near cognates of ‘good’ function in other 
                                                        
8 Cp. EN 1096b23–26. 
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languages.9  Nevertheless, it would be an important step to identify a central and 
widespread use of the term with normative implications. 
 
One way in which we might understand how the term ‘good’ functions is 
suggested by J. O. Urmson’s (1950) observation that ‘good’ is used primarily as 
a grading or evaluative label.  To say that something is good is normally to say 
that it measures up more or less well to some standard or set of criteria.  To say 
that an apple is good is to say, inter alia, that it has a pleasing taste, that it is 
pest-free and relatively blemish-free and that it stores well.  To the extent that an 
apple meets these criteria, it is appropriate to say that it is a good apple.  To the 
extent it falls short of these standards, it is a bad apple.  Although not essential to 
grading, approximation to a standard also allows us to make comparative 
judgments.10  Thus, Urmson pays great attention to the classificatory scheme of 
‘super’, ‘extra fancy’ and ‘domestic’ grade apples, detailing their particular 
characteristics (1950: 151–4).  In this way evaluative judgments contrast with 
deontological judgments.  We might say that on thing is better, more excellent or 
closer to the ideal than another, but not ‘righter’ or more obligatory.   
 
The etymology of ‘normativity’, from the Latin ‘norma’ meaning ‘builder’s 
square’, also suggests a close connection between the idea of a norm and the idea 
of measuring up to a standard.  How, though, do we determine the appropriate 
standard against which to measure?  Well, a starting point is that it depends on 
the kind of thing we are evaluating.  This was part of Geach’s point in saying that 
a substantive must be understood when we make attributions of goodness.  The 
proposition ‘x is good’ is typically elliptical for the proposition ‘x is a good K’                                                         
9 For more on this point, see Wiggins (2009: 195–6).  
10 J. L. Evans objects to Urmson’s account on the grounds that it cannot deal with cases in which 
there is only a single specimen of a kind.  In such cases, Evans writes: ‘we could not compare it 
with anything and, therefore, we could not say it was good in the sense of being good of its kind.  
There can be no superlative judgments unless there can also be comparative judgments’ (1962: 
30).  This shows a misunderstanding.  When we grade an example of a kind the comparison is not 
with other members of the kind, but with an independent standard. Although we grade apples 
(and students) in order to rank them, grading is not essentially concerned with intra-class 
comparisons.  It could be that all members of a kind are equally excellent, or far from the ideal.  
What may explain Evans’ objection is the thought that we would struggle to evaluate a single 
instance of a kind we had not previously encountered.  But this is no different from our difficulty 
in evaluating an antique artefact when we do not know what it was for.  It would not help, 
however, to encounter a vast trove of antique artefacts with minor differences.  We do no need a 
comparison class, but an understanding of what constitutes the relevant standard of evaluation. 
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where K is the kind to which x belongs.  What makes a good apple is quite 
different to what makes a good car.  For example, we shouldn’t expect an apple 
to withstand the impact of human incisors.  These observations suggest a two-
step procedure for evaluating propositions of the form ‘x is a good K’.  First, we 
identify the relevant kind K.  Second, we measure x against the normative 
standard governing things of kind K.  Sometimes, however, the two steps are 
conceptually inseparable.  Identifying an object as belonging to a particular kind 
can depend on grasping the normative criteria that govern membership of the 
kind.  For instance, part of what it is to identify an object as a spade is to identify 
it as a digging implement.11  ‘Spade’ is a success term in the sense that an object 
that is not at all suitable for digging could not count as one.12  Although there are 
such things as rusty, blunt and lightweight spades, there is no such thing as a 
spade made out of room temperature blancmange. 
 
It might be objected that this still does not tell us how to determine the particular 
criteria against which to evaluate a specimen of a kind.  Furthermore, many kinds 
have no plausible normative standards against which they can be evaluated.  For 
example, it seems that there is nothing that it is to be good mud (although there is 
such a thing as good mud for the purposes of farmers, brick-makers and bathing 
hippopotamuses).  Put another way, there is no property of being good qua mud, 
although mud may have the property of being good qua something else, such as 
building material.  So, some kinds, such as spades, seem to come with normative 
standards built into their identity conditions. 13  Other kinds, such as mud, do not.  
Ideally, we would want a principled way to distinguish the one from the other.   
 
 
 
6.2 Functions and Natural Goodness 
                                                         
11 The thought here can be traced back to Aristotle’s ergon argument (EN I: 7).  The Greek term 
‘ergon’ is ambiguous in a potentially suggestive and helpful manner, meaning both ‘function’ 
and ‘characteristic work’.  So, in order to determine a thing’s ergon, we must first consider what 
sort of work or activity is characteristic of it.   This means understanding its form (eidos).  As 
Aristotle writes in the Meteorologica:  ‘What a thing is is always determined by its function: a 
thing really is itself when it can perform its function; an eye, for instance when it can see’  
(390a10-2). Hence, the ideas of a thing’s function and a thing’s identity come together in the idea 
of a thing’s ergon. 
12 Cp. De Partibus Animalium 640b36-641a3 and De Anima 412b21-3; 416a3-6. 
13 As Thomson puts it, some kinds are ‘goodness-fixing’ (2008: 21). 
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One possibility is to draw on teleological considerations at this stage.  As a 
number of philosophers in the Aristotelian tradition have observed, there is a 
close relationship between the goodness of a thing and its purpose or function.  A 
spade, unlike mud, is for something.  Because spades are essentially for digging, 
a good spade has whatever properties fit it for that end.  Because mud does not 
have a function, it does not make sense to think of mud as being good or bad 
except in relation to some further function.  This suggests as a working 
hypothesis the view that the goodness of x depends on it fulfilling the function of 
the kind K to which it belongs.  This is a matter of degree and x will be better or 
worse to the extent that it fulfils that function.  There are, however, some obvious 
concerns with this idea.  In particular, it might be thought that the example of a 
spade has allowed me to make the case that the goodness of a thing depends on 
its function rather too easily.  For spades (and cars) are unusual in being human 
artefacts, which have been designed for a purpose.   
 
One possible concern is that a designer arbitrarily assigns a spade’s function to it.  
As a result, saying that a spade has the function of digging fails to pick out any 
interesting metaphysical truth. We might just as easily assign it the function of 
being a doorstop or a weapon.  Worse, it might then seem that a spade’s function 
is irrelevant to questions concerning its goodness.  The goodness of a spade 
depends entirely on the human interests it serves.  A heavy spade with a sharp 
edge is good because it enables us to plant potatoes, bury treasure, and the like, 
not because it measures up to some abstract standard independent of human 
interests.  The first point to make in response is that it is not in general a 
weakness of a theory that the presence of normativity and value in the world 
turns out to depend in some way on the exercise of rational agency.  Realist 
views do not require that there would be normative truths in a lifeless universe 
comprised entirely of non-rational matter.  Second, although it is true that 
artefacts such as spades are designed with the satisfaction of human interests in 
mind, we are still able to evaluate them independently of our present concerns. 
We can, for example, recognise the excellence, or shoddy workmanship, of a 
piece of obsolete or alien technology.  So, even if artefacts are designed in 
response to human interests or concerns, it does not follow that the goodness of 
the artefact depends on satisfying any current interests.  Should it be suggested 
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that in cases of obsolete or alien technology there is a covert reference to the 
designer’s interests, we might reply that we are able to evaluate artefacts against 
the normative standard given by their function even if that function serves no 
possible human interest.  Some weapons of mass destruction may fall into this 
category. 
 
Perhaps, though, it will be suggested that it is the designer’s intentions that 
matter.  Certainly, it can be very difficult to know the function of an artefact if 
one is ignorant of the designer’s intentions.  However, it is not true that a 
designer can arbitrarily assign function to artefacts.  One reason, as I have 
already mentioned, is that terms that refer to functional kinds, such as ‘spade’, 
are success terms.  This comes from the fact that the function of an object 
depends on the criteria of identity for objects of that kind.  So, a spade could be 
entirely unfitted for use as a doorstop or a weapon and still be a spade, but it 
could not be entirely unfitted for digging and still be a spade.  Although a 
designer may well have a function in mind, he cannot decide that an artefact has 
a particular function by a simple act of will. 
 
A second type of objection allows that the function of artefacts such as spades 
provide us with legitimate examples of goodness, but claims that artefacts such 
as spades are atypical insofar as they are the products of rational agency.  
Therefore, they can hardly serve as paradigm cases of goodness.14  One possible 
response would be to argue that the world is the product of a Creator and 
therefore shot-through with rational design.  A functional account of goodness 
seems to fit well with a theistic framework and it is probably not a coincidence 
that a number of prominent neo-Aristotelians are also theists.15  Given certain                                                         
14 Pigden (1990: 147–53) among others presses this line of objection against neo-Aristotelian 
accounts of goodness. 
15 In am thinking in particular of Anscombe, Geach and MacIntyre.  The Unmoved Mover of the 
Metaphysics also plays an important an under-appreciated role in Aristotle’s ethical theory.  
When in Book X Aristotle advocates a life structured towards the end of intellectual activity 
(theoria) he notes that it is ‘not insofar as he is a human that he will live like this, but insofar as 
there is something divine in him’ (1177b26-7).  The relationship between a flourishing life and 
participation in the divine is brought out most explicitly in the Eudemian Ethics: ‘If some choice 
or possession of natural goods – either goods of the body or money or of friends or the other 
goods – will most produce the speculation of god, that is best, and that is the finest limit; but 
whatever, whether through deficiency or excess, hinders the service and speculation of god, is 
bad.’ (1249b17-20; see also 1145a6-11). 
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further assumptions concerning the attributes of God, this view would seem to 
have just the right shape for grounding the normativity of goodness.  Although 
this is an important possibility and attractive in the present context, I shall simply 
acknowledge it and set it aside for the moment.  As an atheist I do not think it is 
the right position to adopt and I am not persuaded that the theoretical advantages 
of theism in this case are sufficient to justify theism on balance.  Although I shall 
return to related issues towards the end of the chapter, I do not see how to make 
constructive progress on the topic without too much digression here.  In any case, 
I shall proceed without the assumption of a theistic framework. 
 
A second possible response starts by observing that even if the world is not the 
product of rational design, we can still understand much of the biological world 
in design terms.  In particular, evolutionary theory can explain a large number of 
apparently purposive features in nature.  After all, evolutionary theory would not 
present a difficulty for the Argument from Design if it did not save (many) of the 
appearances.  The case looks here particularly strong for organs that contribute to 
complex systems.  For instance, we are inclined to say that hearts are for 
pumping blood, that eyes are for seeing, that roots are for absorbing nutrients etc.  
A plausible explanation for these biological functions can be given in terms of 
the evolutionary pressures bearing on an organism’s ancestors.16  The reason that 
the function of the human heart is to pump blood and not, say, to make a 
thumping sound is that only the former made a contribution to the fitness of our 
ancestors.  
 
These examples fit well with a functional account of goodness.  Given that the 
function of the eye is to see, it is very plausible that a good eye sees well.  
Perhaps more interesting, however, is the thought that evolution works at the 
level of behavioural traits.  In particular, certain behavioural traits are adaptive 
for a species in the context of a distinctive way of life or ‘life-form’.17  For 
instance, climbing trees well is adaptive for squirrel monkeys because they 
primarily live on fruit that grows on trees.  Signalling well is adaptive for                                                         
16 The locus classicus for this view is Wright (1973).  For a useful overview of evolutionary 
approaches to the nature of functions see Davies (2001: Ch. 2). 
17 See further Foot (2001: 33–7). 
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meerkats because they live in large social groups and are individually vulnerable 
to predators.18  With such thoughts in mind, it looks attractive to say that the 
function or purpose of a particular behavioural trait should be understood in 
terms of its contribution to the way of life typical for the species.  But, of course, 
man is also a species of animal with a distinctive way of life.  Perhaps most 
significantly, we are as Alasdair MacIntyre (1999) calls us, ‘dependent rational 
animals’.  We are also essentially social and linguistic beings.  So, as with 
nonhuman animals, we might say that a behavioural trait is good when it is 
conducive to man’s distinctive way of life.  But in the case of humans, a stable 
behavioural trait is just the sort of thing we call a virtue when it is good and a 
vice when it is bad.  In this way, virtues and vices might appear indissolubly 
connected to our natural history.19 
 
Perhaps Philippa Foot (2001) did most towards developing an account of ‘natural 
goodness’ along these lines.20  The idea of natural goodness connects what is 
good for man with his natural history and his distinctive way of life in an 
attractive way.  Presumably, we could have evolved quite differently, but we are 
as we are with our special strengths and vulnerabilities, and these facts have a 
strong bearing on what counts as living well for beings like us.  It is also 
important to recognise that although evolutionary forces have produced design, 
or the illusion of design, an account of natural goodness can be constructed quite 
independently of evolutionary considerations.  What matters is the place of 
particular traits in the life of a species as they are.  What Michael Thompson 
calls ‘natural-historical judgments’ (2008: 20) concern the present nature of a 
species.  These have an evolutionary explanation, but the norms consequent upon 
                                                        
18 Looking back at one of earlier examples, we might similarly talk about the goodness or 
badness of an apple in terms of its contribution to the reproductive cycle of the apple tree.  I 
mentioned the following criteria above: having a pleasing taste, being pest-free, being relatively 
blemish-free and storing well.  We can now see that the first two are good because an apple that 
does not have a pleasing taste and is not pest-free will not make its proper contribution to the life-
form of an apple tree.  The criteria of being relatively blemish-free and storing well are perhaps 
less clear and remind us that we can evaluate an object according to its intrinsic goodness or from 
an external perspective.  For instance, it is certainly good for a mouse to be quick and lean given 
its way of life.  From a cat’s perspective, however, it is better for a mouse to be slow and fat.  I 
return to this topic towards the end of section 6.4. 
19 As Geach wrote, ‘men need virtues as bees need stings’ (1977: 17). 
20  Recent discussions include Thomson (2008), Thompson (2008) and Hacker-Wright (2009). 
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our natural history do not depend on an evolutionary justification.21  This may 
help advocates of an ethics of natural goodness avoid the charge that they are 
trafficking in explanatory reasons under the guise of justificatory reasons.22  
What it is to be a good man depends on what it is to be a man, but not on the 
causal or historical explanation of the nature of our species. 
 
I think there is a lot to be said in favour of this type of view and much to be 
learnt from it concerning the nature of goodness.  For instance, I am inclined to 
think that it provides us with the resources to say most or all of what we should 
say concerning the goodness of most or all nonhuman life.  Ultimately, though, I 
am not convinced that it is adequate as it stands as an account of human 
goodness.  For, to misappropriate a phrase, it is distinctive of human rationality 
to put nature to the question.  Whilst one can take a more or less positive view of 
the natural mode of human existence, it makes sense to adopt an external 
perspective on our distinctive way of living and ask whether it provides us with 
an ideal to be pursued. When one does this, it seems that there is always the 
possibility that we will not reflectively endorse the way of life distinctive of our 
species.  For instance, it would be hard to deny that human beings are warlike 
animals or that aggression between sub-groups of humans has been a pervasive 
and non-incidental feature of human life and history.23  It would be curious if an 
anthropologist Mars omitted these facts from his report on us.  However, the 
conclusion that warlike behaviour is good for human beings does not follow 
from this.24  I am sure that Foot and other advocates of natural goodness would 
agree and I think the most likely response would be that aggression and war are 
harmful given the nature of man.  Men do not flourish under conditions of 
warfare.  Although this is right, it is not clear how this can be related back to the 
idea of natural goodness.  If warfare is a part of our distinctive way of life, it 
appears that an independent criterion of goodness is being employed.                                                         
21 Compare with my earlier comments on the relationship between a designer and a spade’s 
function. 
22 See, however, Millum (2006) for the complaint that this constitutes a move away from the 
relatively well-understood idea of evolutionary function that partly motivates the idea of natural 
goodness in the first place. 
23 Slote (2003: 134) presses this objection in his review of Foot’s (2001). 
24 Similarly Glassen (1957) argued that Aristotle’s ‘function argument’ conflated what it is to be 
a good man with the good for man. 
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Foot comes close to addressing this concern when she asks what reason there is 
to care about natural goodness (2001: 52f.).  Her response is essentially that the 
pursuit of the human good is the rational choice.  She supplements this with the 
argument that there is a closer connection between happiness and natural 
goodness than is generally recognised  (2001: 94–7).  This might seem to miss 
the point.  For the question I was pressing above is not whether we have reason 
to pursue the human good, but whether we have reason to act in accordance with 
norms of natural goodness.  But, in fact, Foot’s response does address the 
question.  For, if the human good is natural goodness, then the question of 
whether we can reflectively endorse natural goodness just is the question of 
whether we can reflectively endorse the human good.  The problem, of course, is 
that the identity claim is precisely what is at stake and so the work Foot puts in to 
persuading us that we have reason to care about natural goodness is wasted if we 
are not already persuaded of her basic position.25  Still, the fact that the question 
of whether we can reflectively endorse natural goodness appears distinct from 
the question of whether we can reflectively endorse the human good is prima 
facie evidence that natural goodness is not the whole story.  Indeed, I shall argue 
below that it is not. 
 
6.3 Goodness and the Practice of Chess 
 
This may be an appropriate juncture at which to recap and take stock.  I started 
with Geach’s idea that ‘good’ typically functions as an attributive adjective.  It 
normally makes no sense to say that ‘x is good’ unless some kind K to which x 
belongs is understood.  After looking at the metaphysical implications of this, I 
endorsed Urmson’s view that ‘good’ is typically a term used to evaluate things 
against an appropriate standard for the kind of thing being evaluated.  In 
particular, I picked up the Aristotelian thought that what provides the standard 
against which the goodness of a thing is measured is the function of the kind to 
which it belongs.  In response to the anticipated objection that most things are 
unlike artefacts and do not have functions, I considered the idea that evolutionary 
processes produce a category of natural goodness that applies to the biological                                                         
25 This is not of course a criticism of Foot’s approach.  One can hardly move forward on the basis 
that one’s earlier arguments are wrong. 
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world including man.  Given that there is something that it is to be a man, there is 
something that there is to be a good man.  Finally, though, I stopped short of 
endorsing Foot’s account of natural goodness with the observation that there 
appears to be a further question of whether we can reflectively endorse the type 
of natural goodness given by our natural history. 
 
I would like to bring forward five ideas from the above discussion.  First, in the 
central case, the goodness of a thing depends on the kind of thing it is.  Second, 
evaluating the goodness of a thing is a matter of determining the extent to which 
it measures up to a normative standard.  Third, the appropriate normative 
standard for a kind is teleological in the sense that it depends on the function or 
purpose of a kind.  Fourth, the function or purpose of a kind depends on the 
criteria of identity for a kind, i.e. what makes it what it is and not another thing.  
Fifth, given something’s goodness, the question remains open as to whether we 
should reflectively endorse the pursuit of it.  In this section I shall bring the first 
four ideas to bear on the toy example of goodness in chess.  In section 6.4, I shall 
look at deontological constraints in chess.  This will give us a sketch of the good 
and the right within the context of a particular practice.  I shall then be in a 
position to pull focus and consider the cases of morality and epistemic 
normativity in the final section of the chapter.  In doing so I will return to the 
fifth idea above.  To anticipate, I shall be arguing that the fifth idea is accounted 
for by a second sense of what it is for something to be good and that this is 
related to questions of meaning in life. 
 
At the beginning of the chapter I advertised that I would offer an account of 
goodness in chess.  Rather than asking in general terms what goodness in chess 
amounts to, however, I would like to start with the more tractable question of 
what it means to be a good chess move.  This meets the demand that attributions 
of goodness require a kind, i.e. chess move, and allows me to build up an account 
from the bottom.  So, what is the appropriate normative standard against which 
to measure a chess move?  Well, given that the normative standard for a kind 
depends on the nature of the kind in question, ascriptions of goodness or badness 
to chess moves must depend on some ‘chessy’ feature.  It also seems that the 
chessy feature must be related to the practice of which a particular move is a 
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part. Altering the location of a horse-shaped piece of wood would not count as 
playing a knight move outside of the practice of chess.  Moreover, given our 
earlier considerations, we should look for a normative standard related to the 
function or purpose of a chess move.  I propose, then, that a good chess move is 
one that is conducive to the goal of the practice of chess.  To a first 
approximation, this means a move conducive to securing the best possible result 
in a game.  This could be a move conducing to winning a game, but it could 
come to mean achieving a draw from an inferior position or maximising the 
chances for the best possible result, whilst not necessarily leading there with best 
play. 
 
It might seem that this idea of goodness in chess faces the same difficulties as the 
instrumentalist account of epistemic normativity that I criticised in the last 
chapter.  If the value of an action derives from the fulfilment of some further end, 
why not adopt some other policy to achieve that end?  Why not, for instance, 
cheat?  In fact, however, I am not proposing that we think of the goodness of a 
chess move purely in instrumental terms.  Rather the relationship between good 
moves and a winning game of chess is partly to be explained in constitutive 
terms.  So while it is true that good moves are instrumental to winning a game of 
chess, it is also the case that a winning game just is a series of good moves.  The 
model I have in mind is Aristotle’ account of flourishing, according to which it is 
part of the definition of virtuous action that it is conducive to flourishing, but 
also the case that flourishing is constituted by virtuous action.  To lead a 
flourishing life is not something over and above acting virtuously.  If the 
goodness of a chess move were to be explained in purely instrumental terms, 
then spiking your opponent’s water with sleeping pills, say, would turn out to be 
a good thing to do from a narrowly chess-focussed point of view.  It would help 
to win the game.  But sabotaging one’s opponent does not count as a good from 
any perspective, because such an action, aside from its moral viciousness, is no 
part of what counts as winning.  Spiking drinks with sleeping pills would have no 
proper place in the description of a winning game. 
 
Another way to bring out this constitutive connection between good moves and 
the aims of chess is to reflect on possible variations of Moore’s paradox.  There 
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is something troubling about the assertions ‘p is true, but I do not believe that p’ 
and ‘p is true, but I believe that not p’.26  The problem is not, of course, a logical 
contradiction.  The truth conditions for these assertions are straightforward, and 
the assertions could be true.  It is only first person assertions in the present and 
future tenses that are troubling.  One plausible explanation of this is that there is 
a norm of truth governing belief.27  If I sincerely assert that p is true, but do not 
believe p, or believe not p, then I violate this norm.  Given that a norm of truth 
governs belief, it is irrational not to believe a proposition I take to be true.  
Notice, though that there would be no incoherence or conceptual confusion if 
belief were governed by the norm of truth in a purely instrumental fashion.  For 
then the norm I would violate in failing to adjust my beliefs to what I take to be 
true would be the norm of truth-conduciveness.  But it is easy to think of 
examples in which failing to adjust my beliefs to what I take to be true would 
actually be conducive to truth.  It is always possible to arrive at true beliefs on 
the basis of false ones (e.g. Gettier cases) and in these instances it would be 
better not to adjust my beliefs to what I take to be true.  Similarly, it would be 
better not to adjust my beliefs to what I take to be true when I take a proposition 
to be true on the basis of misleading evidence.  So, if the relationship between 
belief-formation and the end of truth were instrumental, there would be cases in 
which assertions of the form ‘p is true, but I do not believe that p’ would violate 
no norm in relation to the end of truth.  But, in fact, first person present tense 
utterances of Moorean sentences are always incoherent.  It is difficult even to 
make sense of the idea that a rational agent could fail to adjust their beliefs to 
what they take to be true.  This can be explained, I suggest, by the fact that the 
regulative role truth plays with regard to belief is constitutive rather than 
instrumental.28 
 
                                                        
26 There is a connection between the strangeness of asserting ‘p, but I do not believe that p’, and 
my claim in the previous chapter that it is irrational to fail to form the belief that p when one 
encounters overwhelming evidence in its favour.  The connection is revealed by Evans’ idea of 
transparency, according to which an agent answers the question of whether she believes that p in 
the same way as she answers the question of whether it is true that p, namely by attending to the 
world rather than her own mental states (1982: 225–6). 
27 I return to this idea in the next chapter. 
28 See Railton (1994: 71–3) for related discussion of Moore’s paradox and truth as the 
constitutive aim of belief. 
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If my proposal that there is a constitutive relation between good chess moves and 
the goal of chess is right, similar considerations should apply.  In particular, there 
should be something deeply confused about the assertion ‘moving thus leads to 
winning the game, but I shan’t do it’.  And, indeed, this assertion does seem 
odder than the assertion ‘spiking my opponent’s water with sleeping pills leads 
to winning the game, but I shan’t do it’.  The first assertion stands in need of 
further explanation in a way that the second assertion does not.  Spiking an 
opponent’s water is no part of winning a game of chess and so the fact that it 
leads to that end does not give us a reason to do it.  This is some confirmation 
that we were right to say that the goodness of a chess move is not merely its 
instrumental goodness in relation to winning the game.   
 
But this comparative oddness may seem scant consolation for the fact that the 
assertion ‘moving thus leads to winning the game, but I shan’t do it’ is not 
incoherent in anything like the same way as the Moorean assertion ‘p, but I don’t 
believe that p’.  I think, however, that there is a straightforward explanation at 
hand.  For when we are considering what makes sense within the context of a 
game of chess, we naturally bring other normative standards to bear.  We can 
think of plenty of good reasons why we might recognise a winning move and 
decide not to play it.  Perhaps we recognise that our opponent is psychologically 
vulnerable in such a way that losing would be harmful to him.  Perhaps he will 
sink into a deep depression.  Or perhaps we have some financial incentive not to 
win.  Perhaps we are subject to intimidation from the ruling authorities.  Given 
these possibilities, we naturally assume that if someone asserts ‘moving thus 
leads to winning the game, but I shan’t do it’ they are responding to the all-
things-considered judgment that they have most reason not to win.  We would be 
curious for a further explanation, but we would not be baffled into 
incomprehension.  By contrast, we might try to imagine a world in which playing 
chess constituted the only activity.  I suggest that the inhabitants of this 
impoverished world would find the sincere assertion ‘moving thus wins the 
game, but I shan’t do it’ similarly baffling to Moorean assertions for us.  For, if 
chess were the only activity, there could be no rational reason not to pursue the 
good of the practice. 
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So, it is not difficult to provide an account of the way in which reasons that are 
external to the practice of chess block the practical inference from ‘moving thus 
wins the game’ to ‘I shall move thus’.  It is interesting, however, to consider a 
different sort of reason for failing to conform to the norm of winning at chess.  
For example, it is possible that we want to encourage a learner to develop his 
talents and, so, stay our hand.  We might think that it makes no sense to ‘punish’ 
a learner for an error that he could not reasonably be expected to have avoided.29  
This sort of reason is connected to the wider practice of chess and shows the 
inadequacy of my earlier conception of chess according to which the goal of 
participation in the practice is to win games.  Chess has institutions, history, 
traditions, literature, physical artefacts, tournaments and much else associated 
with it.  If it did not have at least some of these features it would not count as a 
practice or a rule-governed activity (and, simultaneously, part of what makes 
these disparate elements part of a single practice is their contribution to the goals 
of the practice).  Training junior players is a good internal to the practice.  
Indeed, it is necessary for the survival of the practice.  So, failing to make the 
best move in order to train an apprentice player can be justified in terms of chess 
goods.  What we should really claim, then, is that it is incoherent, from a 
perspective internal to the practice, to assert ‘doing thus is conducive to the 
flourishing of the practice of chess, but I shan’t do thus’.   
 
In some ways this would be a much better account.  Certainly, it is a better 
analogue of the ethical case, where much of the work of saying what counts as a 
virtue depends on the work of judging what it is to flourish.  Unfortunately, 
however, what it is for the practice of chess to flourish is far less clear than what 
it is to succeed in playing a particular game and so a fuller account tends to 
obscure the basic normative structure.  One reason that chess is sometimes used 
as a toy example for discussions of normativity is that it appears to be a tightly                                                         
29 Similar considerations apply to the practice of philosophy.  Although philosophy is governed 
by the norm of truth, it takes experience and sensitivity to know which of a student’s false beliefs 
to correct and when.  We might also notice that the normative standards for good philosophy 
seem to move as the student develops.  A good undergraduate essay would normally make a bad 
doctoral thesis, and I daresay that a good doctoral thesis is not normally a good work of 
philosophy tout court.  But this does not really show that philosophy has moving or multiple 
standards of evaluation.  Rather it shows that to evaluate someone’s work is often just a way of 
evaluating a person at a particular stage of her development. 
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rule-governed activity.  This may be true of a particular game, but a game is only 
comprehensible within the context of the practice, the boundaries of which are 
far less clear.30  Indeed, there is a general problem of establishing the identity 
conditions for practices.  This difficulty is even more pressing in light of the 
account of deontological concepts I develop in the next section.  Unfortunately, I 
do not see a general, principled way of solving the difficulty.  Of course, it is 
possible to place strict conditions on which activities count as instances of a 
practice.  We could define chess in such a way as to exclude near variants, but 
this would be an arbitrary and unhelpful move.  First, it would have little to do 
with carving nature at its joints.  Second, the criteria of identity for practices such 
as chess are necessarily indeterminate in order to allow for innovation and 
development of the practice.31  This is further complicated by the fact that some 
practices have more rigid identity conditions than others.  Compare, for example, 
Byzantine iconography and abstract expressionism. 
 
Although these are genuine difficulties, I do not think they are anything like fatal 
to the position I am defending, namely that the goodness of a chess move is 
dependent on its role, or function, within a practice and, more particularly, 
dependent on whether it contributes to satisfying the goal of the practice (which 
partly determines the identity of the practice).  Although it should be allowed 
that the identity conditions for practices are sometimes vague, this point should 
not be overstated.  We might argue whether Waiting for Godot is a tragedy or a 
comedy, or more one than the other, but we know it is a play and not a painting.  
Similarly, we are perfectly able to distinguish central instances of chess from 
central instances of squash or tiddlywinks.  Doubts concerning what should 
count as an instance of a practice occur mainly in relation to marginal cases and                                                         
30 In fact, the rules governing a game of chess are far less clear than it might seem.  For instance, 
positions sometimes occur in which there is no prospect of either player winning without one 
player making an obviously bad move.  Normally players agree a draw in these circumstances.  
However, chess is played against the clock.  Each player has a fixed length of time to play a 
certain number of moves and if he runs out of time he loses.  So, if one player has more time than 
his opponent, one possible strategy is to keep playing moves in a drawn position until his 
opponent loses on time.  To prevent this, if a player has less than two minutes remaining on his 
clock, he can appeal to the tournament arbiter and object that his opponent is ‘making no attempt 
to win by normal means’.  If the arbiter agrees, a draw will be awarded.  Although it is not 
normally controversial, the arbiter’s decision depends on practical wisdom rather than the 
application of formal rules.  He is required to read a player’s intentions. 
31 See further van Fraassen (2002: 145) on the nature of scientific practice. 
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in response to two types of considerations.  First, it can be uncertain whether the 
norms internal to a practice apply to particular new cases – “it’s all very well, but 
is it Art?”  Second, though, there can be challenges to the norms internal to 
practices – “isn’t there more to Art than sweetness and light?”  These are 
difficult normative questions, but we regularly address them as practices evolve 
and change in response to external norms and pressures of internal consistency.  
We shall also see in the final section of the chapter that these questions do not 
arise in quite the same way in relation to ethical and epistemological questions. I 
propose, then, to bracket them off for the moment. 
 
6.4 Rightness and the Practice of Chess 
 
It is customary to draw a distinction between the good and the right.  Sometimes 
philosophers also propose to explain the one in terms of the other.  For instance, 
Moore claimed that ‘right’ simply means ‘productive of the greatest good’ (PE 
18).  On the surface of things, however, this looks unlikely to be true.  It is wrong 
as a purported lexicographical fact and it is implausible as a claim about the 
hidden conceptual structure of normative discourse.  For, there are a great many 
apparent differences between the good and the right.  We have seen that 
goodness is normally understood in relation to an end, although the connection is 
not wholly instrumental.  By contrast, to say that an action is wrong is normally 
to say categorically that one must not act thus.  When we say that something is 
the right thing to do, we sometimes mean that is the right thing to do despite its 
consequences.  It is also true that we sometimes say that an action cannot be right 
in view of its consequences, but nonetheless we think that the two are logically 
distinct.  
 
There is also a difference in the normative force associated with the good and the 
right.  The good is weaker.  Doing what is good often seems optional – “It would 
be good/better if you did it”.  Whereas we can oppose the goodness of an action 
with other considerations, a claim that an action is right is a conversation stopper.  
Doing what is right is doing what one’s duty dictates, what one must do or what 
one is obliged to do.  By contrast, the connection between goodness and 
obligation is weak.  ‘Ought’ implies ‘can’, but ‘good’ does not imply ‘can’.  So, 
it would be good if I could run a mile in less than four minutes.  But I am under 
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no obligation to be able to do this.  Related to this, the connection between 
goodness and blame is weak.  All things being equal, I am not blameworthy 
because I cannot run a mile in less than four miles, but I am blameworthy if I fail 
to fulfil my obligations.   
 
In this section, I shall offer an account of the place of the right within chess that 
is consistent with these differences.  It is complementary to my account of the 
good and by the end of this section we shall have a complete sketch of the norms 
of chess.  Under what circumstances, then, might we distinguish between the 
right and the good in chess?  One example is strategy.  It is not strictly speaking 
wrong to open a game by moving an outside pawn as beginners sometimes do.  
However, it is bad in the sense that it wastes time in developing pieces, cedes the 
centre of the board and weakens one’s pawn structure.  Therefore, it is not 
conducive to winning the game and a bad move.  But, one may open thus and a 
beginner does not merit any sanction if he does so.  This fits with our earlier 
description of goodness in chess. 
 
By contrast, it is wrong to break the rules of the games, for example, by moving 
a rook diagonally or by using pawns as missiles to bombard the opponent’s king 
into submission.  This is not because such moves are bad ones.  Rather it is 
because these are not chess moves at all.  Indeed such ‘moves’ undermine the 
practice and thus the conditions under which goodness in chess is possible.  In 
order to play chess it is necessary that we follow the rules that serve in part to 
define the game.  If a player ‘checkmates’ his opponent, but has two bishops on 
squares of the same colour at the end of the game (and has not promoted a pawn 
to a bishop), then he has not won.  It does not make a difference if his opponent 
has not noticed the rule violation and concedes the loss.  He may be awarded the 
win and its trappings, but all that shows is that everyone is persuaded of a 
falsehood.  It is just as if someone were presented a gold medal for winning a 
marathon when they had travelled half the distance by taxi.  They cannot have 
won the marathon for the simple reason that they have not run a marathon.  So, 
insofar as we are playing chess at all, we must obey the rules.  Failing to do so 
fundamentally undermines the activity and also bars one from any goods which 
are internal to the practice.  The problem is not merely that breaking the rules is 
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unconducive to attaining the good associated with the ends of the practice, but 
that breaking the rules makes it impossible to act well or attain those goods.  For 
goodness comes with the game.  It is not a property that can be predicated of a 
move independently of its role in the game.   
 
One might recall here my earlier observation that terms referring to functional 
kinds are success terms.  For instance, I suggested that there could be no such 
thing as a spade made out of room temperature blancmange.  The thought might 
then occur that there is a connection between the good and the right in the sense 
that something can be such a bad instance of a kind that it no longer counts as an 
instance of that kind at all.  We can imagine, for example, a good spade that is 
left to rust.  The spade will gradually deteriorate and become worse.  Finally, it 
will become more rust than spade and so bad that it will no longer count as a 
spade at all.  This may suggest that the difference between the right and the good 
is less clear than I have suggested and that the good and the right (or the bad and 
the wrong) lie on a continuum.  For, by analogy, it might seem possible to play 
chess so badly that one is not playing chess at all.  One might think of a situation 
in which a player makes legal moves at random, or deliberately makes bad 
moves.   
 
In these sorts of cases I am inclined to agree that the player would not be playing 
chess.  However, it is not the badness of the moves that matter but the mental 
states of the player.  A beginner can play very badly indeed without there being 
any doubt that she is playing the game.  Indeed, complete beginners often lose in 
just four moves to ‘scholar’s mate’.32  But as the term ‘scholar’s mate’ indicates, 
its victim is normally a very junior practitioner.  If an experienced player lost in 
four moves, we would know that they were not really playing the game, but 
using the game as a vehicle for some other end.  The important point here is that 
participation in a practice depends on the intentions of the practitioners.  All 
things being equal, an experienced player could only lose in four moves if his 
intentions were unrelated to the norms that govern chess.  Although one can                                                         
32 It is possible to lose in just two moves to ‘fool’s mate’ (1. f3 e5 (or e6), 2. g4 Qh5 ++).  
However, this requires a particular sequence of moves from both players and is more likely to 
befall a stooge than a fool. 
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intend to play chess and fail to do so because one has not grasped the rules, one 
cannot play chess in spite of one’s intentions or in the absence of any intention to 
do so.  For example, one cannot find oneself playing chess by accident.  This 
explains a number of other situations in which performing a series of legal moves 
would not count as playing a game.  For instance, one could pretend to play 
chess, say on a stage, and make a series of legal moves by accident.  Or, one 
could move the pieces legally, but as someone else’s agent.  In neither scenario 
would one be playing chess.  
 
So, conforming to the rules is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient 
condition, for participation in the practice of chess.  Another necessary condition 
is that playing chess requires intentional action governed by the norms of the 
game.  Playing chess is something one does well or badly.  It is a manifestation 
of rational agency.  Only in a derivative sense can we talk of being a good chess-
player or a good move.  In this sense, chess moves are unlike spades.  Chess 
computers provide an interesting point of comparison here.  For we can describe 
them as ‘good’ or ‘strong’ chess players and, indeed, they can compete with the 
best players in the world.  However, chess computers do not (currently) do 
anything in the relevant sense, for they are not (yet) capable of intentional action.  
Consequently, I suggest that a computer no more plays chess than an actor on a 
stage plays chess, or a monkey at a typewriter composes Hamlet, or Searle’s 
unfortunate captive speaks Chinese.  They are not playing chess because they are 
neither responsive to nor accountable to the norms of the practice.  Or, as it 
sometimes put, they are conforming to the rules but not following them.  As a 
result, computers merely simulate playing chess.  Like spades, we can evaluate 
chess computers in light of their function and independently of human interests.  
We can ‘play’ two computer programmes against each other and get a reliable 
measure of which one is better.  But, like spades, we cannot talk meaningfully 
about the duty, obligation, rightness or wrongness of a chess computer. 
 
So, wrongness in chess is a matter of intentional actions that undermine the 
preconditions for engaging in the practice.  What, though, of the normative force 
I have already mentioned as being associated with deontological concepts such 
as the right?  It seems there may be a clue in the etymology.  The term 
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‘deontology’ derives from the Greek ‘deon’, which is often translated as ‘duty’.  
However, the word ‘duty’ is a relatively modern, semi-technical term of art 
correlated in particular ways with rights and obligations.  In fact, there was no 
ancient Greek word for ‘duty’.  As Bernard Williams (1985: 16) notes, 
deontology comes from the Greek for what one must do.  So, etymology suggests 
a connection between deontology and necessity.  Indeed, this coheres with what 
we have already said, namely that obeying the rules of chess is a necessary 
precondition for engaging in the practice.  Another way to put this is to say that 
we need to obey the rules if we are to play chess.  I should like, then, to conclude 
my discussion of rightness in chess with a few comments on the subject of needs.  
I shall develop the relation between needs and deontology further in the next 
section. 
 
To say that there is a need for something is often to make a particularly strong 
sort of claim.  As Harry Frankfurt puts it, ‘claims based upon what a person 
needs have a distinctive poignancy’ (1984: 1).  But, of course, not all needs have 
the same poignancy.  It is part of the grammar of the term ‘need’ that one needs x 
for y or in order to z.33  The poignancy of a particular need is only revealed when 
the placeholders have been filled.  We can then distinguish between the needs we 
need to have and the needs we do not need to have.  The needs we do not need to 
have are contingent upon our desires and interests.34  For instance, I might need 
£30 to buy a ticket to watch a football match.  But if I tried to press this needs 
claim on a third party, it might well be responded that I do not really need the 
£30 because I do not really need to watch a football match.  What matters when 
we are assessing the strength of contingent needs is the value of the end.  There 
is no general moral requirement to satisfy anyone’s contingent needs and, if the 
end is nefarious, there may be a moral requirement to prevent the need being 
satisfied.  Nevertheless, contingent needs can have something near the force of 
moral obligation if the value of the end is particularly high, the need is 
particularly easy to satisfy or if one stands in a morally significant relationship                                                         
33 Because of the relationship between the satisfaction of needs and action, it may be better to 
restrict needs in the reason-giving sense to ‘needs to’ as opposed to ‘needs for’.  I thank Jonathan 
Lowe for drawing my attention to this point.   See also his (2006) in this connection. 
34 They are variously called ‘volitional’ (Frankfurt 1984), ‘contingent’ (Reader and Brock 2004), 
or ‘instrumental’ (Wiggins 1998) needs. 
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with the bearer of the contingent needs.  It is clear that when I have been 
discussing the necessary preconditions for playing chess I have been discussing 
contingent needs.  We may need to obey the rules if we are to play chess, but we 
do not need to play chess.  The strict necessity of obeying the rules only binds us 
insofar as we are participants in the practice. 
 
6.5 Non-Contingent Needs, Flourishing and Meaning 
 
In the previous two sections, I sketched an account of the right and the good in 
the context of the practice of chess.  Briefly, I argued that the goodness of a 
chess move is a matter of its conduciveness to the goal of winning.  This goal is 
the regulative norm for chess moves and the relationship between the two should 
be understood in constitutive rather than instrumental terms.  I then argued that 
the right is associated with the necessary preconditions for playing chess and that 
these are contingent needs.  Providing an account of value and obligation within 
the context of a particular practice is not a trivial task.  However, my real quarry 
lies elsewhere and I would now like to consider how, and to what extent, the 
normative framework I have sketched for chess can be applied to moral and 
epistemic normativity. 
 
We have already noted that the normative significance of the reasons internal to 
the practice of chess can be questioned.  The reason that a sentence like ‘moving 
thus leads to winning the game, but I shan’t do it’ doesn’t strike us as 
paradoxical is that we can bring non-chess related norms to bear on the practice.  
We can consider how the practice of chess fits into a person’s life and we can 
consider its significance in terms of more fundamental values.  We can ask 
whether chess contributes towards or undermines a person’s other projects.  
Hence, we can allow that an action is good relative to the norms internal to the 
practice of chess, but ask whether it is good in an all-things-considered sense or 
in a moral sense.  There are certainly some practices which are morally evil, or 
indifferent, or largely good but liable to come into conflict with moral demands.  
The point is that we can evaluate chess from an external perspective.  If we 
decide that playing chess is not a good thing in light of our other values, we can 
decide that we should stop playing.   
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I suggested above that the reason some needs are contingent is that they do not 
need to be met.  Thus, chess related needs are contingent because we do not need 
to play chess.  By contrast non-contingent needs are needs that do need to be 
met.  But, what is it to say that a need needs to be met?  The idea is not merely 
that it would be good or valuable for the need to be met, but that they have the 
binding force of obligations.  Soran Reader and Gillian Brock (2004) make a 
useful proposal here.  They suggest that we should mark the distinction between 
contingent and non-contingent needs as follows: 
 
The mark of moral importance of non-contingent needs in ethics is that the 
needing being simply cannot go on unless its need is met.  It is no 
exaggeration to say that in a state of non-contingent need, the very existence 
of the needing being as we know it is at stake.  (2004: 252) 
 
They go on to mention the examples of ‘agency, life, flourishing or avoidance of 
harm’ (2004: 252) as candidates for non-contingent needs and argue that they 
generate obligations at the level of public policy.  I think that they are right to 
stress the connection between non-contingent needs and the persistence of the 
needs-bearer.  I also think they are right that when the persistence of a needs-
bearer is at stake, we have a moral obligation to meet his needs.  Building on 
these insights, I would like to look more closely at how non-contingent needs 
should be understood within the normative framework I have been developing. 
 
I suggested above that the normative force of the claim ‘S needs x in order to y’ 
is revealed when the placeholders are filled.  Although it is a little awkward 
grammatically, we might say that non-contingent needs are characterised by true 
propositions of the form ‘S needs x in order to be S’.  So, ascriptions of non-
contingent needs depend on questions of personal identity.  We cannot say 
whether a person has a non-contingent need unless we have a grasp of what it is 
for a person to persist and we cannot say what it is for a person to persist without 
a grasp of what it is to be a person.  This might remind us of the earlier thought 
that the appropriate normative standard for a kind depends on the criteria of 
identity for a kind.  Moreover, we have already seen that the right in chess 
depends on the criteria of identity for the practice.  Let us then rephrase part of 
the conclusion of section 6.4 as follows: ‘A chess player needs to obey the rules 
in order to be a chess player’.  So, the necessary preconditions for participating 
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in the practice of chess generate non-contingent needs within the context of 
chess.  Were a subject’s agency restricted entirely to playing chess, chess related 
needs would be non-contingent.  Breaking the rules of chess would undermine 
the preconditions for the only sort of value available to the subject.  However, we 
can ask whether a person needs to be a chess-player.  As the answer is almost 
certain to be ‘no’, the need expressed by the sentence ‘a chess-player needs to 
obey the rules in order to be a chess player’ is a contingent need. 
 
My proposal, then, is that non-contingent needs are categorical obligations and 
that they depend on what is essential to the nature of the needs-bearer.  At this 
point it would be desirable to have an account of the criteria of identity for 
persons; what it is that makes a person a person and not some other thing.   
Unfortunately, I do not have a detailed account to offer.  Nevertheless, I would 
like to venture some thoughts on the general shape of such an account.  An 
obvious starting point is that we are embodied beings and, hence, physically 
vulnerable.  As a result we have so-called ‘basic needs’.  These are goods such as 
food, water and adequate shelter that are needed to hold body and soul together.  
As basic needs are shared by everyone and do not depend on a controversial 
account of personhood, they have figured large in public policy debates.   
 
Basic needs are non-contingent needs.  However, they provide rather a thin basis 
for normativity.  It was with something like basic needs in mind that Shakespeare 
had King Lear say: 
 
O, reason not the need!  Our basest beggars 
Are in the poorest thing superfluous. 
Allow not nature more than nature needs, 
Man’s life is as cheap as beast’s.  (King Lear II. 4) 
 
Of course, the fact that a person’s life can go very badly despite their basic needs 
being met does not show that our obligations go beyond meeting those needs.  
Nevertheless, it is clear that our persistence depends on more than biological 
continuity.  Most significantly in this context, man is an essentially rational 
animal.  By this I mean that it is a necessary part of our identity that we 
recognise reasons for action and belief and that we are capable of responding to 
those reasons by modifying our behaviour and thought.  This has important 
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implications.  For example, the capacity for reason requires that we can represent 
the world as being in certain ways.  It also requires the capacity to reflect upon 
these representations, which in turn depends on an ability to construct sentences 
that contain or refer to other sentences used to express our reasons.  Moreover, 
we are social or political beings.  We are born dependent upon others and that is 
normally how we live our lives and how we die.  We learn language from others, 
and if language is necessary for reason, then so is company.  As well as being 
essentially rational, language-using, social beings, we each have a practical 
identity.  We are mothers, women, Europeans, teachers, students, plumbers, 
lovers, violinists, burglars, Muslims, Tories, vegans and the like.  The 
components of our practical identity are contingent, but the fact that we have a 
practical identity is not. 
 
I submit, then, that non-contingent needs are the necessary preconditions for the 
persistence of beings like us in an environment like ours.  Furthermore, it is part 
of the human condition that we are rational agents and this fact places obligations 
upon ourselves and upon others.  We have no choice but to act and we cannot 
escape the fact that our actions have moral significance.  That is our plight.  For, 
being rational, we are accountable to reasons.  Moreover, we have no choice but 
to represent the world and to form beliefs.  We can choose whether we play 
chess, but we cannot choose whether to be moral or epistemic agents.  Morally 
significant action and belief-formation are non-contingent activities.  
 
Despite this crucial difference between activities that are essential to our nature 
and contingent practices, the normative structures governing them have 
important similarities.  I associated the rules for playing chess with the necessary 
preconditions for engaging in the practice.  Similarly, there are necessary 
preconditions for moral and epistemic agency.  Whereas the preconditions for 
chess are contingent needs, the preconditions for moral and epistemic agency are 
non-contingent needs.  The necessary preconditions for moral agency include the 
capacity for rational, autonomous action.  The necessary preconditions for 
epistemic agency include conformity to the basic canons of logic.  If these 
preconditions are undermined, there comes a point when we cannot go on as 
rational agents.  This places obligations upon us that must be met in our own 
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case and in the case of other rational agents.  For, it is a basic principle of 
rationality that we treat like alike.  It is also a metaphysical presupposition of my 
view that we are each one among many equally real people. 
 
So, meeting the necessary preconditions for moral and epistemic agency situates 
us in the realm of value and opens up the possibility of goodness.  It also enables 
us to act badly and it is a consequence of my position that there can be tension 
between the right and the good.  As I discussed earlier, one must be engaged in 
the practice of chess to be a victim of scholar’s mate.  If this is right, we also 
have a prima facie moral obligation to preserve a life even when it is going 
badly.35  Given the possibility of acting well or badly, there is also the possibility 
of acting more or less well.  As I argued above, playing chess well is a matter of 
degree and depends on meeting the normative standards for the practice.  In the 
simplified case of a single, competitive game this means playing moves that are 
conducive to, or increase one’s chances of winning.  Similarly, there is a purpose 
to epistemic activity and that provides a normative standard against which belief 
formation can be measured.  In the next chapter I shall defend the view that the 
goal of belief is truth.  I shall also explain how this relates to questions of 
knowledge and justification and, so, provide an account of what goodness in the 
way of belief amounts to. 
 
Although morally significant action is like belief-formation in the sense that it is 
inescapable it is more difficult to account for the moral good because morality 
has no uncontroversial goal.  Rather than defending a substantial account of the 
moral good, however, I shall be content to outline the structural features of moral 
normativity.  To this end, I propose to draw a distinction between morality and 
ethics.  Morality, as I have argued, is a matter of meeting the necessary 
preconditions for engaging in non-contingent activities; activities that beings like                                                         
35 The prima facie obligation to preserve life does not entail that lives should be preserved in all 
circumstances and all costs.  One very general reason, as I discuss below, is that we can always 
turn our back on the realm of normativity.  A second reason is that death is certain for beings like 
us.  As I have linked non-contingent needs to our persistence conditions, it might be objected that 
I am committed to an obligation to be immortal.  In fact, as death approaches there is less that 
can preserve our identity and so our needs diminish. For this reason, I am also inclined to say that 
non-contingent needs must be stable or enduring, although I do not know of a principled way of 
deciding how stable or enduring. 
  143 
us to cannot but engage in.  By contrast, I propose that ethics is best understood 
as an activity of practical reason with the goal of ordering the field of practices 
towards the end of flourishing.36  For once our non-contingent needs are met, we 
are left with a plurality of sources of goodness associated with a plurality of 
practices.  The form of practical reason that is distinctive of ethical thought 
allows us to put them together, so we can answer the Socratic question, “how 
ought one to live?”  So, once we have discharged our moral obligations, ethics is 
a matter of bringing the various sources of goodness available to us into a 
balanced and coherent life.  For example, it is a matter of deciding whether to 
structure a life in pursuit of a single overarching aim, or to pursue a number of 
goals. 
 
We have, then, a sketch of the right and the good.  Although it is little more than 
a promissory note, the broad outlines should be clear.  Within the category of 
value-makers, I have identified separate right-makers and good-makers 
associated with the necessary preconditions and the goals of practices 
respectively.  It might be considered a weakly naturalistic account of normativity 
in the sense that it does not depend on supernatural agency or otherwise spooky 
entities.  But whilst my ontology has not outstripped the ontology of the natural 
sciences, or not obviously, I have relied on distinctively philosophical methods 
such as conceptual analysis, thought experiments and a priori metaphysics.  In 
this sense, it is a non-naturalistic account.  I have also appealed to our experience 
as agents situated within practices.  This involves a practical commitment to the 
norms internal to a practice.  For instance, we do not, whilst we are playing 
chess, doubt certain normative truths.  If we notice a combination of moves 
which forces a win in short order, we do not doubt that it is a good strategy.  
When we are playing and have grasped the rules that govern the practice, we do 
not wonder whether it might not better to move our pawns sideways or 
diagonally.  By contrast, a spectator who does not know how to play might 
wonder such things.  Or knowing the rules and the goal, she might wonder                                                         
36 I use the term ‘flourishing’ as a placeholder for the well-lived life, the good life or the 
objectively happy life and I take it to be consistent with a wide range of normative theories.  
Given the place of flourishing within my overall theory, however, it is not blandly neutral.  For, a 
flourishing life cannot be constituted by activities that undermine the preconditions of moral 
agency.  Moreover, it must be associated with the exercise of the capacities that are essential to 
our identity. 
  144 
whether the game might not be better were pawns permitted to move sideways.  
Distancing herself from the flow of the activity and adopting an external 
standpoint, a player might also ask such questions.  In doing so, she abandons her 
practical commitments and adopts a stance towards chess more akin to that of a 
scientist’s.  It is at this point that the Humean doubts we encountered in chapter 
one can creep in and one can start to doubt the normative force of the sorts of 
facts I have identified as value-makers.  Normative reasons are supposedly queer, 
it will be recalled, due to the phenomenon of normative force.  Part of the 
explanation, then, of why normative reasons are difficult to account for using 
only the methods of the natural sciences is that when an agent is not practically 
committed to an activity, there is no necessary connection between the normative 
force of the right and the good on the one hand, and her motivational mental 
states on the other. Rather than pursuing this subject here, I shall devote chapter 
eight to questions of motivation and the relationship between normative force 
and desire. 
 
6.6 Life’s Meaning and Value 
 
I should like to conclude this chapter with some observations on the relationship 
between goodness, normative force and life’s meaning or value.  I have argued 
that insofar as one is engaged in a practice, one must follow the rules and that 
this allows one to act well in light of the goal or purpose of the practice.  Only by 
playing chess, can one play chess well.  But what do we say to the person who 
does not care a fig for playing chess?  One response is to consider in what sense 
playing chess is a good in light of our further practical commitments and finally 
in terms of our non-contingent activities.  We might argue that chess is 
conducive to mental health, we might say it is a pleasurable activity and that 
games of chess can be beautiful in something like the sense that mathematical 
proofs can be beautiful.  In other words, we can undertake the ethical task of 
locating chess within the structure of a flourishing life.  But, as well as wanting 
to know how the practice connects with our other concerns, we should like to be 
able to respond with an account of the distinctive value of the practice of chess.  
Certainly we can talk about the goods internal to the practice, but what about the 
goodness of the practice as a whole? 
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Following my discussion of Philippa Foot’s account of natural goodness, I 
argued that we should not rest content with the thought that some trait is good in 
relation to our distinctive way of life.  Rather, we should be able to reflectively 
endorse the pursuit of particular goods.  I argued that this is an important part of 
what it is to be rational.  I also mentioned that there is a sense of ‘good’ that is 
not covered by the primary attributive use identified by Geach.  I had in mind the 
sort of usage David Wiggins describes as follows: 
 
What the philosophical lexicographer recapitulates under “good”, we might 
say, is the history of our constant interrogation of the life that we lead and 
the place where we lead it, our constant interrogation of the things that 
concern us or might concern us or ought to concern us.  (2009: 198) 
 
Although Geach was right that ‘good’ typically functions as an attributive 
adjective, we sometimes use the word ‘good’ in a rather different sense to mean 
the sort of thing that is worthy of pursuit all-things-considered, or the sort of 
thing that finally stands up to interrogation.  This is what we mean when we say 
things such as ‘pleasure is good’, ‘friendship is good’ or ‘health is good’.  We do 
not mean that these things are good of their kind, or that they are instrumentally 
valuable, but that they are good things and worthy of pursuit.  We mean, in other 
words, that they are final goods, standards against which actions can be 
measured and plausible candidates for being the end, or among the ends, of a 
flourishing life.  The fact that a claim is being made concerning final value is 
indicated by the fact that ‘good’ functions as a predicative adjective in this 
context.37 
 
So, when we consider whether to reflectively endorse a practice such as chess, 
we can consider whether the practice is good in the predicative sense; whether it 
is worth pursuing tout court.  Because chess is a contingent practice, we can 
adopt an external perspective on the practice and consider its value in light of our 
other reasons.  The more pressing case, however, is morality.  As above, I mean 
by ‘morality’ the preconditions for engaging in the sorts of activities that 
constitute a flourishing life.  Unlike chess, we cannot choose to stop engaging in                                                         
37 Geach dismisses predicative uses of ‘good’ as ‘a peculiarly philosophical use of words’ (1956: 
36), but this looks like a case of ad hoc monster-barring.  A quick internet search shows that 
claims such as ‘friendship is good’ and ‘pleasure is good’ are in common parlance. 
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moral activity and pick up some other activity instead.  We can choose to knock 
ourselves out with drink or drugs, but, setting aside questions of addiction, these 
are still actions for which we are morally accountable.  Whereas we engage in 
the activity of chess in virtue of prior choices and contingent circumstances, we 
are engaged in moral activity in virtue of our existence as rational agents.  As 
being moral agents is our plight, to ask whether morality or other forms of 
necessary activity are good in the no-holds-barred predicative sense can only be 
to ask whether life for beings like us is worthy of pursuit.  In other words, it is to 
enquire into the human condition and whether life is meaningful. 
 
Of course, death is a possibility; we can cease being rational agents and thus 
cease to be engaged in normatively governed activity.  As is well known, Kant 
objected to suicide on the following grounds: 
 
To annihilate the subject of morality in one's person is to root out the 
existence of morality itself from the world as far as one can, even though 
morality is an end in itself.  (Metaphysics of Morals, 423) 
 
I am not interested here in the case of suicide as euthanasia, but rather in suicide 
as the rejection of normativity, or what we might call ‘existential suicide’.  As 
Kant suggests, this is a move towards annihilating value.  But, what if 
normativity in the world, with its various preconditions and ends, is not valuable 
to me?  What if I find flourishing pointless, meaningless or absurd?  Why then 
should I be bound by norms instead of committed to suicide?  Consider Tolstoy’s 
account of his doubts concerning the ultimate meaning or value of various 
activities.  He recalls that at the height of his literary success, financially secure 
and with a loving wife and family, the question kept pressing upon him ‘Why? 
Well, and then?’ (1987: 10) whenever he considered any prospective good.  
Repeatedly hitting upon this question, he reported: 
 
I felt that what I was standing on had given way, that I had no foundation 
to stand on, that that which I had lived by no longer existed, and that I had 
nothing to live by. (1987: 11) 
 
According to the view I have been defending, rationality is a matter of 
recognising and responding to normative reasons.  So, we can and should argue 
that existential suicide is irrational.  But, as existential suicide is a rejection of 
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normative reasons quite generally, this will not carry any dialectical force.  
Perhaps Wittgenstein had similar thoughts in mind when he remarked: 
 
If suicide is allowed then everything is allowed. If anything is not allowed 
then suicide is not allowed. This throws a light on the nature of ethics, for 
suicide is, so to speak, the elementary sin. (1979: 91) 
 
Camus also wrote that ‘there is but one truly serious philosophical question and 
that is suicide’ (1955: 11).  This may overstate the case, but it is certainly a 
question that arises in response to an important challenge.  What then can we say 
to assuage doubts that the flourishing life may not be good in the gloves-off 
predicative sense?  
 
It seems there are two sorts of considerations we might offer.  I have attempted 
to account for the normative structure governing our various practices and 
activities, and in so doing provide an account of the good and the right.  But we 
can still question whether any of this is worthy of pursuit because we can 
question whether any of it matters or is meaningful in the grander scheme of 
things.38  Since questions of meaning are questions of significance or fit, we can 
proceed along two axes, which we might think of as horizontal and vertical.  On 
the one hand, activity can be meaningful when it measures up to a higher, more 
encompassing standard.  For instance, I explained the value of chess moves in 
terms of their place in a wider practice.  That practice is in turn embedded in 
larger structures as I indicated when discussing the place of chess in a flourishing 
life.  If we want to progress further along the vertical axis of fit, however, we 
must find something that both transcends and justifies human activity.  Thus,                                                         
38 It is sometimes suggested that questions about the meaning of life originate in a sense of our 
smallness in relation to the cosmos.  As Cottingham explains the concern: ‘We humans pride 
ourselves on our intellectual and cultural achievements, but against the backdrop of unimaginable 
aeons of time through which clouds of incandescent hydrogen expand without limit, we are a 
strange temporary accident, no more significant than a slime or mould that forms for a few years 
or decades on a barren rockface and then is seen no more’ (2003: 3–4). The dizzying attempt to 
view our lives from an Archimedean point, or what Nagel calls the view from nowhere, leaves us 
with a sense of the absurd.  However, it is not our smallness as such that is disturbing.  If we 
dislike the thought of a short meaningless life confined to a tiny corner of the universe, a long 
meaningless life with a massive body, or in a much smaller cosmos hardly seems like a more 
attractive alternative.  Rather, the concern seems to be that projects which loom large in our lives 
will appear insignificant from the point of view of the universe.  However, it is highly doubtful 
whether we have a firm enough grasp of our lives sub specie aeternitatis to make sense of this 
claim. As Scarre observes, ‘perhaps from that standpoint [our lives] will appear not as petty and 
worthless but as precious jewels in a waste of material processes.  Who, besides God, can say?‘ 
(2001: 214). 
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Tolstoy partly assuaged his concerns, and alleviated his depression, by finding 
meaning in the design plan of a benevolent God. 
 
Of course, Tolstoy’s solution depends on an appeal to supernatural agency that 
many of us would reject.  Setting this aside, however, a source of vertical 
meaning still may not be sufficient to address our concerns.  At least, not just any 
source of vertical meaning would do.  For example, God’s existence would be 
little consolation if we were the equivalent of Harvard mice or broiler chickens in 
the Divine plan.  For we are looking for a source of meaning that we can 
reflectively endorse.  The difficulty, however, is that unless normativity is 
internal to human practices or activities, the reasons in favour of the practices are 
likely to be the wrong sort of reasons.  If the reason that our practices and 
activities are justified is that they are conducive to some Divine plan, then the 
reason to engage in them just is that further purpose.  As I argued in the previous 
chapter, if the normative reason for an action or belief is its relation to some 
further end, then we do not have two reasons, i.e. the end and the fact that the 
means produces the end.  If this is right, we would be radically mistaken in 
thinking that we have moral reasons, prudential reasons, epistemic reasons, 
aesthetic reasons and reasons associated with various contingent practices.  The 
reason to meet someone’s non-contingent needs, to provide for one’s future, to 
create and preserve the beautiful, to believe what is true, and even to exchange 
down to an endgame with a queenside pawn majority would finally be their 
contribution to a Divine plan.  In other words, we would only have Divine 
reasons.  But, then, a Divine reason is not necessarily a human reason (and if it is 
a human reason then it is redundant).  So, it is unclear why we should reflectively 
endorse it.  Moreover, most people most of the time do not think that they are 
acting for Divine reasons.  So, the view under discussion would have the 
unattractive consequence that we are generally irrational in the sense that the 
reasons that justify our actions are rarely the reasons that actually motivate our 
actions.   
 
For the above reasons, I am not convinced that we should look for life’s meaning 
or value in something beyond the field of human practices and activities.  If this 
is right, we are left to consider the horizontal axis of fit; the way in which our 
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various activities fit together within the field of practices and activities.  For 
example, we find activity meaningless when it fails against the standards of our 
core projects, activities and practices; those to which we are most fully 
committed and which make us who we are.  We might think of the absurdity and 
alienation of work which is at odds with what matters most to us or which is 
simply unrelated to our goals.  On this view, there is nothing more to the 
question of the meaning of life than the question of the way in which the various 
parts of a life relate to one another.  Judging this means evaluating practices and 
activities in light of each other, and, in particular, evaluating contingent practices 
in light of non-contingent activities such as moral requirements and the pursuit of 
truth.  This means considering the reasons that are given by the right and the 
good associated with the preconditions and goals of practices and activities.  It 
also means considering whether an agent’s practical identity fits with her more 
idiosyncratic capacities.  
 
It might be objected that we cannot appeal to facts about the significance of 
activities within a human life when it is the significance of those very facts 
which is under scrutiny.  Indeed, it is true that we face a very general dilemma 
when it comes to the justification of reasons.  For we either appeal to reasons of 
the same sort in which we case we are guilty of circular reasoning.  Or, we can 
appeal to reasons of a different sort, such as Divine reasons, in which case it 
seems that the reasons will belong to the wrong category.  Perhaps the most 
famous example of this sort of dilemma is Hume’s problem of induction.39  On 
the one hand, it is circular to justify induction on inductive grounds.  On the 
other hand, it is inappropriate to justify induction on deductive grounds.  A 
number of commentators have concluded that all Hume succeeded in showing is 
that induction is not deduction, and that it is wrongheaded to try to explain the 
one in terms of the other.40  So, although the objection that horizontal meaning is 
viciously circular should be taken seriously, the alternative seems to be the 
misguided attempt to reduce the meaning internal to a human life to a type of 
meaning external to a human life.                                                           
39 Weintraub (1995) argues persuasively that Hume’s problem of induction is in fact just a special 
case of the ancient problem of the criterion.  The paradox of analysis also has the same structure. 
40 See, for example, Strawson (1952: 250). 
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We are left with the conclusion that we can explain meaning within the field of 
practices, but that we cannot justify it on pain of circularity or irrelevance.  But 
even if we cannot justify a life as a whole, perhaps it is enough to show that there 
is value within it.  Perhaps we can do no more than identify life’s sources of 
value and then attempt the difficult ethical work of trying to understand how to 
structure a life towards the end of flourishing.  Finally, I see no alternative but to 
maintain that the meaning of life is just whatever meaning there is to be found in 
a flourishing life consisting of a coherent set of valuable practices and activities 
flowing from the distinctive activities of beings like us.  There is no shortcut to 
answering whether life is good in the predicative sense.  We must carry out the 
painstaking ethical work of considering what there is to be said in favour of 
particular practices and courses of action and how they can be integrated into a 
life with horizontal meaning. 
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Chapter Seven 
Truth, Virtue and Epistemic Normativity 
 
The previous chapter was perhaps the most ambitious of this dissertation.  In 
response to the difficulties facing naturalistic accounts of normativity we 
encountered in earlier chapters, I defended the broad outlines of my own 
account.  I considered the case of the contingent practice of chess in some detail 
and I touched on questions of morality and finally meaning in life.  In this 
chapter, I defend the view that truth is the regulative norm of epistemic activity, 
draw out conclusions with respect to epistemic justification and respond to a 
number of possible objections.  The emergent view stands in contrast to the 
instrumentalist position I discussed in chapter five and the psychologism I 
discussed in chapter four.  It also constitutes an important test case for the 
account of normativity I defended in the previous chapter. 
 
It is agreed on all hands that there is some connection between what is true and 
what we ought to believe.  Broadly speaking for the present, it seems that we do 
well if we believe what is true, and we do badly if we believe what is false.  
However, bringing out the precise nature of this relationship is not easy.  In 
section 7.1, I outline my view of this relationship, drawing on insights from 
virtue epistemology and contrasting my position with Linda Zagzebski’s.  
Briefly, I argue that we ought to believe propositions that are produced by 
virtuous dispositions of thought which are directed towards and reliably 
conducive to truth for beings like us in an environment like ours.  In sections 7.2 
and 7.3 below, I consider arguments that appear to count against this view.  In 
section 7.2, I consider an argument adapted from Bykvist and Hattiangadi 
(2007), which seems to suggest that my account places impossible demands upon 
epistemic agents.  I argue that this is not the case, drawing on the distinction 
between what we ought to believe and what it would be good for us to believe.  
In section 7.3, I look at an argument suggestive of the idea that epistemic 
normativity depends in some measure upon practical interests.  In particular, I 
consider a thought experiment of Jason Stanley’s (2005) which intuitively 
suggests that ascriptions of knowledge depend upon practical interests.  I accept 
that our intuitions tend in that direction, but attempt to explain away the 
experiences by disentangling competing sources of normativity. 
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7.1 True Beliefs and Epistemic Virtue 
 
Part of the view I would like to defend is that the activity of belief-formation is 
necessarily governed by the norm of truth.  For epistemic agents it is constitutive 
of having beliefs that they are governed by epistemic norms, and in particular the 
epistemic goal of truth.  It is not that agents form beliefs with the aim of 
believing true propositions, as one might have the aim of believing, say, 
interesting propositions.1  Rather, part of what it is to be a belief is to be 
normatively governed by truth.  Just as winning is the goal of chess, narrowly 
construed, and flourishing is the goal of human action quite generally, truth is the 
goal of belief-formation.  Like chess, belief-formation can be evaluated in the 
light of other standards.  Beliefs, or rather their content, can be beautiful, useful 
and the like.  But, like morality, it is the inescapable plight of beings like us to 
form beliefs.  Humans are essentially epistemic agents and there could not be an 
epistemic agent whose beliefs were not governed by and evaluable against this 
normative standard.  Indeed, it would be entirely opaque to call a mental state a 
‘belief’ if it were not primarily evaluable against the standard of representing the 
world as it is.  
 
In the last chapter I discussed Moore’s paradox in the context of goodness in 
chess.  Something has gone amiss with an agent who sincerely asserts ‘p, but I 
don’t believe that p’.  This is despite the fact that the assertion is not only 
logically consistent, but is true in many circumstances.  Given human fallibility, 
it is close to certain that some of an individual’s beliefs are false even though 
they are not in a position to identify which ones with certainty.  At least it is 
necessarily true that if we take two epistemic agents with contradictory beliefs, at 
least one of them holds a false belief.  As I suggested in the previous chapter, at                                                         
1 It is often said that belief aims at truth, and this can be a helpful metaphor as long as one does 
not confuse it with the proposition that epistemic agents necessarily aim at truth.  For instance, 
Steglich-Peterson (2009: 396) writes: ‘It is a conceptual truth about believing, that someone 
believing p aims at believing p truly, it is simply impossible to consciously and deliberately 
believe that p despite evidence to the contrary.’  But this is not a conceptual truth and it is 
probably not even a truth.  For even if, as Steglich-Peterson suggests, it is impossible consciously 
and deliberately to believe that p despite evidence to the contrary, it does not follow that 
believing truly is among the aims of an agent who believes that p.  It seems perfectly possible to 
believe p despite one’s aims.  I have argued that there is always a reason to believe a true 
proposition, but it would be rather optimistic to think that we always aim at what we have reason 
to do. 
  153 
least part of the problem is that the assertion of a Moorean sentence must be 
understood as a violation of the norm of truth that governs belief.  The assertion 
implicitly denies that in holding beliefs one is normatively committed to the goal 
of holding true beliefs.  We can make no sense of this denial, hence the 
assertion’s paradoxical appearance.2  
 
The fact that the activity of belief-formation is governed by the norm of truth 
also helps to explain why from the first-person deliberative standpoint the 
question of how I believe the world to stand collapses into the question of how 
the world in fact stands.3  As Gareth Evans noted: 
 
In making a self-ascription of belief, one’s eyes are, so to speak, or 
occasionally literally, directed outward – upon the world.  If someone asks 
me ‘Do you think there is going to be a third world war?’, I must attend, in 
answering him, to precisely the same outward phenomena as I would attend 
to if I were answering the question ‘Will there be a third world war?’. (1982: 
225). 
 
This phenomenon has come to be known as transparency.4  Other propositional 
attitudes are not similarly transparent.  We do not usually direct our eyes outward 
in order to determine whether we desire that p.  This is because we do not need 
evidence for p in order to be rationally entitled to desire that p; normally the 
reverse is true.  By contrast, one is only rationally entitled to believe that p if one 
is rationally entitled to take p to be true.  So, on the assumption of one’s own 
rationality, one self-ascribes a belief that p by considering the evidence that p is 
true.  Of course, when it comes to beliefs we have already formed, the 
assumption of one’s own rationality may be unwarranted.   Nevertheless, when 
we come to self-ascribe a belief, we assume that it was formed on the basis of the 
evidence for its truth, for we cannot make sense of ourselves unless we assume 
that we are rational. 
 
                                                        
2 This has certain formal affinities with transcendental arguments.  So, the thought runs, it is 
manifestly true that we understand and engage with rational others, but for this to be possible it 
must be the case that their beliefs are normatively regulated by the goal of truth.   
3 Similarly, the question ‘What do I want?’ seems to collapse into the question of ‘What is all 
things considered good?’  See Moran (1988: 145) for further discussion. 
4 See, for example, Shah (2003: 448).  Although Evans’ idea is widely accepted, see, Cassam 
(2011) for several concerns about the transparency thesis. 
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Another consideration pointing in the same direction is that the norms governing 
rational inferences between beliefs are the same as the rules of deductive logic 
which guarantee truth preservation.  So, for example, if S believes p and S 
believes q, then S is rationally committed to believing p and q.  If S believes that 
if p then q and S believes that p then S is rationally committed to believing that 
q.5  If, however, belief were not normatively governed or regulated by truth, then 
it is obscure why agents should be rationally committed to these norms.  
Propositional attitude that are not governed by the norm of truth do not behave in 
this way.  For instance, my desire that p and my desire that q do not jointly 
commit me to a desire that p and q.  I might be caught between my simultaneous 
desires for tea and coffee, without thereby desiring both.  Similarly, if I entertain 
the thought that if p then q and I entertain the thought that p, I am not rationally 
committed to entertaining the thought that q.  Perhaps q is too terrible to 
contemplate. 
 
Once we grasp what is meant by sincerely asserting a belief that p, we cannot 
without conceptual confusion wonder whether the speaker also believes that p is 
true.  To employ another of Moore’s ideas, the questions ‘I believe that p, but is 
p true?’ and ‘S (sincerely) asserts that p, but does S believe that p is true’ are 
closed.  To understand what it is to believe that p is to understand that whoever 
sincerely asserts p believes p and whoever believes p believes p to be true.  This 
contrasts with open questions such as ‘p is good / beautiful / promotes my self-
interest, but do I believe that p?’  Our handle on the concept of belief depends on 
the relationship in which belief stands to the goal of truth, not the contingent 
relations which beliefs bear to other valuable goals.  The beauty or goodness of a 
proposition can certainly provide us with a reason to believe it, but these are 
aesthetic or ethical reasons.  From a purely epistemic perspective, any such 
reason is always over-ridden by the proposition’s falsity. 
 
                                                        
5 Of course, the fact that I am rationally committed to the conclusion does not mean that I will in 
fact believe the conclusion.  For, as Carroll (1895) illustrated with his example of Achilles and 
the Tortoise, I can always question the normative force of modus ponens or any other rule of 
logical inference.  Normative force is not motivational force and Logic does not take one by the 
neck and force one to believe as Achilles hoped. 
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Although it is not possible to find a rational interpretation for Moorean sentences 
like ‘p, but I do not believe that p’, we can make sense of the assertion ‘p, but I 
desire not to believe that p’.  A wife might desire to believe that her philandering 
husband is faithful.  Caught in this position, she might even say ‘my husband is 
unfaithful, but I don’t believe it’, and we would have a sympathetic grasp of her 
meaning.  In fact, she does believe that her husband is unfaithful, for otherwise 
we could make no sense of her sincere assertion to that effect, but she desires, 
and perhaps intends, to form the contrary belief.  Her utterance may well be part 
of that very strategy.  It is familiar enough that repetition of a falsehood can lead 
to belief in its truth.  The most convincing liars, it is sometimes said, finally 
come to believe their own lies.  In order to fulfil her desire to falsely believe in 
her husband’s fidelity she may also avoid looking for compelling evidence.  Or 
she might actively seek scraps of evidence to the contrary.  However, in doing so 
she is deliberatively cultivating an epistemic vice.  This does not entail that her 
behaviour is wrong all things considered.  Moral, prudential, aesthetic and other 
sorts of reasons can trump epistemic reasons on occasion.  Nevertheless, she is 
manifesting an epistemic vice. 
 
Claiming that the truth-goal is always relevant to epistemic appraisal is neither to 
say that having a true belief is necessary, nor sufficient, for being the appropriate 
object of epistemic praise.  The reason for this is that we do not directly evaluate 
beliefs against the normative standard of truth.  This is clear from the fact that we 
neither blame someone who is subject to epistemic misfortune, nor praise 
someone who is the beneficiary of epistemic good luck.  The world can be a 
cruel and deceptive place.  Zebras can turn out to be cleverly painted mules.   
Epistemic luck can trump diligence. So it cannot be quite right to say, as I 
suggested as a first pass, that we always do well if we hold true beliefs, or that 
we always do badly if we hold false beliefs. 
 
Moreover, we do not have immediate or direct control over our beliefs.  If I see a 
red truck coming towards me I cannot by an act of will believe that it is a yellow 
tractor.  Generally, if I am faced with misleading but compelling evidence, I 
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cannot simply choose to disregard it and believe the truth.6  But although we 
cannot always make an immediate decision to believe or withhold belief from 
some proposition, we can aim to bring about the appropriate circumstances for 
the correct beliefs to arise.7  We can do this in at least two ways, by working on 
ourselves directly or indirectly.8  On the one hand, we can affect our mechanisms 
of belief formation by cultivating epistemic virtues and improving our 
background knowledge.  On the other hand, we can influence the input.  This can 
mean changing our location, focusing on different aspects of the world or 
seeking out different sources of testimony.  It can also mean actively exploring 
and engaging with our environment.9  We do this when we shuffle tiles on a 
Scrabble rack, complete a jigsaw puzzle and try to set a philosophical argument 
down on paper. 
 
Chisholm has suggested that the situation of the epistemic agent with respect to 
his beliefs is analogous to a debtor who has an obligation to repay borrowed 
money, but not at the moment at which he takes on the obligation (1991: 126).  
Chisholm sees this primarily as a matter of discharging our epistemic obligations 
in due course, by carefully reflecting upon our existing stock of beliefs.  
However, to stretch the analogy a little, it seems more important that the debtor 
ensures that he is in a position of fiscal responsibility before he takes on the loan, 
so as to avoid taking on an obligation he cannot discharge.  To this end, I suggest 
that a virtuous epistemic agent should cultivate those dispositions of thought                                                         
6 As William Alston argues, ‘If I were to set out to bring myself into a state of belief that p, just 
by an act of will, I might assert that p with an expression of conviction, or dwell favourably on 
the idea that p, or imagine a sentence expressing p emblazoned in the heavens with an angelic 
chorus in the background intoning the Kyrie of Mozart’s Coronation Mass.  All this I can do at 
will, but none of this amounts to taking on the belief that p’ (1988: 263).  There is of course a 
large literature on the subject of doxastic voluntarism.  For a sampling, see Naylor (1985), 
Feldman (2000), Katzoff (2001), Booth (2007) and Hieronymi (2008).  Even if is true that we 
cannot form beliefs at will, there are interesting questions concerning what sort of impossibility is 
involved.  Is it ‘mere’ psychological impossibility, or is it conceptual, metaphysical or logical 
impossibility?  For more on this see Bennett (1990).   
7 Huss (2009: 257–61) lists ten ways in which we can exert indirect control over our beliefs, but 
they are variations on the two themes I mention.  See also Nottelmann (2008: 84–93) for further 
detailed discussion of doxastic control. 
8 A third possibility is to bring it about that we believe that p by bringing it about that p.  
However, this has little to do with epistemic normativity, which is a matter of aligning one’s 
beliefs to the world as it is. 
9 As Noë during his excellent discussion of the role of action in belief-formation, ‘the process of 
perceiving, of finding out how things are, is a process of meeting the world; it is an activity of 
skilful exploration’ (2004: 165). 
  157 
which are reliably conducive to the acquisition of true beliefs.  These are 
epistemic virtues such as intellectual integrity, precision, care and consistency; 
virtues because of the relationship in which they stand to truth.  By contrast a 
vicious epistemic agent either fails to cultivate epistemic virtues, or deliberately 
adopts strategies which are antithetical to truth.  Determining the particular 
dispositions of thought which are epistemically virtuous or vicious is formally a 
matter for empirical psychology, for it is a matter of determining which 
dispositions of thought are reliably conducive to forming true beliefs for beings 
like us in an environment such as our own. However, in practical terms, the 
common sense of responsible and mature epistemic agents is normally a 
sufficient guide. 
 
So the account of epistemic evaluation I favour is virtue-based.  When we 
transfer our attention to the prior cultivation of epistemic virtue, we can see that 
the fact that we cannot decide to believe at will is not a threat to the idea that we 
are epistemically responsible for our beliefs.  Consider again the example of the 
red truck coming towards us.  If we automatically form the belief that there is a 
red truck, then we are in fact manifesting an epistemic virtue, namely the 
disposition to believe the evidence of our senses in the absence of obvious 
defeaters.  If we lived in a world in which apparently red trucks routinely turned 
out to be yellow tractors on closer inspection, then it is quite plausible to suppose 
that we would not be disposed to form the belief that there is a red truck coming 
towards us.  We do not, for example, form beliefs about tiny trucks in the 
distance, although that is arguably what we see.  Epistemic virtues are stable 
dispositions to form certain sorts of belief in certain circumstances.  It is no 
concern that we form beliefs automatically and unreflectively.  Doing so requires 
the sort of skill that is the manifestation of epistemic virtue. 
 
So, a virtue-based account of epistemic evaluation is attractive because it enables 
us to account for doxastic responsibility.  It also issues in intuitively correct 
judgments in cases of epistemic luck.  We do not do badly, epistemically 
speaking, if we exercise a virtue of thought that unluckily produces a false belief 
and the same is true, mutatis mutandis, for epistemic vice.  Moreover, a virtue-
based account helps to resolve a third issue.  If truth were the end of belief-
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formation, it is sometimes objected, one way to satisfy this end would be simply 
to form a great many beliefs.  Thus, van Fraassen argues, we would do well to 
believe everything we can believe to ‘be sure to catch the truths in our net’ 
(2002: 86).  However, this is a terrible epistemic strategy.  By casting our 
cognitive nets as wide as possible we would also catch a great many falsehoods.  
So, the argument proceeds, we must have at least two cognitive aims, namely the 
acquisition of true beliefs and the avoidance of false beliefs.  However, as van 
Fraassen argues, the aims of holding true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs are 
distinct and involve trade-offs; ‘they cannot be jointly maximised; to some 
extent, each is gotten at the expense of the other’ (2002: 87).  For, he argues, if 
avoidance of error were our primary aim, we would do well to pare down our 
beliefs to a minimum of secure beliefs; perhaps, he suggests, tautologies.  This 
suggests some sort of compromise between the acquisition of true beliefs and the 
avoidance of false beliefs, rather than truth as an overriding aim.   
 
A virtue-based account has a simple response to this line of argument, namely 
that believing as many propositions as possible is not the manifestation of an 
epistemic virtue.  One straightforward reason is that believing as many 
propositions as possible is not reliably conducive to truth.  But this is not quite to 
get to the heart of the matter.  Let us say that a stable disposition of character 
counts as the virtue of justice if it is reliable conducive to giving people what 
they deserve or are owed.  Imagine, then, that someone claimed that justice was a 
matter of wandering around beating everyone one encounters with a stick.  This 
might be defended on the grounds that people are generally wicked and deserve a 
beating.  Even if this is so, and people were generally getting what they deserved 
at the hands of the stick-wielding vigilante, we should hardly count this as 
administering justice.  The reason for this is that actions are virtuous when they 
are skilfully directed towards their targets.  Similarly, if one forms as many 
beliefs as possible one would likely catch many true propositions in one’s 
cognitive net.  But one would not believe them because they were true and so 
one would not be acting on the basis of epistemic virtue. 
 
For the above reasons, I think virtues are the primary focus of epistemic 
evaluation.  But although I am drawing on ideas from the field of virtue 
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epistemology, I am not advocating what Zagzebski describes as a ‘pure virtue 
theory’.  So, Zagzebski describes pure virtue theories as follows: 
 
The concept of a right act is defined in terms of the concept of a virtue or a 
component of virtue such as motivations.  Furthermore, the property of 
rightness is something that emerges from the inner states of persons. 
(1996: 79)  
 
By contrast, I am defending the view that an agent is epistemically virtuous 
because his stable dispositions of thought are reliably conducive to the good, i.e. 
truth or cognitive contact with reality.  A stable disposition of character is a 
virtue because of the relation in which it stands to the epistemic good of true 
beliefs, which is the final source of normativity.  True beliefs are not good 
because they are the product of virtuous activity.   
 
One reason to prefer this order of explanation is the difficulty involved in 
understanding what counts as an epistemic virtue without a prior understanding 
of the epistemic good.  Zagzebski claims that ‘an act is right because it is an act a 
virtuous person would (or might) do’ (1996: 80).  However, without a conception 
of the good, it is far from clear how we could recognise a virtuous person.  
Aristotle advised us to become wise by observing the wise.  However, it is often 
asked, how are we to identify the wise (phronimoi) without possessing practical 
wisdom (phronesis) in the first place?  Although this is a very old, well-known 
problem, it is difficult to see any satisfactory solution.  Zagzebski appeals to the 
example of ‘persons whose goodness shines forth from the depths of their being’ 
(1996: 83), but it is hard to know quite what to make of this.  She fleshes out the 
comment as follows:  
 
I believe it is possible that we can see the goodness of a person in [a] 
rather direct way.  She may simply exude a “glow” of nobility or fineness 
of character, or as I have occasionally seen in a longtime member of a 
contemplative religious order, there may be a inner peace that can be 
perceived to be good directly, not simply because it can be explained on 
the theoretical level as a component of eudaimonia.  (1996: 83) 
 
I do not doubt that we occasionally have the experience of such encounters.  Nor 
do I doubt that the actions of virtuous others are sometimes our best guide to the 
virtuous course of action.  This is especially the case during our early moral and 
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epistemic development.  However, I do not see how Zagzebski’s comments 
could help us to recognise a virtuous person without some understanding of how 
their behaviour relates to the good.  Although we might be subject to the kind of 
impression Zagzebski describes, appearances can be deceptive.  The virtuous do 
not glow, and sadly they may appear rather dull.  By contrast, the vicious can 
exude inner peace.  The devil, as they say, has all the best tunes.  We sometimes 
communicate our dispositions through our demeanour, but this is a highly 
unreliable guide to virtue.  Much better, I contend, to evaluate a person’s 
dispositions in the light of the good. 
 
7.2 Impossible Standards: obligation and evaluation 
 
I have argued, then, that an epistemic agent is always answerable to the 
reliability of her cognitive processes with respect to forming true beliefs.  I 
would also like to endorse the stronger claim that this is the only criterion against 
which it is appropriate to evaluate epistemic agents qua epistemic agents.  In 
order to develop this idea, it will be helpful to consider a near alternative and 
why it fails.   
 
Bykvist and Hattiangadi criticise the following putative principle: 
 
For any S, p: S ought to believe that p if and only if p is true. (2007: 277) 
 
So, according to this principle, the psychological state of believing some 
proposition is correct, fitting or appropriate if and only if the proposition is true.  
If a proposition is false, one ought not to believe it regardless of other 
considerations in its favour.10  Unfortunately, as Bykvist and Hattiangadi 
observe, this principle quickly runs into serious trouble.  For, there are clearly 
true propositions for which it is not the case that one ought to believe them.  For 
example, there are true propositions which one cannot believe.  No human mind 
can entertain a proposition containing infinitely many true conjuncts, and, hence, 
                                                        
10  Again, this is not to suggest that believing the truth is always what we ought to do in an all-
things-considered sense.  As I conceded in chapter five, situations occur in which it is best to 
believe what is false.  We may have moral, aesthetic or prudential reasons to believe what is 
untrue, and these reasons may trump our epistemic reasons.  So we need to read the ‘ought’ as 
purely epistemic. 
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no human can believe such a proposition despite its truth.  As ‘ought’ implies 
‘can’, no human ought to believe such a proposition.11 
 
Now, the view I am advocating does not face quite the same difficulty because, 
on my view, it is not true that we always ought to believe what is true.  Imagine 
that I see what appears to be a red surface in ordinary lighting conditions, and so 
form the belief ‘there is a red surface over there’.  But, in fact, what I see is due 
to a hidden jokester projecting red light on to a white surface.12  Given this outré 
scenario, my view would entail that it is epistemically virtuous to believe what is 
false.  This is because trusting one’s senses, in the absence of any reason to 
suppose that there is a defeater for one’s perceptual evidence, such as a jokester, 
in the vicinity, is reliably conducive to forming true beliefs for beings like us in 
an environment such as ours. We would have, as always, a reason to believe the 
truth, but that reason would be cognitively unavailable for non-culpable reasons.  
This seems the correct response insofar as the victim of the joke is not intuitively 
blameworthy when he forms the false belief that he sees a red surface, but yet 
something has gone wrong with regard to his belief.   
 
Nevertheless, it is not difficult to envisage an analogous objection.  Given that 
epistemic virtue is understood in terms of reliability with respect to true beliefs, 
ought not an agent cultivate the disposition of epistemic infallibility?  Ought not 
a virtuous epistemic agent believe the truth and nothing but the truth?  But, for 
the reasons noted above, infallibility is impossible for beings like us.  We cannot 
believe every true proposition, because we cannot even entertain or consider 
every true proposition.  So, doesn’t my position also saddle epistemic agents 
with obligations they are impotent to discharge?  
 
I think not, for reasons I’ll now explain. In this chapter, I have been referring 
more or less interchangeably to epistemic evaluation and what an epistemic agent 
ought to do.  But, as we saw in the last chapter, the good and the right are                                                         
11 Whiting argues that Bykvist’s and Hattiangadi’s putative principle is too strong and that from 
the fact that the correctness of a belief depends on its truth we should draw the conclusion that 
‘For any S, p: S may believe that p if and only if it is true that p’ (2010: 216).  But although I 
agree with Whiting that the principle involving ‘ought’ is too strong, I think that Whiting’s 
principle involving ‘can’ is too weak.  I argue for middle ground below. 
12 I borrow this example from Ernest Sosa (2007: 31–4). 
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distinct.  Epistemic obligation or rightness, what one ought to do, is associated 
with the necessary preconditions for epistemic agency.  These include 
specifically epistemic conditions such as conformity to the basic principles of 
logic and also conditions such as free will, which are necessary for rational 
agency quite generally.  These are not, however, standards against which we can 
evaluate epistemic agents, but preconditions for evaluation.  We cannot criticise 
non-rational representational systems, such as a computers and all or most 
nonhuman animals, for failing to form true beliefs.  We can only evaluate the 
goodness of artefacts and all or most nonhuman animals, against their function 
and life-form respectively.  We cannot evaluate them epistemically because 
‘ought’ implies ‘can’ and non-rational cognitive systems cannot believe other 
than they do.  Even saying this much assumes that we can coherently ascribe 
beliefs to non-rational beings, which is questionable.  So, for a creature to meet 
the necessary conditions of epistemic agency is for it to be the sort of creature 
which is appropriately subject to epistemic evaluation.  Epistemic evaluation 
then focuses on the belief-forming mechanisms of the agent.  Insofar as the 
agent’s belief-forming mechanisms are reliably conducive to forming true 
beliefs, the agent is epistemically virtuous, or, in an alternative idiom, he does 
well epistemically.   
 
The answer, then, is that it would be good, excellent, indeed ideal, to cultivate 
the disposition of infallibility.  This is why omniscience has traditionally been 
attributed to the God of the Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition.  However, we are 
under no obligation to do so.  This does mean, it is true, that insofar as we are 
unable to believe every truth we are to some extent epistemically bad or 
imperfect.  Yet this much is commonplace.  It is perfectly obvious that we are all 
fallible and, to that extent, less than ideal.  This also coheres with my argument 
in chapter five that there is always some epistemic reason to believe trivial true 
propositions.  If we are inclined to deny that a person should be evaluated 
negatively due to the unavoidable cognitive limitations, then it is because of the 
connection between evaluation and blame.  To evaluate someone as bad in some 
respect is frequently not only to label them imperfect, but also to censure or to 
reprimand.  But censure is inappropriate when someone fails to do what is best 
because they cannot do so.  Although blame can rightfully accompany failures to 
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be good as well as failures to discharge obligations, in both cases it is fitting only 
for someone who could have done otherwise.  For someone who could not have 
done otherwise, it is appropriate to merely withhold admiration. 
 
7.3 Knowledge and Practical Interests 
 
If the above arguments are compelling, the position outlined in section one 
emerges in tact.  However, as we shall see shortly, there is some reason to 
suppose that epistemic evaluation depends not only on a belief’s (indirect) 
relationship to truth, but also on practical interests.  At least, whether or not we 
are intuitively inclined to ascribe knowledge seems to depend upon relevant 
practical interests. This is of course related to the view that we looked at in 
chapter five that epistemic normativity is instrumental normativity.  
Nevertheless, as is so often the case in philosophy, we can improve our 
understanding of a question by addressing it from several perspectives.  
Moreover, we can now draw on insights from the positive account of epistemic 
normativity developed over the past two chapters.   
 
Given my concern with the nature of epistemic normativity, it might seem 
surprising that I have said so little about the nature of knowledge.  However, 
several of the elements of my view are in place.  Since Plato it has been widely 
thought that knowledge is true belief plus some normative element such as 
warrant or justification.  There must be some normative element involved 
because knowledge is valuable, and subject to epistemic evaluation, in a way that 
mere true belief is not.  Now, I have argued that the evaluative element of 
knowledge depends upon epistemic virtue and its relationship to truth.  So, 
roughly, on my account, I know some proposition p if p is true, if I believe that p 
and if I have acquired p virtuously.  This is not an analysis, but a list of three 
necessary conditions.  Nevertheless, I think it accounts for most of what we want 
to say about knowledge.13  However, the point for present purposes is that I take 
the difference between knowledge and mere true belief to be something 
normative associated with truth as the end of epistemic activity. 
                                                         
13 For a far more detailed account of knowledge in the virtue-theoretic tradition, and a proposal 
for how to deal with Gettier cases, see Zagzebski (1996: 293–9). 
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Let’s consider a reason to suppose that I am mistaken about this.  Jason Stanley 
describes the following two scenarios: 
 
Low Stakes: Hannah and her wife Sarah are driving home on a Friday 
afternoon.  They plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit their 
paychecks.  It is not important to do so, as they have no impending bills.  But 
as they drive past their bank, they notice that the lines inside are very long, 
as they often are on Friday afternoons.  Hannah says, ‘I know the bank will 
open tomorrow, since I was there just two weeks ago on Saturday morning.  
So we can deposit our paychecks tomorrow morning.’ 
 
High Stakes: Hannah and her wife Sarah are driving home on a Friday 
afternoon.  They plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit their 
paychecks.  Since they have an impending bill coming due, and very little in 
their account, it is very important that they deposit their paychecks by 
Saturday.  Hannah notes that she was at the bank two weeks before on a 
Saturday morning, and it was open.  But, as Sarah points out, banks do 
change their hours.  Hannah says, ‘I guess you’re right, I don’t know that the 
bank will be open tomorrow.’ (2005: 3–4) 
 
Now, Stanley suggests that Hannah is right in both cases.  In the first scenario 
she knows that the bank will be open on Saturday morning.  In the second 
scenario she doesn’t know this.  However, the only difference between the two 
cases is that in High Stakes it is important to deposit the cheque, whereas in Low 
Stakes it is not.  So, if these linguistic intuitions represent reality, ascriptions of 
knowledge would seem to depend on practical interests.  
 
In truth, my intuitions concerning these cases don’t carry much conviction.  I 
doubt one would feel much inclined to challenge Hannah in either case, but it 
seems to me that one could do so without manifesting any linguistic 
incompetence or conceptual confusion.  Consider a variant combining the two 
cases: 
 
Low Stakes*: Hannah and her wife Sarah are driving home on a Friday 
afternoon.  They plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit their 
paychecks.  It is not important to do so, as they have no impending bills.  But 
as they drive past their bank, they notice that the lines inside are very long, 
as they often are on Friday afternoons.  Hannah says, ‘I know the bank will 
open tomorrow, since I was there just two weeks ago on Saturday morning.  
So we can deposit our paychecks tomorrow morning.’  But, as Sarah points 
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out, banks do change their hours.  Hannah says, ‘I guess you’re right, I don’t 
know that the bank will be open tomorrow.’ 
 
Quite likely the emphasis in Hannah’s last sentence would be on ‘know’ - ‘I 
guess you’re right, I don’t know that the bank will be open tomorrow’.  She 
might also accompany her assertion with a roll of the eyes and cast her mind 
back to philosophy classes in which she had to admit that, no, she didn’t know 
that she wasn’t a brain in a vat.  I don’t wish to deny that we are more inclined to 
say Hannah has knowledge in Low Stakes than in the High Stakes.  Rather, the 
point is that we don’t have a particularly firm intuitive grasp of the level or type 
of justification required for knowledge ascriptions.  As indicated by Low Stakes*, 
the criteria for accepting knowledge ascriptions are not a straightforward 
function of the practical interests relevant to the situation.  It would be a mistake, 
therefore, to rest substantive conclusions upon our rather vague intuitions 
concerning such cases.  Still, I do accept that our inclination to ascribe 
knowledge or withhold ascriptions of knowledge on the basis of the practical 
interests presents a prima facie objection to the position I advocate. 
 
My view, then, is that Hannah knows that the bank is open in both cases 
regardless of her practical interests.  Knowledge does not depend upon financial 
solvency.  Our overall evaluation of epistemic agents can depend on practical 
interests, but not our epistemic evaluation of epistemic agents.  We need to note 
here that epistemic agents and their epistemic activities are subject to evaluation 
on a number of grounds which one can easily fail to distinguish.  We are never 
solely engaged in epistemic pursuit.  As well as being epistemic agents, we are 
also, for example, moral agents with certain roles in our societies.  Importantly 
epistemic activity provides the basis for action.  Instrumentalists are right that 
beliefs are the premises for practical syllogisms, and that true beliefs often enable 
us to satisfy our desires and successfully engage in valuable activities.  When 
these activities are of significant value, we have a non-epistemic duty to form 
beliefs with especial diligence.  W. K. Clifford (1877) was right that there are 
ethical reasons for belief.  So, a lighthouse keeper, for example, has a duty to 
form true beliefs with respect to the weather.  She has a duty to know when a 
storm is brewing.  Yet, this duty is a moral duty with respect to her epistemic 
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behaviour, not an epistemic duty.  The source of her duty is the moral obligation 
she has to protect the lives of seafarers. 
 
The varieties of justification can easily become obscured when we come to 
ascribe knowledge to a person.  So, given that a person has a true belief, we ask 
ourselves whether she is justified in holding that true belief before ascribing her 
knowledge.  But the sources of justification, the sources of normativity, are 
diverse.  One can be justified in one respect, but not another.  Epistemic 
justification, moral justification, prudential justification and aesthetic 
justification, as well as the many sources of justification associated with 
particular contingent practices, can cut across each other in all directions.  One’s 
belief can be epistemically justified insofar as it is the product of a virtuous 
disposition of thought.  However, the evidence for the belief might be 
insufficient for one to be pragmatically justified.  Thus, we might be inclined to 
say that a glance is sufficient to know that I have tied a knot securely if I am 
tying a dog to a lamppost, but not if I am a surgeon tying an artery.  In fact, from 
an epistemic perspective – the appropriate perspective from which to judge 
knowledge claims – one has an equal claim to knowledge in both cases 
(assuming that a glance is an equally reliable method).  Yet, it would be 
reasonable to call into question the surgeon’s belief, and we might do that by 
asking, “do you really know that the patient’s artery is tied properly?”  The 
surgeon is not pragmatically justified and he is not justified in holding his belief 
in an all-things-considered sense. 
 
These examples show that ascriptions of knowledge have a useful social 
function.14  We frequently use ‘knowledge’ as an honorific term to indicate that a 
belief is justified all-things-considered.  This is a perfectly legitimate use outside 
the context of philosophical epistemology.  Moreover, we use the tern 
‘knowledge’ as an honorific for epistemic agents.  To say that someone has 
knowledge, that he is knowledgeable, is to praise him in a certain way.  It 
suggests that when he acts on the basis of his beliefs we can reasonably expect 
him to succeed in his various pursuits.  Moreover, when others act on the basis of                                                         
14 Williams (2002: Ch. 3) develops this idea well, focusing particularly on the importance of 
accuracy and sincerity as social epistemic values. 
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his testimony they also can reasonably expect to succeed in their endeavours. As 
it sometimes put, knowledge is a collective good.  So, to ascribe someone 
knowledge is to evaluate that person as a valuable member of a community.  
Pace Descartes, knowledge does not require certainty but rather a certain degree 
of probability or reliability based on warrant.  Stating the precise degree of 
reliability necessary for knowledge is of course a difficult matter.  But 
fortunately there is no need to do so for present purposes.  The point is that the 
degree of certainty can sometimes fall below the level which we would require a 
reliable or trustworthy member of the community to possess for beliefs which are 
the basis for important purposes.  This being the case, we are inclined to 
withhold the honorific ‘knowledge’ in cases where someone is sufficiently 
justified to know a proposition, but is insufficiently justified to act as a reliable 
informant for the pursuit of our practical interests.  I submit that this is what 
explains our intuitions concerning knowledge ascriptions in the cases of Low 
Stakes and High Stakes. 
 
In conclusion, this chapter has been a case study for the approach to normativity 
I defended in chapter six and also an alternative to the approaches to epistemic 
normativity I rejected in chapters four and five, namely psychologism and 
instrumentalism.  I have taken the claim I made in the previous chapter, that the 
goal of epistemic practice is the formation of true beliefs and argued for it in 
greater detail.  In particular, I have considered the implications of this view for 
our practices of epistemic evaluation.  Thus, I have argued that the foci of 
epistemic evaluation are virtuous dispositions of thought and defended this view 
against two possible challenges.  The challenge of impossible obligations 
allowed me to apply the distinction between the good and the right in a definite 
context.  The challenge of practical interests allowed me to explain in more detail 
the way in which belief-formation can be evaluated against competing standards 
of normativity. 
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Chapter Eight 
Normative Force, Reasons and Desires 
 
I began this dissertation by proposing that we can profitably understand three 
influential philosophical arguments in terms of the difficulty naturalists face in 
locating the truth conditions for normative propositions.  I suggested that the 
particular problem was to identify value-makers, or truth-makers with normative 
force.  Value-makers not only justify actions and beliefs, but they also bind us 
and move us.  This can seem mysterious and it is especially hard to explain from 
a naturalistic perspective.  We have already seen some reasons for this and we 
shall explore the subject further in the final two chapters.  In this chapter, 
however, I want to focus primarily on whether it is possible to resolve the 
problem of normative force by grounding reasons in desire.  In fact, we shall see 
that a number of philosophers have thought that desires are the only possible 
explanation for the phenomenon of normative force since we need desires in 
order to explain motivation.  This would be very bad news indeed for the sort of 
realist, externalist account of reasons I have developed in the previous two 
chapters.  For the good-makers and right-makers I have identified are 
contingently related to desires at best.  Fortunately for my account, there are 
good reasons to think that a desire-based theory of reasons does not explain 
normative force, as I shall argue in this chapter. 
 
8.1 Desires-Based Reasons 
 
When I argued against instrumentalism with respect to epistemic norms in 
chapter five, I focussed mainly on the role of true beliefs.  But, although 
instrumentalists typically argue that truth is the proximate goal of belief 
formation, they also claim to have identified a final source of normativity in the 
satisfaction of an agent’s desires.  For instance, Kornblith writes that epistemic 
norms are ‘derived from our desires in a way that removes any mystery 
surrounding them’ (2002: 157), and again that ‘epistemic evaluation finds its 
natural ground in our desires in a way that makes truth something we should care 
about’ (2002: 161). Similarly, Papineau claims:  
 
There is always a species of derived personal value to having true beliefs 
that are relevant to action, for such truth will always help you to find a way 
of satisfying whatever desires you have.  (2003a: 17)  
  169 
 
When it comes to the final source or ground of normativity, naturalists avoid 
queer notions of objective, sui generis, final epistemic value.  Instead, they turn 
their reflection into their own breasts and discover desires.  I have already 
questioned whether the satisfaction of desires on the basis of true beliefs can 
explain the specifically epistemic dimension of epistemic normativity.  In this 
chapter, I would like to consider whether, in any case, desires are suitable 
candidates to ground normativity.  In this section, I look at the relationship 
between desires and motivation, the explanation of which is sometimes thought 
to require a desire-based theory of reasons (henceforth, DBR).  In the next 
section, I look at the relationship between desires and rationality.  I conclude that 
the two most common lines of arguments in favour of grounding normativity in 
desire do not work, and that DBR is inconsistent with our practices of reasoning 
about ends. 
 
The question of whether reasons can depend on, or be grounded in, desires is a 
major fault lines in metaethics.  Philosophers in the ‘yes’ camp include Foot 
(1972), Williams (1981), Smith (1994) and Schroeder (2007).  The ‘no’ camp 
includes Nagel (1970), Scanlon (1998), Dancy (2000), Foot (2001) and Parfit 
(2011).  As I remarked in chapter four, I favour metaphysical externalism with 
respect to reasons. I take practical reasons to stand objectively in favour of 
actions and theoretical reasons to stand objectively in favour of beliefs.  Subject 
to minor qualifications discussed below, I do not take it that desires stand 
objectively in favour of a belief or an action.  Our desires produce contingent 
needs, such as the need to have £30 in order to watch a football match.  
However, it is my view that the normative force of contingent needs depends 
entirely on whether there are independent reasons for pursuing the end.  So, I am 
in the ‘no’ camp. 
 
I am not, of course, the only philosopher to be wary of grounding reasons in 
subjective mental states.  Here is Thomas Nagel on the subject of ethical reasons: 
 
It will not in any case do to rest the motivational influence of ethical 
considerations on fortuitous or escapable inclinations.  Their hold on us 
must be deep, and it must be essentially tied to the ethical principles 
themselves, and to the conditions of their truth.  The alternative is to 
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abandon the objectivity of ethics.  This is a course which cannot be 
excluded in advance, but it should not be taken before serious attempts to 
rescue the subject have failed.  (1970: 6) 
  
Nagel is suggesting that grounding ethical reasons in ‘escapable inclinations’ is a 
method of last resort because it means abandoning objectivity.  If Nagel is right, 
and if there is a presumption in favour of moral objectivity, then there may be a 
burden of proof argument against desire-based theories of reasons in the 
vicinity.1  Moreover, it is very plausible that any presumption in favour of 
objectivity with respect to epistemic reasons is at least as strong as the 
presumption in favour of moral objectivity.  Most hard-nosed naturalists would 
agree that the presumption is stronger. 
 
If one is not persuaded of the merits of burden of proof arguments, or of this one 
in particular, it remains the case that for many philosophers the strongest 
argument in favour of DBR is the alleged impossibility of the alternative, namely 
an objective theory of reasons.2  Thus, Philippa Foot, who abandoned her 
commitment to DBR, remarks: 
 
I now wonder why, given the obvious indigestibility of the idea that 
morality is indeed a system of hypothetical imperatives, I should have 
accepted it even for a short time.  What seemed to force it on me was the 
sheer difficulty of showing a practical rationality that was independent of 
desire or interest.  (2001: 60–1) 
 
Explaining the normative force of reasons independently of desire is indeed a 
difficult task.  However, as we shall see, it is especially difficult for naturalists 
who need to identify scientifically available facts that can simultaneously explain 
and justify our actions.   
 
In the remainder of this section, I shall explain why it is sometimes thought an 
appeal to desires can help to solve questions concerning the normative force of 
reasons and then offer a number of reasons to doubt that desires can do the work                                                         
1 Burden of proof arguments are fairly common in the debate over moral realism (see, for 
example, Brink (1989: 23–4), Nagel (1986: 143) and Shafer-Landau (2003: Ch. 1). The debate 
concerning moral realism is closely related to questions of objectivity insofar as moral realists 
claim, among other things, that the truth conditions for normative propositions are mind-
independent. 
2 Finlay (2007: 6) makes the same point. 
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required of them.  In effect, this is a tu quoque argument designed to show that 
DBR has no particular advantage over an objective theory of reasons.  This 
undermines the motivation for DBR and, in doing so, strengthens any 
presumptive case for an objective theory of reasons.  One limitation of a tu 
quoque argument is that it will have little dialectical force for someone who does 
not recognise the presumptive case in favour of an objective theory of reasons.  I 
have of course argued for my own account of objective normative reasons.  
Rather than relying on the compelling nature of my positive account, however, I 
shall also argue directly against DBR in section 8.2 below.  Consequently, this 
chapter will be (i) a self-contained challenge to DBR, (ii) part of the supporting 
structure for my account of the right and the good and (iii) a further reason to 
think that instrumentalism is an inadequate account of epistemic normativity, 
and, hence (iv) a further reason to think that naturalism cannot account for value-
makers. 
  
The key idea that supports DBR is closely related to one of the main arguments 
for ethical non-cognitivism.  It starts from the observation that norms give us 
practical and theoretical reasons for action and belief.  Moreover, these reasons 
have a particular sort of power, which we sometimes call normative force.  By 
saying that reasons have normative force we mean that reasons both justify our 
actions, by standing in their favour, and also that they help to explain why we act 
as we do, by directly or indirectly motivating us.3  Thus, the normative force of 
reasons requires the possibility of coincidence between explanatory and 
justificatory reasons.  How, though, are we to explain this?  We might observe 
that, all things being equal, if one has recognised a normative reason, then to fail 
to respond appropriately to it is to be practically irrational.  Being appropriately 
responsive to normative reasons is at least part of what it means to be rational.  
But this is more a statement of the problem, than a solution.  For, why should the 
requirement to be rational have normative force?  Although the normative force 
                                                        
3 It is logically possible that there are also reasons which justify, but cannot explain action.  For 
instance, given mind-independence, normative realists must be willing to countenance the 
possibility of normative reasons that we cannot enter into cognitive contact with or that cannot 
motivate us.  Perhaps, for example, there are justificatory reasons that are beyond human 
comprehension.  Of course, justificatory, but non-explanatory reasons do no constitute an 
interesting category from the perspective of practical rationality. 
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of reasons is a familiar part of experience, explaining this phenomenon is one of 
the more formidable tasks in philosophy.   
 
However we understand the phenomenon of normative force, it places 
constraints upon what a theory of reasons must be like.  Any theory of reasons 
must be compatible with the fact they make claims on us and have the potential 
to motivate us.4  Ideally, a theory of reasons will also explain their normative 
force.  For instance, Plato’s metaphysics of value attempts to locate the ultimate 
source of reasons and normativity in the Form of the Good towards which 
everything strives by its nature.  Arguably, the Unmoved Mover of the 
Metaphysics plays a similar role in Aristotle’s account of flourishing.  Of course, 
naturalists are disinclined to appeal to spooky entities like Platonic Forms or the 
Unmoved Mover.  However, naturalists also find it difficult to locate reasons 
anywhere other than in an agent’s subjective mental states.  For, if we recall the 
image from chapter one of Hume contemplating a newly disenchanted nature, we 
will also recall Hume’s view that the content of our sensory impressions is 
always compatible with motivational indifference.  We can see that the world is 
thus and so, and we can simply shrug.  Whether or not we are at all motivated by 
normative reasons depends on our antecedent mental states.  In part, this is a 
matter of what we know about the descriptive facts of the matter.  For example, 
apportioning one’s belief to the evidence requires understanding the evidence, 
and that can require a lengthy process of education.  Nevertheless, agents with 
the same background knowledge with respect to descriptive facts can still 
respond differently because of differences in character, in virtue, in moral 
sensitivity and the like. 
 
The fact that external states of affairs are not sufficient to motivate, even 
defeasibly, should be enough to persuade motivational internalists that reasons 
must be internal mental states.  But it is also likely to persuade naturalists who 
think that there is any reliable connection between normative reasons and                                                         
4 To say this is compatible with neutrality regarding the question of whether there is a necessary 
internal connection between recognising a reason and being motivated to act on it. Although 
there are various points of contact between the debate over desire-based reasons and the debate 
over motivational internalism, the two debates are distinct.  For instance, one might deny that 
reasons are mental states whilst maintaining that the recognition of a reason necessarily motivates 
any (rational) agent to act. 
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motivation.  For, as we have seen in chapter three, the scientific stance aspires to 
subjectless knowledge and is predicated upon the interchangeability of 
investigators.  However, the fact that only some agents appear to recognise, and 
to respond to, particular external normative reasons is not fully explained by 
differences in the agents’ background knowledge of scientifically given facts. 
Along these lines, it is sometimes claimed that the normative implications of any 
state of affairs are ‘essentially contestable’.  Consequently, reports of external 
normative reasons cannot be replicated and verified, and naturalism cannot 
accommodate them.5  In the absence of some external state of affairs that would 
motivate anyone who came into cognitive content with it, such as the Form of the 
Good, naturalists are left to focus on the motivational aspects of an agent’s 
psychology.  These also appear more scientifically tractable because the 
explanatory power of normative reasons can then be explained in terms of the 
causal power of mental states.  If the causal powers of mental states are still 
philosophically puzzling, naturalists will argue that they are at least part of the 
domain of empirical psychology. 
 
So, we have the following chain of thought.  If reasons have normative force, if 
normative force motivates, and if the only scientifically respectable source of 
motivation is an agent’s mental states, it follows that reasons must depend on 
mental states.  Moreover, it follows from certain widely accepted views about the 
nature of action and motivation that the relevant mental states must be desires.  
For, according to the received view, mental states can be divided into beliefs and 
desires, which jointly explain action.  Thus, I might open my fridge because I 
believe there is fruit juice inside and because I desire to slake my thirst.  But, the 
belief and the desire play different roles in this explanation.  Borrowing 
Anscombe’s (1957) helpful and widely used metaphor, beliefs and desires have 
different ‘directions of fit’.  Whereas we change the world to fit our desires, we 
change our beliefs to fit the world.  As it is only on the basis of desires that we 
change the world, it is often maintained that desires are necessary for motivation                                                         
5 One could also put the point in terms of scientific ‘observation sentences’.  Thus, according to 
Quine: ‘An observation sentence is one on which all speakers of the language give the same 
verdict when given the same concurrent stimulation.  To put the point negatively, an observation 
sentence is one that is not sensitive to differences in past experience within the speech 
community’ (1969a: 86–7).  Clearly, on this definition, observation sentences cannot have 
references to external normative reasons as their content. 
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and that beliefs are not sufficient.6  My belief that there is fruit juice inside the 
fridge will not motivate me to open the fridge in the absence of a desire to slake 
my thirst.7  Of course, beliefs and desires are supposed to explain action jointly.  
So, my desire to slake my thirst will not motivate me to open the fridge unless I 
also believe that there is fruit juice inside.  My desire will, however, defeasibly 
motivate me to find some appropriate means to its satisfaction, whereas the belief 
in the absence of the relevant desire will not have any particular motivational 
force.  Whereas a belief is merely a vehicle for representing how things stand in 
the world, a desire is an intrinsically motivating mental state.  So, if reasons can 
motivate us, and if motivation necessarily depends on desires, then reasons must 
depend on desires and DBR is true.8 
 
We have, then, the principal argument in favour of DBR, namely that it is 
supposed to provide the best explanation of the motivational force of normative 
reasons.  I am not, however, persuaded that the task of explaining normative 
motivation can be accomplished so easily or that desires provide us with the right 
sort of basis for normative force.  To see why, let us look at the relationship 
between desire and motivation in a little more detail.  Now, it is certainly true 
that we all have the experience of being motivated by desires.  However, the fact 
that desires can (and regularly do) motivate us does not demonstrate by itself that 
desires are necessary (or sufficient) for motivation.  Indeed, elementary 
phenomenology suggests that they are not.  We regularly experience being 
motivated by all manner of reasons other than desire.  For a start, there are near 
relatives such as wanting, wishing, yearning, craving, fancying and the like.  But                                                         
6 This is sometimes called the ‘Humean theory of motivation’ (e.g. Smith 1994; Schroeder 2007).  
The attribution is based on Hume’s claim that ‘reason alone can never be a motive to any action 
of the will’ (T II, 3, III, 413).  For a detailed discussion of the relationship between Hume’s 
theory of motivation and the ‘Humean theory of motivation’ see Radcliffe (1999). 
7 It is also necessary that belief and the desire are appropriately related or put together.  For, I 
could believe that there is fruit juice in the fridge, desire to slake my thirst, but fail to bring the 
two mental states together in practical reason.  For example, I might not realise that my belief 
provides me with a way to satisfy my desire, or the fact that I believe that there is fruit juice in 
the fridge might slip my mind.  Schueler (2009) develops this point into an argument against the 
Humean Theory of Motivation.  In order to avoid saying that we only deliberate on the basis of 
desires – a psychologically implausible claim – Humeans typically argue that desires need only 
be background conditions, which can be below the level of conscious cognition.  However, 
Schueler argues that in order for us to put beliefs and desires together in practical reason, we 
must be able to represent desires and that this requirement is in tension with the claim that desires 
can be subconscious. 
8 Schroeder (2007: 6) calls this the ‘classical argument’ for a Humean theory of reasons. 
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there are also various motivational influences which run contrary or tangentially 
to desire.  The following examples spring to mind: acting from habit, copying 
others, acting from grief, from a sense of mischief or devilry, from a sense of 
duty or obligation, from a spirit of contrariness, from sheer impulse and due to 
the force of circumstances.  When we hear someone saying ‘I desire to φ, but 
intend to ψ’ it is not normally a sign of practical irrationality or conceptual 
confusion, but an indication that there are motivating reasons other than desire.9 
 
Although it is difficult to see how these appearances could be denied, Michael 
Smith (1987: 45–50) has argued against the significance of this sort of 
elementary phenomenology claim on the grounds that it depends on a mistaken 
‘phenomenological conception of desire’.  He characterises the mistaken view as 
follows:  
 
Desires are like sensations in that they have phenomenological content 
essentially, but differ from sensations in that they have propositional 
content as well.  (1987: 48) 
 
In order to defeat this view, Smith discusses various examples in which our 
desires seem to be revealed to us through our observable behaviour rather than 
being immediately present to consciousness.  For instance, someone who avows 
a desire to be a musician, but takes no steps in that direction, might come to 
realise that he had no such desire and really just wanted the approval of his 
music-loving mother.  Smith then argues that the fact that we can be deceived 
about whether or not we have a particular desire is inconsistent with the 
phenomenological conception of desire, according to which desires have 
phenomenological content essentially.  Smith concludes: 
 
If there is no reason why any theorist should accept a phenomenological 
conception of desire, as we have seen that there is not, then it can hardly be 
an objection to the Humean’s theory [DBR] that we are unable to 
introspect the presence of each and every desire that he says we have.  
(1987: 49) 
 
                                                        
9 Furthermore, it may well be an indication of being a mature rational agent.  See section 8.2 
below. 
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One obvious line of response is to question why Smith forces upon his opponents 
the view that desires must have phenomenological content essentially as opposed 
to potentially.  But, in any case, Smith’s conclusion looks too ambitious.  Even if 
it is true that we cannot provide a phenomenological analysis of desire, this does 
not show that there is nothing to be learnt from the phenomenology of desire.  
The same is true of other mental states such as beliefs, intentions and emotions.  
There is no general principle to the effect that it must be possible to provide a 
phenomenological analysis of a mental state in order for phenomenological data 
to count as evidence concerning the nature of that mental state.   
 
Moreover, the fact that we can be mistaken about what motivates us does not 
show that we are often mistaken or that we are deceived in a systematic fashion 
concerning our motivational influences.  Indeed, the very fact that we are 
sometimes able to step back, reflect and recognise that our desires were not what 
we took them to be seems to be more a reason for optimism concerning our 
ability to recognise our motivational influences than a reason to be sceptical 
about the phenomenology of desire.  The objection is not, as Smith suggests, 
‘that we are unable to introspect the presence of each and every desire’ that the 
proponent of DBR must say we have.  For, Smith is right that it is implausible to 
suppose that we are infallible with respect to our own desires.  But the concern is 
that the claim that all of our actions are motivated by desire could only be true if 
our everyday phenomenology were radically mistaken. 
  
Rather than questioning the basic phenomenology of motivation and desire, it is 
perhaps more likely that an advocate of DBR would accuse me of equivocation.  
Quite likely it will be pointed out that when it is claimed that desires are 
necessary for motivation, the term ‘desire’ is being used in a special sense, such 
that it is essentially a matter of definition that all voluntary action depends on 
desire.  As a result, it might be objected that my earlier comments on the 
phenomenology of desire miss the point.  A desire, in the sense in which it is 
often contrasted with a belief, is merely a placeholder for a pro-attitude that 
disposes an agent to act.10  Thus, it is trivially true that if an agent hadn’t desired                                                         
10 See, for instance, Smith (1987: 50–4; 1994: 117) and Schroeder (2007: 146). 
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to act as he did, he would not have done so; that is assuming that he was not 
subject to influences beyond his control, in which case the action was 
involuntary.  So, when we hear someone say ‘I desire to φ, but intend to ψ’, we 
should interpret this to mean that although they desire to φ, their desire to ψ is 
stronger.  Although it is not entirely clear how we should determine the relative 
strengths of competing desires, it can be stipulated that our actions reflect the 
balance of our desires.  Indeed, if an agent’s action does not reflect the balance of 
her desires, there is a sense in which she is not the author of her own actions.  
Rather she is buffeted by external motivational influences, which are unrelated to 
the goals and projects that help to make up her identity. 
 
In reply to this, I do not deny that ‘desire’ is sometimes used as a placeholder for 
a pro-attitude, or that this practice has some advantages.  It is worth emphasising, 
nevertheless, that this is a special, technical usage.  Hence, we cannot assume 
that the sorts of things we would normally say about ‘desires’ in anything like 
the colloquial sense will apply to ‘desires’ in the technical sense.   Indeed, the 
technical sense is rather opaque insofar as we are still left with the task of 
distinguishing within the category of desire the various ways in which we are in 
fact motivated.  For, it would appear difficult to say much that is true concerning 
all the members of the heterogeneous group of desires-as-pro-attitudes.  Indeed, 
it looks like all that holds the category together is the fact that to have a desire 
that p is to be disposed to bring it about that p.  If so, however, we cannot rule 
out the possibility that there could be things which are very unlike desires in the 
colloquial sense that could count as desires in the technical sense.  In particular, 
for all that has been said, it could turn out that evaluative beliefs or cognitive 
contact with external reasons, will count as desires in the technical sense. 
 
Smith (1987: 56) argues that there is something incoherent about evaluative 
beliefs, or ‘quasi-beliefs’ because they would simultaneously have contradictory 
directions of fit.  Insofar as an evaluative belief that p is a belief it would persist 
in the face of the perception that p.  Insofar as a desire that p is motivating, it 
would not persist in the face of the perception that p.  For the realisation of a 
desire extinguishes it.  Firstly, however, it is far from clear that the metaphor of a 
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direction of fit is sufficiently robust to support this sort of logical argument.11  
Secondly, we need not allow that an evaluative belief is simply a belief and a 
desire pasted together in such a way that it inherits the modal properties of its 
constituent parts.  Rather an evaluative belief is the judgement that some state of 
affairs is a normative reason for action.  For instance, it may be the judgment that 
bringing someone pleasure is good in the circumstances.  But, then, there is 
nothing obviously incoherent about saying that this judgment will motivate us to 
bring about the good and persist when the good is brought about.  Although we 
will no longer be motivated to bring about the good after we have brought it 
about, we might well persist in our belief that it is a good. 
 
If it is a merely logical, or definitional constraint that an action must be 
motivated by a desire, then to deny that evaluative beliefs or external reasons 
could count as ‘desires’ is to take up a substantive philosophical position.  
However, there is very strong prima facie evidence that evaluative beliefs and 
external reasons do count as desires in the technical sense.  For, when we explain 
the behaviour of mature rational agents, we are more likely to appeal to objective 
features of the world or beliefs about what is valuable, than to desires in the 
colloquial sense.12  Perhaps, it will be argued that we are radically and 
systematically deceived in thinking that we are motivated by anything other than 
our desires. But I do not know how this view could be argued for, if not on the 
basis that we are necessarily motivated by desires.  And that is of course 
precisely the claim in question. 
 
In summary, if the term ‘desire’ is understood in line with common usage, then 
desires are neither necessary nor sufficient for motivation and we cannot be sure 
that they will explain why someone acted as he did.  It is common for us act on 
the basis of motivations that are not desires and it is also common for us to act 
contrary to our desires as a result of competing motivational influences, or as a 
                                                        
11 See Schueler (1991) for development of this sort of criticism. 
12 See Ratcliffe (2007) for a persuasive defence of the view that it is a shared world of norms that 
enables us to understand and predict each other’s behaviour (rather than belief-desire 
psychology).  He remarks that when we ask why someone acted as they did, ‘what is often 
expected is a description of a situation that makes clear the relevant norms of activity, rather than 
an account of people’s psychological predicaments’ (2007: 97). 
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result of depression or apathy.13  There is a clear phenomenological licence for 
these claims and Smith’s attempt to undermine it is not compelling.  If, on the 
other hand, desires are understood in the technical desire-as-pro-attitude sense, 
then it is a substantive question as to whether or not evaluative beliefs or external 
reasons could fulfil their role.  It seems at first blush that they could.  At least, in 
the absence of further independent argument, we are not forced to accept DBR as 
the only possible explanation of the motivational force of normative reasons.   
 
8.2 Desires and the Rationality of Ends 
 
Although I have offered reasons to doubt that desires are necessary for 
motivation, I have not denied that desires can and do motivate us.  So, for all I 
have said, it could be that amongst the heterogeneous category of desires-as-pro-
attitudes there is a category of mental states which are properly called ‘desires’ in 
something like the colloquial sense and transmit normative force from reasons to 
action or constitute normative reasons in themselves.  Although I have argued 
that DBR is not the only possible explanation of the motivational force of 
normative reasons, or indeed the most plausible, I have not shown that DBR is 
false.   
 
In this section, I would like to consider a second line of argument for DBR, 
which depends upon privileging a particular view of the nature of rationality.  
Even if desires are not necessary for motivation, it might be argued that it is only 
when we are motivated to act in the service of our desires that we motivated to 
act rationally.  In other words, it is only in the form of desires that explanatory 
and justificatory (or motivating and normative) reasons come together.  For, it 
might seem that if we are motivated by anything other than our desires, we are 
alienated from our ends and, to that extent, less than fully rational, autonomous 
agents.  On this basis, it is sometimes argued that there is nothing more to 
practical rationality than the rationality one employs in adopting the means to the 
satisfaction of one’s ends.  As we shall see below, this appears to have been 
Hume’s view.  It also seems to be one of the ideas motivating the kind of 
instrumentalism we encountered in chapter five.                                                         
13 See Cholbi (2011) for more on motivation and depression. 
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We already have the resources for one response to this line of argument.  If 
desires are understood in the colloquial sense, then it is psychologically and 
phenomenologically implausible to think that they exhaust our ends.  As 
Schueler writes: 
 
It is difficult to believe that anyone, let alone everyone, reasons on the basis of 
nothing but her own desires all the time.  That would be a level of self-
absorption almost beyond belief and certainly far beyond the ordinary.  (2009: 
117) 
   
If, however, desires are just dispositions to achieve whatever ends we have, then 
DBR is not supported in any interesting sense by the claim that rationality is a 
matter of successfully pursuing our ends. Nothing substantive has been 
demonstrated about our ends, and they could be quite unrelated to our desires-in-
the-colloquial-sense.  For example, they could be objective reasons. 
 
As with the main argument of the previous section, this response is a limited 
defensive manoeuvre that blunts the argument in favour of DBR.  Unless one is 
persuaded that there is a presumptive argument against DBR, globally or with 
respect to particular categories of reasons, one would need further arguments in 
order to adjudicate between DBR and other theories.  In this instance, however, I 
think we can push a little harder against the account of rationality on offer and in 
so doing apply direct pressure against DBR.  Is it really the case that our 
normative reasons are solely given by what we desire?  I shall argue in due 
course that the answer is ‘no’. 
 
The view that there is nothing more to rationality than instrumental rationality is 
widespread in economics, game theory and some areas of the social sciences.  
For instance, the following quotation is from an introductory textbook on 
decision theory: 
 
Instrumental rationality presupposes that the decision maker has some 
aims, such as becoming rich and famous, or helping as many starving 
refugees as possible.  The aim is external to decision theory, and it is 
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widely thought that the aim cannot in itself be irrational … If someone 
strongly desires to count blades of grass on courthouse lawns, just for the 
fun of it, that might very well qualify as rational.  (Peterson 2009: 5)14 
 
Notice the transition from ‘instrumental rationality’ to ‘rationality’ simpliciter.  
Very plausibly, though, the natural response is to object that it is irrational to 
spend one’s time counting blades of grass.  Peterson’s reply that ‘everyone 
should be free to decide for herself what is important in life’ (2009: 5) picks up 
on the important connection between rational agency and autonomy.  
Nevertheless, it looks like a weak defence of a life dedicated to counting blades 
of grass.  For, notwithstanding my earlier argument that there is always some 
epistemic value to the possession of true beliefs, it is very hard to see how it 
could qualify as rational to spend one’s life counting blades of grass when to do 
so is to incur a very large opportunity cost and be unresponsive to more pressing 
and important reasons.  One cannot make a trivial goal important by an act of 
will, any more than one can make an immoral goal moral by an act of will.  Of 
course, one can decide to make a trivial goal an important part of one’s life.  
However, to think that what is an important part of one’s life is important tout 
court would be to have an uncommonly high view of one’s own significance.  
We might be inclined to think that someone committed to counting blades of 
grass is a harmless eccentric who should be left in peace, but it is rather pushing 
it to claim that his activities are important. 
 
The example of counting blades of grass is a relatively benign example of 
irrationality.  Here is Hume in provocative mood: 
 
‘Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to 
the scratching of my finger.  ‘Tis not contrary to reason for me to chuse my 
total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly 
unknown to me.  (T II, 3, III, 416) 
 
We saw in chapter one how this idea comes from Hume’s naturalism.  But, as it 
is sometimes put, this is the sort of thing that only someone in the grip of a                                                         
14 Peterson is of course referring to an example discussed by Rawls (1999: 379–80).  Oddly, 
Peterson thinks that for Rawls a life-plan centred on counting blades of grass is irrational.  In 
fact, Rawls writes that ‘if we allow that his [the grass counter’s] nature is to enjoy his activity, 
and that there is no feasible way to alter his condition, then surely a rational plan for him will 
center around this activity’ (1999: 380). 
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theory could sincerely assert.  One feels compelled to respond that it is very 
evidently contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the world to scratching 
one’s finger.  Indeed, anyone who suggested otherwise would seem to be beyond 
the pale of rational discourse.  Were such a claim sincerely asserted, we would 
have cause to wonder whether the speaker had lost their grip on reason 
altogether.  They would be a danger to themselves and to others.   
 
Well, Hume may have lost his grip on the concept of reason, but not of course on 
reason itself.  He did not mean to assert that there is no reason to prefer the 
scratching one’s finger to the destruction of the world.  Rather, Hume meant that 
there is no rational requirement such that we ought to prefer the one state of 
affairs to the other.  It is our passions, such as benevolence and resentment, 
which provide us with reasons determine our preferences and they are not, in the 
main, subject to rational scrutiny.15  Hence, Hume’s famous claim: 
 
Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never 
pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.  (T II, 3, III, 415)  
 
This is of a course a highly restrictive proposal concerning the scope and nature 
of reason.  Our ends are given by our passions and rational activity is merely a 
matter of discovering the means to those ends. 
 
So, Humean instrumentalism is a form of anti-rationalism insofar as it denies the 
possibility of rationally evaluating ends. Although anti-rationalism has gained 
considerable popularity in recent decades, it is clearly a minority view in the 
history of philosophy.16  Hume himself acknowledged that ‘this opinion may 
appear somewhat extraordinary’ (T II, 3, III, 415).  Of course, this is not 
necessarily a fault and may not concern forward-thinking naturalists.                                                          
15 Hume mentions, and then immediately seems to retract, an exception: ‘a passion must be 
accompany’d with some false judgment, in order to its being unreasonable; and even then ‘tis not 
the passion, properly speaking, which is unreasonable, but the judgment’ (T II, 3, III, 416).  
Rather optimistically, I think, he continues that ‘the moment we perceive the falsehood of any 
supposition, or the insufficiency of any means our passions yield to our reason without any 
opposition’ (T II, 3, III, 416). 
16 As a socio-political aside, it is surely no coincidence that the rise of anti-rationalism in public 
policy debates has occurred against the backdrop of the failed Soviet experiment.  A large part of 
anti-rationalism’s appeal is its apparent support for economic and social liberalism and its 
opposition to top-down planning and the idea of a common good that overrides the individual 
good.  It also chimes with the more extreme, my-blood-or-thine, libertarian tendency of some 
contemporary economic thought. 
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Nevertheless, it does seem that anti-rationalists have some explanatory work to 
do, perhaps in the form of an error theory.  For it has seemed to many 
philosophers that rational deliberation about ends lies at the very heart of ethics, 
broadly understood.  For example, one might see the central task of Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics as being to rationally evaluate and adjudicate between the 
lives of hedonism, civic duty and intellectual contemplation; each life governed 
by a different conception of the end of human flourishing.  Moreover, the 
considerations Aristotle finally presents in favour of a life structured towards the 
end of intellectual contemplation appear intelligible as rational arguments.  On 
the instrumentalist view of rationality, it is difficult to make sense of this. 
 
The process of moral or normative education is also difficult to make sense of 
from a Humean perspective.17  Without doubt, instrumental rationality plays an 
important role in our lives.  But, given their problem-solving abilities, it also 
seems that something very much like instrumental rationality plays an important 
role in the lives of nonhuman animals.  Certainly, we can use the categories of 
belief-desire psychology in order to construct plausible explanations of animal 
behaviour.  Thus, we might say that the dog ran towards the tree because it 
desired to continue chasing the cat and because it believed the cat was in the 
tree.18  Moreover, a dog’s behaviour is sensitive to its beliefs, or representational 
states.  It may decide not to climb the tree if it realises that the cat it was chasing 
has now escaped over the rooftops.  But, what the dog will not do is stop to 
consider whether chasing cats is really such a good idea after all.  Instead, it will 
attempt to satisfy whatever desires it happens to have. 
 
The predicament of a human infant seems to be very much like that of many 
nonhuman animals.  At first his behaviour is entirely the product of instinct, but 
he soon learns that he can modify the world through his behaviour in order to 
satisfy his desires; that is, he becomes an instrumental reasoner.  But, unlike all                                                         
17 The structure of the following argument is much influenced by MacIntyre’s (1999) book 
Dependent, Rational Animals.  See also Hacker-Wright (2009) who emphasises the non-
instrumental reasoning of educators and caregivers. 
18 In the absence of a mode of representation for propositional content one might deny that 
nonhuman animals have beliefs or desires in a strict sense.  Be that as it may, they clearly have 
analogue mental states which enable them to satisfy their goals on the basis of representations of 
the environments. 
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or most nonhuman animals, a child also learns that it can be better to modify his 
desires than to modify the world.  Sometimes, this may be a matter of learning 
that frustrated desires are painful and, so, acquiring a higher-order desire to quell 
desires that are frequently frustrated.  But a child also begins to understand that 
he is one person among many, and that there are considerations and reasons for 
action that may be quite unrelated to his desires or immediate viewpoint.  Thus, 
through a process of education and socialisation, children learn to mould and 
transform their desires in response to the needs and desires of others around 
them.  For instance, Brock and Reader describe the process of moral education 
thus: 
 
We have to learn that our own needs are not the only ones, still less the only 
ones that matter, and that our needs exist in a universe full of needs.  
Learning to recognize and respond to the needs of others is essential if we 
are to become mature moral agents.  (2002: 287) 
 
As I argued in chapter six, a universe full of needs is a universe full of reasons.  
In time a child’s understanding of what counts as a reason expands beyond his 
own desires and his viewpoint becomes increasingly objective.19  In particular, 
he starts to question whether his desires are justified in light of the reasons for 
action he has learnt to recognise.  If he realises that his desires are not justified, 
he attempts to change them accordingly.  
 
The ability to reason about ends seems distinctively human and it is only when a 
child learns to do so that it makes sense to think of him as a rational agent.  We 
rely on the instrumental rationality of animals and pre-rational children in order 
to modify their behaviour with a system of rewards and punishments that 
correlates with their desires.  But, once children learn to question their desires, 
we can offer them reasons to change their behaviour.  Some of these reasons will 
be instrumental to their ends, but many will not be.  Moreover, it is only when a 
child is able to reason about his ends that he becomes responsible for this 
behaviour.  We can reward or punish a pre-rational child or a nonhuman animal, 
but we cannot properly speaking praise or blame them.  If this picture is more or 
less correct, then the development of instrumental rationality is merely a                                                         
19 For a detailed account of child’s development in response to the needs of others and her 
increasingly objective view of moral reasons see Hoffman (2000: Ch.3).  
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preliminary step along the path to becoming mature rational agents.  It is a 
mistake, therefore, to identify instrumental rationality with rationality simpliciter. 
 
Perhaps it will be replied that instrumentalism has the resources to explain what 
it is to reason about our ends in the only way possible, namely by considering 
our ends in the light of our existing reasons.  As our reasons are given by our 
desires, this just means bringing our desires into equilibrium.  Presumably this 
would mean making our desires mutually consistent and factoring in their 
relative strengths.  Perhaps, for instance, there is a tension between my desire to 
spend the afternoon watching amusing videos on YouTube and my desire to 
spend the afternoon writing an article on metaethics.  But, perhaps I also desire 
to publish a paper on metaethics in order to increase my chances of securing an 
academic job.  Moreover, securing an academic job might fit with a number of 
my other desires, such as pursuing professional research into philosophy, 
working in an intellectually stimulating environment and paying the bills.  There 
is, then, an obvious way to bring these desires into equilibrium.  If I am rational, 
and if I am not weak-willed, I will abandon my desire to spend the afternoon 
watching amusing videos on YouTube.  In that way, my remaining desires will 
be consistent. 
 
But, of course, it is also possible that my over-riding desire is to watch videos of 
people slipping up on banana skins and that I am willing to structure my life 
towards the satisfaction of this desire.  It might be pointed out to me that I am 
missing out on far greater goods such as intellectual stimulation, creative 
enterprise and the dissemination of knowledge.  But if I do not desire any of 
these goods, or if my desire for these goods is much weaker than my desire to 
watch videos of people falling over, there will be no rational pressure to modify 
my existing desires.  It might even be claimed that it is an advantage of the view 
in question that it makes my behaviour immune to rational criticism so long as 
there is no inconsistency among my desires.  The thought here would be that as 
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‘ought’ implies ‘can’, it is not fair to criticise me on the grounds that I am not 
motivated by desires I do not have.20 
 
It strikes me, however, that it is an unattractive consequence of Humean anti-
rationalism that we would not be able to provide reasons why someone with an 
impoverished, but consistent set of desires should broaden their horizons.  Far 
worse, though, is the possibility that my over-riding desire is to act in a way that 
is immoral.  Perhaps, my desire to shoot an innocent man is in tension with my 
desire to avoid the sight of blood.  But perhaps I also desire to own a gun, to run 
the risk of imprisonment and to revel in the misery of the victim’s relatives.  
Here, if I am rational, and if I am not weak-willed, it looks like I should 
overcome my desire to avoid the sight of blood and shoot an innocent man.  This 
is an intolerable conclusion, but I do not see how it can be ruled out if the only 
constraints upon our reasons are that they are apportioned to the strength of our 
desires and mutually consistent. 
 
It might be suggested that we should add some further condition to rule out 
deviant, irrational or immoral desires counting as reasons.21   Thus, one might 
appeal to something like what we would desire after undergoing cognitive 
psychotherapy (Brandt 1979), or what we would desire if we were in possession 
of all the facts, or in possession of all the relevant facts.  However, if we knew all 
the relevant facts, it is very likely that this would change our view of the world 
and, so, change our desires.  We might then want to appeal to what a fully 
informed self, or ideal advisor, would desire for us as we currently are.  But, of 
course, our current desires are the product of historically contingent processes 
some of which (perhaps trauma, or exposure to advertising) may have corrupted 
us to such an extent that no amount of information or cognitive psychotherapy 
could cure us of our irrational desires.  Perhaps, then, we might want to appeal to 
what our fully informed self would want for us if we had had a ‘cognitively 
unimpeachable history’.22                                                         
20Shafer-Landau (2003: 181–3) reconstructs this sort of argument on the basis of comments made 
by Williams (1989).  Of course, this line of argument only works on the questionable assumption 
that desires are necessary for motivation. 
21 See, for example, Smith (1995; 2009) and Schroeder (2007: 83–5). 
22 See Zimmerman (2003: 391) for this proposal.  See also Smith (2009: 100–1). 
  187 
 
There is an extensive literature on ideal advisors, much of it in relation to 
preference utilitarianism.  Prominent in the literature are proposals for refining 
the nature of the relationship between our fully informed selves and our real 
selves, and disputes concerning the appropriate modal semantics (usually cashed 
out in terms of possible worlds).23  Without pursuing these subtleties, however, I 
think it is possible to make three general observations.  Firstly, appeals to ideal 
advisors and the like undermine the prima facie attractions of DBR.  If my 
reasons for action are given by the mental states of a fully informed version of 
myself in another possible world, then the straightforward link between reasons 
and motivation that DBR appears to provide is lost.24  Furthermore, the intuitive 
connection between the satisfaction of desires and autonomous action is also lost.  
For it is unclear, at best, how my autonomy could consist in acting for reasons 
grounded in another version of myself with quite different beliefs and desires and 
located in another possible world.  Secondly, there are serious epistemological 
difficulties.  I have no idea what a fully informed version of myself would desire 
for me, or advise me to do, if not what I would desire for myself after careful 
deliberation.  Again, this is problematic if DBR is supposed to explain 
motivation. Third, if these refinements preserve the letter of DBR, they do not 
preserve its spirit.  For each refinement is in the direction of an objective theory 
of reasons.  Unless one is persuaded that desires are necessary for motivation, I 
suggest it is better to bite the bullet and acknowledge that the reason to invoke 
fully informed selves and the like is to take into account what we have most 
objective reason to do. 
 
In conclusion, the primary reason to endorse DBR is the thought that desires are 
necessary for motivation and that this is the only naturalistically acceptable 
explanation for the phenomenon of normative force.  I have argued, however, 
that there is no compelling reason to think that desires are necessary for 
motivation.  Moreover, I have argued that DBR saddles us with an unattractive 
anti-rationalism with respect to ends, which is inconsistent with our evaluative                                                         
23 For a recent example, see Baber (2010). 
24 There is also the formidable task of providing a naturalistic account of modal facts.  For some 
of the difficulties involved, and an extended argument that naturalism is unable to explain our 
knowledge of modal properties, see Rea (2002: Ch. 4).  
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practices.  Refinements of DBR to accommodate this tend only to undermine the 
view’s supposed prima facie attractions.  But, if reasons are not grounded in 
desires, it might be asked, what grounds their normative force.  I made an initial 
attempt to answer this question at the end of chapter six when I considered the 
meaning or value of a life as a whole.  In the next and final chapter, I shall try a 
different tack as I also look at questions concerning the epistemology of 
normative properties. 
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Chapter Nine 
Normativity, Queerness and the Emotions 
 
I would like to conclude the dissertation by arguing for a central role for the 
emotions in moral epistemology.  In the last chapter, I argued that the normative 
force of reasons need not and should not be explained in terms of desires.  In this 
chapter, I would like to show that the emotions explain how acquiring normative 
knowledge is reliably, but not necessarily or internally, related to being 
motivated to act.  I also argue that emotional experience provides us with a 
defeasible warrant for normative knowledge.  I frame my discussion in relation 
to J. L. Mackie’s (1977) influential argument from queerness.   
 
9.1 Mackie’s Argument from Queerness 
 
Norms have two essential qualities.  They are standards against which actions, 
dispositions of mind and character, states of affairs and so forth can be measured.  
However, norms also govern our behaviour, make claims on us, bind us and 
serve as reasons for action with motivational force.  It is all very well to grasp the 
fact that the telos of some practice or activity serves as a normative standard 
against which the excellence of an action can be measured, or that the necessary 
preconditions for engaging in some practice or activity ground our obligations.  
However, it is not until one has also grasped the force of a norm as something to 
be acted upon that one can be said to possess normative knowledge in the full 
sense relevant to practical reason. 
 
Consider J. L. Mackie’s well-known argument from queerness, which he 
summarises as follows: 
 
If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities of a 
very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe.  
Correspondingly, if we were aware of them, it would have to be by some 
special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our 
ordinary ways of knowing everything else. (1977: 38) 
 
Mackie thinks that the queerness of objective values and the queerness of any 
putative faculty of moral intuition – the metaphysical and epistemological 
strands of the argument from queerness respectively – follow from the kinds of 
facts about normativity just mentioned.  In Mackie’s words, objective value 
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would have to be ‘such that knowledge of it provides the knower with both a 
direction and an overriding motive; something’s being good both tells the person 
who knows this to pursue it and makes him pursue it’ (1977: 40).  Such an 
account of objective value is dramatically exemplified by Plato’s Form of the 
Good.  How then does the queerness of objective value follow from the now 
familiar thought that a norm is a standard which binds? 
 
Although Mackie does not distinguish them, we can reconstruct his argument in 
terms of two premises.  First, Mackie seems to assume the truth of motivational 
internalism.  Knowledge of the good, he tells us, provides an ‘overriding motive’ 
such that the knower pursues it.1  Second, he assumes that motivational 
internalism is true in virtue of some property of objective goodness.  I do not 
think that we should accept either premise.  As I have argued in chapter six and 
elsewhere, we can make sense of the idea of a person recognising that something 
is good and not being in the least motivated to pursue it.  This is quite clearly 
true for the functional goodness of artefacts.  But it also true for a flourishing life 
as a whole.  Certainly, someone who knows the good he ought to do and doesn't 
do it, sins in the sense that he is practically irrational.  If, however, we build full 
rationality into our account of internalism, then internalism is trivially true.  For, 
among other things, rationality is a matter of responsiveness to reasons. 
 
Questions of internalism aside, it does seem clear that there is a reliable and non-
accidental connection between recognising a reason for action and acting in 
accordance with that reason. What I should like to focus on, then, is the second 
premise.  For motivational internalism to be true, Mackie takes it that objective 
value would need to have ‘to-be-pursuedness somehow built into it’ (1977: 40).  
It is this property of to-be-pursuedness which appears to makes objective values 
queer.2  The property of to-be-pursuedness is likely to seem especially queer if                                                         
1 Earlier, Mackie writes that ‘just knowing them or “seeing” them will not merely tell men what 
to do but will ensure that they do it, overruling any contrary inclinations’ (1977: 23).  Here at 
least Mackie appears to be defending an implausibly strong version of internalism according to 
which the connection between grasping a norm and being motivated to act in accordance with 
that norm is non-defeasible.   
2 The tension between moral objectivity and the property of to-be-pursuedness that Mackie 
highlights is similar to Michael Smith’s (1994) ‘moral problem’ generated by the tension 
between moral realism and motivational internalism in the light of neo-Humean moral 
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one takes science to be the ultimate arbiter of ontology.  For it might seem 
unlikely that to-be-pursuedness would feature alongside properties such as mass 
and charge in a hypothetically completed physics of the future.3  It is this 
implausibility that explains the force of the metaphysical strand of the argument 
from queerness. 
 
In fact, the two strands of his argument, metaphysical and epistemological, are 
interdependent.  The idea that to-be-pursuedness must be built into objective 
values underpins the epistemological strand of the argument.  Mackie elaborates 
as follows: 
 
When we ask the awkward question, how we can be aware of this 
authoritative prescriptivity, of the truth of these distinctively ethical 
premises or of the cogency of this distinctively ethical pattern of reasoning, 
none of our ordinary accounts of sense perception or the framing and 
confirming of explanatory hypotheses or inference or logical construction or 
conceptual analysis, or any construction of these, will provide a satisfactory 
answer. (1977: 39) 
 
It is difficult to be entirely certain how to interpret this without a clear account of 
‘our ordinary accounts of sense perception’.  However, it seems likely that 
Mackie means accounts in terms of the causal interaction between an animal and 
its environment.  The various patterns of reasoning he mentions then operate 
upon the contents of perceptual experience.  The problem, then, is that the 
property of to-be-pursuedness does not seem to be the sort of property which we 
can causally interact with (which explains the thought that to-be-pursuedness is 
unlikely to appear in a final scientific ontology, science concerning itself with 
causal and constitutive relations).  We might say, in a Sellarsian idiom, that to-
be-pursuedness is within the space of reasons, not a property causally impinging 
on that space.  Given that to-be-pursuedness is not a property with which we can 
enter into causal relationships, it is hard to see how we could perceive it.4  We                                                         
psychology.  This is, Smith claims, ‘the central organizing problem in contemporary meta-ethics’ 
(1994: 11). 
3 This is the structure of Mackie’s argument, but as I observed in chapter two, who are we to 
speculate concerning the contents of a hypothetically completed physics of the future?  
Naturalists should not rule out the existence of particular properties on a priori grounds. 
4 The argument has the same formal structure as the standard epistemological argument against 
Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics (see, e.g., Benacerraf 1973).  Mackie’s ‘error theory’ 
finds its mathematical parallel in Field’s mathematical fictionalism (see, e.g. Field 1989). 
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might think that we can derive the idea of to-be-pursuedness from the contents of 
perceptual experience by way of the operations of reason, perhaps akin to the 
Lockean method of acquiring mathematical knowledge.  However, we have 
already encountered some of the difficulties involved in this approach in chapter 
one when we studied Hume on ‘is’ and ‘ought’. 
 
In any case, there is a way in which we can undercut this whole line of argument.  
I observed earlier that Mackie believes that motivational internalism must be 
grounded in and explained by recognition of the property of to-be-pursuedness 
somehow built into objective value in the world.  However, this does not 
immediately follow.  For it might be that the motivational force of normative 
structures in the world is grounded in facts about the perception or sensibility of 
moral agents.  It might be, for example, that the faculty of moral perception is 
such that moral agents are reliably and non-accidentally motivated by normative 
facts when they perceive them.  In this case we would have no need to appeal to 
a further property of to-be-pursuedness located in the world.  So, as a crude first 
pass, the normative facts are in the world, but the to-be-pursuedness is in the 
head.   
 
This alternative might not appear live for the moral realist who Mackie is 
concerned to criticise, because it might seem to relocate an essential feature of 
normativity away from the objective world and into subjective consciousness.  It 
might be objected, therefore, that a moral realist is committed to the view that 
norms and, hence, normative force is mind-independent, and that if normative 
force is mind-independent then the facts which explain an agent’s motivation 
must be found in the external world.  However, this line of criticism trades on an 
ambiguity concerning what it is to ‘explain’ an agent’s motivation.  As we saw in 
chapter four, an explanation might focus either on what it is that causes a moral 
agent to be motivated by his perception of some normative property, or what it is 
that justifies him being thus motivated.  Causes and justification can coincide, 
but they are logically distinct.  Moral realism of the sort I have been developing 
involves the claim that there are objective good-making and right-making 
properties in the world, and that these properties are such that moral agents are 
subject to their normative force.  Moreover, rational moral agents will be reliably 
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and non-accidentally motivated when they recognise these normative properties.  
However, the cause of their motivation need not be some mind-independent 
property of to-be-pursuedness.  The facts that provide the causal explanation of 
why they are motivated might well be facts about their faculty of moral 
sensibility.  Indeed, this is just the view I shall be arguing for in this chapter.    
 
Moral realism does, however, demand that the justification for moral agents 
being motivated by moral reasons lies in the domain of mind-independent 
normative facts.  Thus, we must explain, in the latter sense, the fact that a moral 
agent is appropriately motivated in terms of the good-makers and right-makers in 
the external, mind-independent world.  However, there is no need to appeal to 
some further queer property in the world, a property of to-be-pursuedness 
beyond the various good-makers and right-makers, in order to explain this.  
Indeed, such an appeal would be independently implausible.  It is not as if the 
difference in motivational state between Uday, who sees some state of affairs in 
the world as making moral demands on him, and John, who fails to see that the 
very same state of affairs makes moral demands on him, is to be explained by the 
fact that Uday causally interacts with the property of to-be-pursuedness shining 
over a state of affairs like the star of Bethlehem, whereas John does not.  Rather 
the difference in motivational state is explained by the relevant differences in 
their respective moral sensibilities.  To repeat, however, it does not follow from 
this that the facts which justify Uday are mind-dependent facts of the sort to 
trouble a moral realist.   
 
To sum up this section of the discussion, in order to counter the force of 
Mackie’s argument from queerness it would be sufficient to show that moral 
sensibility has an intrinsically motivational aspect.  We could then make sense of 
the idea that moral agents are justified in being motivated due to the normative 
facts located firmly in a mind-independent world, whilst what makes it the case 
that appropriately rational agents will be motivated appropriately are facts about 
their cognitive capacities.  On this view, there is no need to make an appeal to 
metaphysically queer properties built into the fabric of the world.  However, it 
remains to be shown that we do in fact possess an appropriately structured 
faculty of moral perception, and that this faculty is not queer.  
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My view is that we do indeed have just such a faculty of moral perception in the 
form of emotional experience.  The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to 
defending and elucidating this claim.  A reasonably detailed account of the 
emotions, and more particularly the so-called ‘secondary emotions’, as our 
faculty of moral sensibility should dispel the impression of queerness.5  In part 
this is an empirical claim, and I shall draw on empirical evidence where relevant.  
However, any such account must be sensitive to the normative phenomena.  It 
needs to be shown not only that we do in fact employ the emotions in moral 
judgement and perception, but also that the emotions are well suited to pick up 
on normative facts in the world.  Thus, the causal explanation should not 
undermine the justificatory explanation.  I do not pretend to offer anything like a 
general theory of the emotions, but I shall discuss some of their most important 
features and argue that these features make emotions cognitive capacities well-
suited to detect norms in the world.  In particular, I shall argue that emotional 
experience can be intentional, evaluative and evaluable. 
 
9.2 Moral Cognition and the Brain 
 
At one level, the question of how we go about forming moral judgements is an 
empirical question; and the empirical evidence strongly supports the thesis that 
the emotions play a key role.  Our ability to reason morally and prudentially, 
according to social rules, norms and conventions, depends on the proper 
functioning of the brain’s prefrontal cortices and, in particular, the ventromedial 
and posterior cingulate regions.6  In particular, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(VMPFC – an evolutionarily modern part of the brain located behind the bridge 
of the nose) appears to be the area of the brain primarily responsible for various 
‘secondary’ emotions that play a significant role in moral cognition.7  This 
suggests that our ability to engage in moral reasoning and judgement depends 
upon our ability to exercise certain emotional capacities.    
 
                                                        
5 I discuss the distinction between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ emotions in section 9.4 below. 
6 For a clear overview of the evidence see Greene and Haidt (2002). 
7 These are the so-called ‘secondary’ emotions.  I discuss the distinction between primary and 
secondary emotions below. 
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Much of the evidence for this claim comes from the work of the neuroscientist 
Antonio Damasio and his research group (e.g. Saver and Damasio 1991, 
Damasio 1994).  Damasio describes the now famous case of a patient called 
‘Elliot’, also referred to as ‘EVR’.8  Following surgery on a brain tumour, Elliot 
suffered a lesion to his VMPFC.  Elliot’s personal and social life promptly 
started to disintegrate as he lost his job and family due to increasingly 
unreasonable behaviour.  He was no longer able to guard his own interests or to 
respond appropriately in social situations.9  Remarkably, however, he showed no 
decline in cognitive function as measured by the standard psychological tests.  
His IQ, short- and long-term memory, production and comprehension of 
language, powers of facial discrimination, grasp of logical inference and various 
other cognitive capacities were average or, more often, above average.10  His 
emotional capacity, however, was severely affected, as Elliot was himself aware.  
Damasio describes the change as follows: 
 
Elliot was far more mellow in his emotional display than he had been before 
his illness.  He seemed to approach life on the same neutral note.  I never 
saw a tinge of emotion in my many hours of conversation with him: no 
sadness, no impatience, no frustration with my incessant and repetitious 
questioning.  I learned that his behaviour was the same in his own daily 
environment.  He tended not to display anger, and, on the rare occasion 
when he did, the outburst was swift; in no time he would be his usual self, 
calm and without grudges. (1994: 45) 
 
Despite his emotional indifference and poor social behaviour, Elliot retained his 
theoretical knowledge of moral, prudential and social principles.  Faced with 
moral and prudential reasoning tests, Elliot’s performance was average or 
superior. This was in sharp contrast to his real-life performance, which was, as 
Damasio comments, ‘a catalogue of violations in the domains covered by the 
problems’ (1994: 46).  Elliot’s erratic behaviour was not due to any loss of 
knowledge, either of normative or non-normative facts.  In other words, he knew 
the better and did the worse.  The likely conclusion, then, is that damage to 
Elliot’s VMPFC damaged his emotional responsiveness to moral and prudential                                                         
8 The classic case is that of Phineas Gage (1823–1860) whose prefrontal cortices were destroyed 
by a tamping iron passing through his skull following an explosion.  By all available accounts 
Gage’s acquired sociopathy was similar to Elliot’s (see A. Damasio 1994: Ch. 1–2; H. Damasio 
et al. 1994). 
9 For a detailed clinical report of Elliot’s behaviour see Eslinger and Damasio (1985).  
10 See Saver and Damasio (1991). 
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norms, which in turn undermined his motivation to act appropriately.  The causal 
link between his recognition of the to-be-pursuedness of a norm and his 
motivation to actually pursue it was severed along with his emotional 
responsiveness.  The fact that he remained subject to norms, and his knowledge 
of that fact, remained in tact.   
 
Damasio’s original study of Elliot has been extended to twelve other patients 
with similar prefrontal damage, all of whom show the same combination of poor 
decision making, flat emotional response and lack of impairment in terms of 
general cognitive function (Damasio 1994: 53–4).  Numerous other studies back 
up these findings.11  Thus, Anderson et al. note:  
 
It is well established that in adults who have had normal development of 
social behaviour, damage to certain sectors of prefrontal cortex produces a 
severe impairment of decision-making and disrupts social behaviour, 
although the patients so affected preserve intellectual abilities and maintain 
factual knowledge of social conventions and moral rules. (1999: 1032)12 
 
This is all part of a growing body of empirical evidence supporting the thesis that 
there is an intimate connection between moral judgement and the emotions.13 
 
9.3 Emotion and Feeling 
 
So, the empirical evidence cited above strongly suggests a connection between 
the emotions and our faculty of moral sensibility.  Nevertheless, it is far from 
clear what, if anything, this entails in terms of the moral realism/anti-realism 
debate.  One promising consideration is that emotions have a motivational 
dimension, or, as psychologists describe it, ‘action tendencies’.  Emotions 
involve, as William James maintained, ‘an urge to vigorous action’ (cited in 
Solomon 2007: 76), which distinguishes them from cold rational calculation.   
However, considerable work is still required to show that an emotional basis for                                                         
11 See, for example, Price et al. (1990), Grattan and Eslinger (1992), Bechara et al. (1996), 
Anderson et al. (1999) and Ciaramelli et al. 2007. 
12 Anderson’s study goes on to provide evidence that damage to the VMPFC in infancy severely 
impairs the acquisition of moral knowledge, apparently by dramatically reducing responsiveness 
to punishment.  This can lead to extreme forms of anti-social behaviour, which is rare in cases of 
acquired sociopathy such as Elliot’s. 
13 For functional magnetic imagining (fMRI) studies showing that the regions of the brain 
associated with the emotions are active during moral decision-making see Greene et al. (2001), 
Moll et al. (2002) and Greene et al. (2004). 
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moral sensibility can be used to support moral realism against the accusation of 
epistemological queerness.  Indeed, it might seem to suggest the reverse.  If 
moral sensibility depends on the emotions and the emotions are non-rational 
feelings ill suited to respond to objective normative facts in the world, this would 
bolster the case for non-cognitivism or an error theory of morality.  Non-
cognitivism would find support from the idea that moral judgements are 
expressions of emotional preferences without cognitive content.  An error 
theorist might argue that although moral judgements purport to express truths, 
they are in fact a product of the emotions which function other than to depict the 
world as it is and so systematically falsify the nature of reality.  For instance, 
Richard Joyce defends the latter view at (2006: 123–33).14  If, on the other hand, 
the emotions have the right properties to function as a faculty of moral 
sensibility, then we have the promise of a secure account of moral epistemology. 
 
In order to adjudicate between these competing views, we need a better 
understanding of what an emotion is.  The dominant trend in twentieth century 
psychology was to identify emotions with feelings or unintelligent sensations.  In 
part this was due to a relative lack of interest in the emotions on the part of 
philosophers, leaving psychologists, and later neuroscientists, to measure what 
was measurable within a laboratory setting.  Thus, the standard scientific view of 
emotions concentrates on short-term physiological responses, in particular 
disturbances to the neurological-hormonal-muscular core: facial expression, 
musculoskeletal responses, effects on the endocrine system and consequent 
variation in hormone levels, and activation of the autonomic nervous system.15    
 
Feeling theories of the emotions have also received some philosophical defence, 
classically from William James (1884) and more recently from Jesse Prinz 
(2004; 2005).  James states his thesis as follows:                                                         
14 See also Joshua Greene, who writes: ‘we believe in moral realism because moral experience 
has a perceptual phenomenology, and moral experience has a perceptual phenomenology because 
natural selection has outfitted us with mechanisms for making intuitive, emotion-based 
judgements, much as it has outfitted us with mechanisms for making intuitive, emotion-based 
judgements about who among us are the most suitable mates.  Therefore, we can understand our 
inclination towards moral realism not as an insight into the nature of moral truth, but as a by-
product of the efficient cognitive processes we use to make moral decisions.’ (2003: 849) 
15 See, for example, Griffiths 1997. 
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The bodily changes follow directly the PERCEPTION of the exciting fact, and 
that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion. (1884: 
189–90) 
 
On this view, an emotion just is the perception of bodily disturbance.  James’ 
argument is that while a feeling can be accompanied by a judgement or an 
‘emotional idea’ (1884: 196), the two are distinct and it is the feeling that we 
properly refer to as an ‘emotion’.  Thus, he writes: 
 
If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our 
consciousness of it all the feelings of its characteristic bodily symptoms, we 
find we have nothing left behind, no “mind-stuff” out of which the emotion 
can be constituted, and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception 
is all that remains (1884: 193) 
 
Again: 
 
What kind of an emotion of fear would be left, if the feelings neither of 
quickened heart-beats nor of shallow breathing, neither of trembling lips nor 
of weakened limbs, neither of goose-flesh nor of visceral stirrings, were 
present, it is quite impossible to think.  (1884: 193–4) 
 
On James’ view, then, a judgement without an accompanying awareness of 
physiological responsiveness to the environment is just a judgement, rather than 
an emotional episode.  We are left with a mental state ‘purely cognitive in form, 
pale, colourless, destitute of emotional warmth’ (1884: 190).  What is distinctive 
of the emotions is the way they feel. 
 
Although James’ thought experiment strongly suggest that emotions are 
intimately connected with feelings, at least for beings like us, this much is fully 
consistent with the thesis advanced here that moral sensibility involves the 
emotions which have an intrinsically motivational dimension.  Feelings can be 
crudely classified into the pleasurable and the painful, and it is little more than a 
truism to note that we are generally motivated to seek pleasure and to avoid pain.  
This is so regardless of whether pleasure and pain are our two sovereign masters.  
The visceral reaction to the perception of an actual state of affairs, or an 
imagined state of affairs, is crucial to our action tendencies and, thus, feelings are 
not merely incidental to our moral psychology.   
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However, James’ claim is stronger than this.  The argument is intended to show 
that a judgement without an accompanying awareness of physiological 
disturbance would not count as an emotion at all.  This is certainly not an a priori 
truth.  In thought at least, sensations can be detached from the underlying 
emotional state.  It is possible to imagine a different sort of creature, or perhaps a 
suitably modified or impaired human, who could be angry without the 
physiological manifestations or sensations.  Another putative counterexample is 
the wrathful Jehovah of the Old Testament as traditionally conceived.  In fact, 
James himself recognises this point, writing: 
 
I do not say that it is a contradiction in the nature of things, or that pure spirits 
are necessarily condemned to cold intellectual lives; but I say that for us, 
emotion disassociated from all bodily feeling is inconceivable. (1884: 194) 
 
However, there is no need here to resort to controversial thought experiments or 
the psychology of supernatural beings.  In quite ordinary cases, it is clear that 
certain emotions remains with us long after the violent neurological-hormonal-
muscular sensations and the concomitant desire to act die down.  Emotions can 
come in short fiery bursts, but they can also be long-lived, such as the enduring 
love of a mother for her child or a man for his wife.  Of course, there remains 
some characteristic activity of the nervous system, but, then, the same is 
presumably true of any mental state.  It is implausible, however, to claim that a 
mother only loves her child when she is conscious of certain accompanying 
feelings.  Minimally, this suggests that there is a distinction to be drawn between 
Jamesian emotional episodes and our common understanding of the emotions.   
 
There are a number of other reasons for supposing that the Jamesian view of the 
emotions is incomplete.  For example, neither the content of an emotion nor its 
intentional object is typically a sensation.  When I am angry, I am not angry 
about changes in my hormonal balance and the like, but some state of affairs in 
the world.  Moreover, to be the subject of someone else’s anger is a matter of 
concern to us in a way that their physiological states are not.  I shall mark out 
this distinction later in the discussion by referring to ‘emotional experience’, and 
outlining in greater detail some of the ways in which emotional experience 
transcends mere feelings.  I contend, then, that there is a close, though 
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contingent, relationship between emotion and feeling.  Although we should reject 
James’ view that an emotion just is a feeling caused be a physiological response 
to some stimulus, we should also acknowledge the pleasurable or painful feelings 
associated with emotional experience.  In the following section, I would like to 
consider how emotions are more than mere feelings. 
 
9.4 Emotional Experience and Intentionality 
 
To make matters vivid, and lend the discussion a focal point, let us consider an 
example of emotional experience described by Peter Goldie: 
 
Imagine you are in a zoo, looking at a gorilla grimly loping from left to right 
in its cage.  You are thinking of the gorilla as dangerous, but you do not feel 
fear, as it seems to be safely behind bars.  Then you see that the door to the 
cage has been left wide open.  Just for a moment, though, you fail to put the 
two thoughts – the gorilla is dangerous, the cage is open – together.  Then, 
suddenly, you do put them together: now your way of thinking of the gorilla 
as dangerous is new; now it is dangerous in an emotionally relevant way for 
you.  The earlier thought, naturally expressed as ‘That gorilla is dangerous’, 
differs in content from the new thought, although this new thought, thought 
with emotional feeling, might also be naturally expressed in the same words.  
Now in feeling fear towards the gorilla you are emotionally engaged with the 
world, and, typically, you are poised for action in a new way – poised for 
action out of the emotion. (2000: 61) 
 
Perhaps the first point to notice in this sort of case is that the emotional 
experience is not a blind sensation.  Rather it is intentional in the sense that the 
emotion is directed towards or about the gorilla.  Indeed, the intentional nature of 
the emotions is commonly remarked on, and the thought can be traced back to 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric.16  To my knowledge, Anthony Kenny (1963) was the first 
philosopher in the analytic tradition to emphasise the intentional nature of the 
emotions.  Indeed, he argued that emotions are defined by their intentional 
objects and, so, necessarily intentional.  For instance, Kenny argued, an 
emotional attitude counts as fear because it takes something dangerous or fearful 
as its formal object.17  Whether or not we endorse Kenny’s strong claim that 
emotions are necessarily intentional states, however, it has seemed clear to many 
philosophers that emotions can be intentional states. The main alternative to an                                                         
16 See, for example, his discussion of anger (1379a–1379b). 
17 Solomon also argues that emotions are necessarily intentional: ‘no feeling and no physiological 
response even counts as emotional unless it has the property of intentionality’ (2007: 205).  See 
also Sartre (1962: 57). 
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intentional view of emotional experience is a bare Jamesian view which we have 
already rejected.  
 
Following from the thought that emotions have intentional content, we might 
notice that in emotional experience we take the world to be a certain way.  
Emotional experience purports to attune us to the world and focus our attention 
on its salient features.  To be fearful of a gorilla is, in part, to take it that the 
gorilla is dangerous.  In this sense, an emotion is more akin to a belief than a 
desire.  In Anscombe’s terms, emotional experience has a mind-to-world 
direction of fit.  Consequently, there is something that it is for emotions to be 
appropriate or fitting and this depends on how the world is.  Emotional 
experience depicts the world in a certain way, and gets it right when the world is 
as depicted in emotional experience. To be fearful of an escaped gorilla may be 
appropriate.  To be fearful of a gorilla inside a secure cage is a mistake. 
 
Emotional experience can get things right in another way.  Whereas a belief gets 
things right when its propositional content is true, emotional experience can also 
be evaluated in terms of its phenomenal intensity.  If I am right that emotional 
experience sometimes serves as the vehicle for normative judgments, this reflects 
the fact that value comes in degrees.  So, sometimes our emotional experience 
has the appropriate direction, but not the appropriate intensity.  It would be 
difficult to make sense of someone both expressing a high degree of moral 
indignation and simultaneously accepting that no great wrong has occurred.  The 
recognition that the emotional response is out of proportion to the offence may in 
itself calm the emotional response.  But it should at least prompt recognition that 
the emotional response is irrational or inappropriate.    Alternatively it might lead 
to post hoc rationalisations or confabulations in order to avoid cognitive 
dissonance; for example a search for reasons that justify the initial violence of 
the emotion.  Whilst this is irrational, it is only intelligible on the basis that 
emotional intensity is subject to rational evaluation. 
 
Not only are occurrent emotions subject to rational evaluation, so are emotional 
dispositions.  I discussed doxastic voluntarism in chapter six.  As I am arguing 
that emotions are belief-like in some respects, we might expect that the broad 
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outlines of that discussion will also apply here.  And, indeed, that is the case.  
Generally speaking, our emotions are not states that happen to us or with which 
we are afflicted.  Although we are occasionally overcome by emotion, this is the 
exception rather than the rule.  Moreover, whether we are overcome in the 
moment normally depends on our background beliefs and dispositions.  As with 
beliefs, we can cultivate our emotional dispositions directly or indirectly.  We 
can realise that we are too quick to anger, and learn to count to ten or redirect our 
attention.  We can make efforts to sympathetically imagine the situations of 
others.  By listening to people, we can learn to respond appropriately to morally 
salient facts that we might not recognise from our own perspective.  We are also 
inveterately story-telling beings and we learn from each other’s tales of everyday 
life and of make-believe.  Sometimes, we refine our emotional dispositions by 
paying attention to subtle moral distinctions in plays, novels, films and other 
narrative arts.  All of this tends to produce virtuous emotional dispositions.18 
 
On the other hand, we can cultivate emotional experience in a way that does not 
reflect normative reality.  For instance, Arlie Hochschild (1983) describes self-
induced emotions in airline stewardesses who are expected to cultivate a general 
disposition of cheerfulness even when it is not the emotional response most 
appropriate to the situation.19  They might have followed William James’ advice: 
 
Smooth the brow, brighten the eye, contract the dorsal rather than the 
ventral aspect of the frame, and speak in a major key, pass the genial 
compliment and you heart must be frigid indeed if it does not gradually 
thaw.  (1884: 198) 
 
More crudely, we can ply ourselves with excessive alcohol, or listen to stirring 
music, in order to intensify feelings of joyfulness, bravery or melancholy.  Partly 
because emotional experience has a felt dimension, the cultivation of intense 
emotions can be pleasurable.  On the other hand, we can become addicted to the 
felt aspects of emotional experience and that can be a severe harm.  From the 
point of view of normative epistemology, however, manipulating one’s 
                                                        
18 See Brady (2010: 117f.) for various other ways in which we pay ‘virtuous attention to our 
emotional systems’. 
19 See also Solomon (2007: 197–8). 
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emotional states in such a way that they become less reliable guides to normative 
reality is always a vice. 
 
So, I suggest that the content and intensity of emotional experience can be 
rationally evaluated in terms of their fittingness to the world and that we are 
subject to evaluation on the basis of the emotional dispositions we cultivate. I 
would now like to argue that in emotional experience the world is disclosed to us 
in a new way.  In particular, emotional experience is a mode of representation 
that reveals normative properties as salient.  Thus, in the course of his 
phenomenological enquiry, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions, Sartre calls an 
emotion ‘a transformation of the world’ (1962: 63).  In an attractive, but rather 
opaque phrase, he also talks about an emotion as ‘a sudden fall of consciousness 
into magic’ (1962: 90).  Expanding on the metaphor of magic he writes: 
 
We have seen how, during an emotion, the consciousness abases itself and 
abruptly transmutes the determinist world in which we live, into a magical 
world.  But, conversely, sometimes it is this world that reveals itself to 
consciousness as magical just where we expect it to be deterministic.  It 
must not, indeed, be supposed that magic is an ephemeral quality that we 
impose upon the world according to our humour.  There is an existential 
structure of the world which is magical.  (1962: 84) 
 
Although the idea is not precise, Sartre’s idea of magic seems to be as sort of 
post-Weberian re-enchantment of the world that makes some courses of action, 
but not others, appear possible.  He largely focuses on cases in which we project 
our emotions on to the world in order to excuse ourselves from acting and to 
reduce cognitive dissonance.20  As these are mere projections of magic, Sartre 
seems for the most part to endorse something like an error theory of the 
intentional content of emotions.  So, it is far from clear that he is entitled to say, 
as he does in the above quotation, that the world reveals itself as magical or that 
it has a magical existential structure.21  Regardless of whether Sartre was 
consistent, however, the above quotation suggests an attractive account of the 
emotions as modes of representation, like perceptions, with intentional content, 
that are distinct from scientific (deterministic) representations and reveal the                                                         
20 See, for example, Sartre’s discussion of the girl who breaks down in emotion because she 
cannot face the prospect of caring for her sick father (1962: 31f.). 
21 Weberman (1998: 396) also presses this line of objection. 
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world as having particular ‘magical’ properties that are significant for action 
(have normative force). 
 
I think this view of the emotions is approximately correct, although I do not think 
that we need to follow Sartre in thinking that value in the world is magical.  In 
fact, I have already provided a non-magical account of normative properties in 
chapter six.  Nevertheless, I think it is right that in emotional experience, we 
have a quasi-perceptual understanding of the world as charged with normative 
force and significance.  I shall return to this idea.  First, though, I want to make 
clear that I am not attempting to provide an analysis of emotional experience.  
The aspects of emotional experience with which I am particularly concerned do 
not characterise all emotions.  For, emotions are a heterogeneous kind and there 
are a number of clear counterexamples to my central claims that emotional 
experience is intentional, subject to rational evaluation, evaluative and analogous 
to perception.22  These exceptions fall into two categories and help us to refine 
our view. 
 
The first exceptions are primary emotions, including certain primitive forms of 
anger, fear and disgust.  Primary emotions are pre-cognitive, more or less hard-
wired responses to environmental stimuli.  In this sense they are like the startle 
response.  They are pan-cultural and also present in many other animals.23  So, 
we can sometimes speak of a person being angry in much the same way that a cat 
is angry.   Whereas a cat raises its hackles and flashes its tail, a person turns red 
and grimaces to bare his teeth.  In both cases, they are signalling that they are 
prepared to fight and the bodily manifestations of the emotion prime them to do 
so.  From a physical perspective, primary emotions are correlated with activity in 
the amygdala, part of the evolutionarily old limbic system.24  By contrast, 
secondary emotions arise from an interaction between the limbic system and the 
                                                        
22 Paul Griffiths (1997: Ch. 9) argues that there is little explanatory power and no theoretical 
unity to the category of emotions, and that consequently, the term ‘emotion’ does not pick out a 
natural kind and should be eliminated from theoretical discourse. 
23 See Ekman (1992) for evidence of the pan-cultural nature of primary emotions. 
24 For detail on the role of the amygdala on moral and social behaviour, see Adoplhs (1999). See 
also Greene and Haidt (2002: 522). 
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prefrontal cortices.25  Whereas the neural substrate of primary emotions is 
entirely in the subcortex, the secondary emotions involve the subcortex and 
neocortex working together.26  Although all emotions recruit and depend on the 
feelings which constitute primary emotions, the sort of emotional experience I 
am interested in here involves the combination of Jamesian feeling and 
representational content that is typical of the secondary emotions.27  Goldie 
captures something of this combination with his description of emotions as 
‘feeling towards’ or, equivalently, ‘thinking of with feeling’ (2000: 58).  Notice 
also, that the secondary emotions can be used to evaluate the primary emotions 
and other secondary emotions.  So, I can be proud of my courage or ashamed of 
my lack of empathy.  I can also be frightened of my fear, which shows that some 
emotions come in primary and secondary forms.  The fear I am frightened of 
might be a primary emotion, whereas the fright I feel of my fear is a secondary 
emotion because it has intentional content.  This tends to confirm the idea that 
secondary emotions are evaluative. 
 
Very generalised emotions, such as moods, form another category of emotions 
that do not seem to be intentional.  Thus, in arguing against cognitive account of 
the emotions, Paul Griffiths (1997: 28) objects that emotions such as depression, 
elation and anxiety do not have a clear object.  Sartre anticipates this sort of 
objection and responds as follows:  
 
Even if it is a case of one of those indefinite anxieties that one feels in the 
dark in a sinister and deserted passage, etc., it is still of certain aspects of the 
night, or of the world, that one is afraid.  (1962: 57) 
 
Perhaps Sartre is right that emotional states such as angst or joie de vivre are 
prompted by features of the world.  We are certainly more likely to enjoy a sense 
of joie de vivre on a warm, bright summer’s than on a drab winter’s evening.  
However, it is not always true that the cause of an emotion figures in its 
intentional content.  For example, I might feel anxious because I have drunk too                                                         
25 For details on the distinction between primary and secondary emotions and an explanation of 
the underlying physical mechanism see Damasio (1994: 131–42). 
26 In particular, the central cingulate is known to integrate basic emotions and cognition.  See 
Panksepp (2003: 238). 
27 As Damasio writes: ‘It is the connection between an intricate cognitive content and a variation 
on a preorganized body-state profile that allows us to experience shades of remorse, 
embarrassment, Schadenfreude, vindication, and so on’ (1994: 150). 
  206 
much coffee.  It does not follow that I am anxious about the coffee.  Similarly, it 
does not follow from the fact that my anxiety is caused by ‘certain aspects of the 
night’ that I am anxious of those aspects.  Moreover, in this particular case it is 
not plausible that our ‘indefinite anxieties’ must have ‘aspects of the night’ as 
their intentional objects.  If indeed they did, they would not be so ‘indefinite’.  
For this reason, I propose to exclude existential moods and highly generalised 
emotions, as well as basic emotions, from my discussion of emotional 
experience.28 
 
9.5 Emotion and Perception 
 
Returning to our main theme, I suggested above that emotional experience is 
quasi-perceptual.  In particular, it is a forming of perceiving as.  In emotional 
experience, we perceive a gorilla as dangerous or we see an act as contemptible.  
In one way, this is just as we perceive an apparently elliptical piece of engraved 
copper as a round penny.  Our experience depends on our virtues and vices, on 
our stable dispositions of character and thought.  However, in emotional 
experience, we do not come to see the world in a new way in virtue of perceiving 
something beyond its sensible or perceptible properties.  In Goldie’s example, 
the difference between before and after putting the two thoughts together – 
gorilla dangerous, cage open – is not that one has literally seen a new property of 
the gorilla, the property of to-be-fearedness.  There is no skywriting in the new 
representation of the gorilla with the word ‘dangerous’ scrawled across the top.29  
The gorilla’s sensible properties are the same.  It is to be feared because of 
properties such as its weight, its strength and its propensity for aggression in 
certain circumstance.  These are all scientifically available, natural properties. 
 
In the quotation at the start of this section, Goldie related this new way of seeing 
the world to the issue of motivation.  As he wrote:  
                                                         
28 In fact, I am inclined towards the view that existential moods can be judgements concerning 
how one’s life is going as a whole and, so, related to the concerns about life’s meaning or value 
mooted in chapter six.  I hope to develop this idea elsewhere. 
29 This lack of representational content is the explanation I offered of Hume’s discussion of ‘is’ 
and ‘ought’.  See Millgram’s (2005: 235) comment on ‘skywriting’ that I quoted in chapter one. 
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In feeling fear towards the gorilla you are emotionally engaged with the 
world, and, typically, you are poised for action in a new way – poised for 
action out of the emotion. (2000: 61) 
 
Like zoologists, we can coolly perceive the various sensible properties in virtue 
of which a gorilla is to be feared.  However, this cool perception does not 
determine that we will fear the gorilla or that we will be motivated to act in 
virtue of the danger it poses to us.  Rather it is when we perceive the gorilla as 
dangerous in emotional experience that we are poised to act; hence, Sartre’s idea 
of transmuting ‘the determinist world in which we live, into a magical world’ 
(1962: 84).  It may seem no surprise that emotional experience tends to produce 
motivation.  For, as I commented in section 9.3 above, emotional experience has 
a felt dimension that can be pleasurable or painful.  But whilst this is evidently a 
spur to action, I think it is only a partial explanation.  More important is Goldie’s 
thought that in feeling fear we are emotionally engaged with the world.  
Consequently, we recognise normative structures in the world as salient and as 
constituting reasons for us.  Indeed, I suggest that the recognition of reasons in 
emotional experience is a significant motivating element in our moral 
psychology.  In this sense, the passions are the servants of reason.  We are 
rational to the extent that we act on the basis of reasons, and it is in emotional 
experience that reasons become salient for us in light of our practical and 
theoretical commitments. 
 
Perhaps my account of the role of the emotions in normative cognition will seem 
like grist for the mill of the anti-realist.  Indeed, as I mentioned above, Joyce 
(2006) defends on an error theory of morality partly on the basis of the 
prominent role the emotions play in moral judgement.  I anticipate the reasonable 
concern that perceiving as or seeing as, unlike perceiving or seeing, is not 
necessarily factive.  If I see a rabbit in a field, then, ceteris paribus, I know that 
that there is a rabbit in the field.  But, if I see something in a field as a rabbit, it 
does not follow, ceteris paribus, that I know there is a rabbit in the field.  I might 
well be seeing a hare or a shadow.  Of course, we can also talk about “seeing 
things as they are”.  So, perhaps it would be a mistake to read too much into 
these locutions.  Nevertheless, the concern remains that even if the world is 
represented as having particular normative properties in emotional experience, 
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the emotions are not reliable cognitive capacities.  Interestingly in light of my 
criticisms of epistemic instrumentalism in chapter five, the main reason for this 
concern might be that emotional experience is targeted at action not truth.   
 
In fact, I do think that there are good reasons to be cautious about the reliability 
of our emotions as cognitive capacities.  As we have seen, emotions function as 
action tendencies and as coping mechanisms.  Moreover, if emotions are 
intentional, we can be wrong about the object of our emotions.  As Freud 
observed, emotions can be displaced.  Similarly, emotions can spread out beyond 
their appropriate object.  For example, disappointment concerning some 
particular failure or injustice can transmogrify into depression and poison our 
view of life and people’.  Alternatively, a joyful event can cause us to view the 
world through ‘rose-tinted spectacles’.  Moreover, as I have mentioned, emotions 
can be directly manipulated for non-rational ends.   
 
In response to these sorts of worries, I would like to make three brief, initial 
points.  First, these phenomena support the claim that emotions do have an 
object, and that the relationship between emotion and object can be more or less 
appropriate.  So, even if emotional experience sometimes misrepresents the 
world, this is against the background expectation that emotional experience gets 
things right.  Second, if we accept that emotional experience represents the world 
as to-be-acted-upon, there are (contingent) evolutionary reasons to think that they 
will be reliable more often than not.  These are the same considerations 
instrumentalists adduce in favour of the idea that epistemic norms can be reduced 
to pragmatic norms.  Third, we are often able to recognise when the normative 
structure of the world is misrepresented in emotional experience.  Sometimes, as 
I have discussed, this is a matter of bringing our emotions to bear on one another.  
This is no more worrying in principle than correcting perception with perception.  
However, it also suggests an independent standard of normative appraisal – grist 
for the realist’s mill. 
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The most important point, however, is that I am not claiming that emotional 
experience constitutes the grounds for normative judgments.30  Rather, I am 
arguing that emotional experience provides a defeasible warrant for normative 
judgments and also motivates us in virtue of the way that reasons became salient 
for us.  I am happy, therefore, to allow that there is an independent standard 
against which emotional content can be evaluated.  Indeed, this is a necessary 
aspect of my overall account.  Emotional experience should be responsive to the 
kind of normative reasons I identified in terms of the right-makers and good-
makers for the contingent practices and non-contingent activities of beings like 
us.   Moreover, I do not claim that there is a necessary connection between moral 
judgment and emotional experience, or between moral motivation and emotional 
experience.  What I should like to argue, and what is necessary in order to 
address Mackie’s argument from queerness, is that moral agents have a faculty of 
moral perception in virtue of which they are reliably and non-accidentally 
motivated by normative facts when they perceive them. 
 
9.6 Conclusion 
 
Quine talks about ‘the deep old duality of thought and feeling, of the head and 
the heart, the cortex and the thalamus, the words and the music’ (1981: 55).  But 
I have argued in this chapter that the duality is not as deep as all that.  In 
normative cognition, the two pull together as the heart works in service of the 
head by drawing our attention to normatively salient facts.  When, in emotional 
experience, we perceive something as a normative reason for action that is 
defeasible evidence for the truth of the corresponding normative proposition.  
Moreover, it is an explanation of the fact that we are often motivated by 
normative considerations. 
 
Appreciating the role of the emotions in normative cognition moves us further 
along in understanding why value-makers present a problem for naturalism.  
Whilst emotional experience helps to explain both normative knowledge and 
motivation, references to the emotions are significantly absent from the context                                                         
30 Except in cases where the fact that someone is in a particular emotional state constitutes a 
reason for action. 
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of scientific justification. This is partly because emotions can distort perception 
and partly because emotional experience is not quantifiable.  More important, 
however, is the fact that the content of emotional experience depends on a 
subject’s perspective, dispositions and practical commitments.  As we saw in 
Goldie’s example of the escaped gorilla, emotional experience represents aspects 
of the world as reasons for us to act.  Thus, emotional experience is subjective in 
the sense that contrasts with science’s regulative ideal of subjectless knowledge.  
As we have also seen, however, this does not mean that the intentional content of 
emotional experience is subjective in the sense that it depends for its truth on the 
mental states of the subject.  A gorilla is dangerous because of its common or 
garden physical properties and its escape is a reason for us to act because of our 
non-contingent needs. 
 
The account of normativity I have defended in the second half of this dissertation 
might be considered naturalistic in the weak sense that it involves no eldritch 
metaphysical claims or appeals to supernatural agency.  Moreover, it is not, I 
hope, incompatible with our best science.  It is, however, incompatible with 
scientism.  The methods I have used to establish and justify this account have 
been drawn from the full range of the traditional philosophical armoury.  For 
example, a priori argument, intuition, emotional experience, phenomenological 
investigation, linguistic analysis and conceptual analysis have been brought to 
bear alongside empirical observation, deductive and inductive logic.  In fact, I 
have reached my conclusions in the standard philosophical way, by marshalling 
and reflecting on whatever sources of evidence seem relevant to understanding 
the general structure of things.   
 
I argued in chapter two that the best way to avoid a dialectical impasse between 
epistemological naturalists and the traditional mainstream in philosophy is to 
judge the respective research programmes by their fruits.  In chapters four and 
five, I identified some of the weaknesses and limitations of naturalistic 
approaches to normativity.  By contrast, I have attempted to demonstrate that by 
enlarging our repertoire of methods, we are able to develop a plausible and 
attractive account of the nature of normativity.  Thus, I have defended an account 
of what normative properties are, how we know about them and how they 
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motivate us to act.  In other words, I have defended, in broad outline, a non-
naturalistic solution to the problem of normativity. 
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